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1.1 Motivation of the thesis 
In the past few years, in particular following the financial crisis, the level of regulation 
of disclosure and corporate governance in Germany and the European Union has in-
creased substantially. Since 2005, the so-called IAS regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 
1606/2002) requires all firms listed in regulated EU stock market segments (with a few 
exceptions) to prepare consolidated accounts in accordance with IFRS. Also, the regula-
tion mandates member states to set up institutions charged with the enforcement of ac-
counting standards to ensure an even level of compliance with IFRS across member 
states. Apart from the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting and enforcement, firms 
listed in the EU-regulated market have been subject to various other regulatory 
measures pertaining to firm disclosures such as the Transparency Directive (Directive 
2004/109/EC), that mandated the publication of interim reports, and the Market Abuse 
Directive (Directive 2014/57/EU), that stipulates, among other things, the publication of 
directors’ dealings. While the mandate to publish interim reports was revoked in 2013 
(Directive 2013/50/EU), regulation of insider trading was increased and extended to 
stocks traded over-the-counter in 2014 (Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014). Other recent 
examples of the regulation of disclosures on the level of the European Union are the 
“CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) Directive” (Directive 2014/95/EU), that man-
dates the disclosure of non-financial and diversity information, and the European Union 
audit reform, that, among other things, mandates audit firm rotation (Regulation (EU) 
No. 537/2014) and introduces restrictions on non-audit services (Directive 
2014/56/EU). 
Apart from the regulation of disclosure, firms listed in the regulated EU stock market in 
Germany have faced an increasing level of regulation of corporate governance, in par-
ticular in the field of executive compensation. In 2002, the German Corporate Govern-
ance Code (‘Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex’) was first introduced and laid 
down detailed soft law requirements on corporate governance for listed firms on a 
‘comply or explain’ basis (sec. 161 Stock Corporation Act). The German Corporate 
Governance Code is revised regularly and, due to relatively low compliance rates (Von 
Werder and Talaulicar, 2009; Von Werder, 2011), various requirements have been con-
verted to hard law. Examples for such conversions are the Act on Disclosure of Execu-
tive Board Remuneration (‘Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz’ (VorstOG)) from 
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2005, that mandates listed firms to disclose compensation for each board member, and 
the Appropriate Director Compensation Act (‘Vorstandsvergütung-
Angemessenheitsgesetz’ (VorstAG)), a direct answer to the financial crisis (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2009b), that regulates the structure of the remuneration of listed firms. 
The economic literature proposes three key theories of economic regulation (Shleifer, 
2005): ‘public interest’ theory, ‘contracting’ theory, and ‘capture’ theory. The ‘public 
interest’ theory of regulation proposes that the government is able to prevent market 
failure through regulation (Pigou, 1938). According to the ‘contracting’ theory, market 
failure is, in most cases, solved by competition and private contracting (Coase, 1960). If 
these mechanisms fail to prevent market failure, private contracting can be enforced by 
courts. Consequently, only little governmental intervention is required. The ensuing 
‘capture’ theory proposes that regulation is often influenced by the interests of firms, 
and regulators are thus barely able to increase social welfare (Stigler, 1971). However, 
Shleifer (2005) proposes that regulation can be beneficial, for example if court proceed-
ings are slow or inefficient thus limiting enforcement of private contracts by courts. 
Glaeser et al. (2001) argue that in the field of stock market regulation governmental 
regulation is preferable to enforcement by courts. Leuz (2010) summarizes four argu-
ments in support of the regulation of financial reporting and disclosure. (1) Regulation 
can create positive externalities. (2) The standardization associated with the regulation 
of financial reporting and disclosure can produce market-wide cost savings. (3) While 
private contracting can only impose (potentially insufficient) monetary sanctions, regu-
lators are able to introduce stricter sanctions through public enforcement and criminal 
penalties. (4) Regulation can mitigate costs from agency conflicts that affect the econo-
my as a whole as controlling insiders choose private benefits over profitable investment 
opportunities by mandating increased disclosure. However, regulation of disclosure and 
financial reporting is limited since the optimal level of disclosure varies across firms 
and contexts. Thus, regulators are unable to mandate an optimal level of disclosure that 
is generally applicable (Leuz, 2010). Successful regulation demands for a careful con-
sideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the regulation, which can be achieved 
through evidence-based regulation (Buijink, 2006; Gassen and Günther, 2014). Buijink 
defines evidence-based regulation as “regulation […] based on peer-refereed scientific 
evidence” (p. 298). While it is to date impossible to measure total net benefits of disclo-
sure and reporting regulation, researchers can conduct studies that evaluate specific as-
pects of new regulation (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). The identification and quantification 
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of regulatory effects is useful when assessing costs and benefits of disclosure and re-
porting regulation. While the analysis of the economic effects of regulation requires the 
assessment of the intended consequences, research also needs to investigate unintended 
consequences (Brüggemann et al., 2013; Gassen and Günther, 2014; Leuz and Wysocki, 
2016).  
1.2 Context and objective of the thesis 
As established in the previous section, the level of regulation of disclosure and corpo-
rate governance on the national and supranational level has increased substantially in 
the last decade. With that in mind, and in the light of the demand for evidence-based 
financial reporting and disclosure regulation outlined in the previous section (Buijink, 
2006; Gassen and Günther, 2014; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016), this dissertation aims at 
investigating economic consequences of such regulation. In particular, this dissertation 
attempts to provide empirical evidence that helps regulators to assess intended and unin-
tended economic consequences of regulating disclosure and corporate governance. 
My dissertation comprises three studies that relate to the economic evaluation of intend-
ed and unintended consequences of specific regulatory measures in the field of the regu-
lation of disclosure and corporate governance. The first study, “Market Reactions to the 
Regulation of Executive Compensation”, investigates the market perception of the regu-
lation of corporate governance in Germany under the VorstAG, an exogenous shock to 
contractual arrangements. The study aims to infer whether investors perceive the regula-
tion of executive compensation contracts as value enhancing. The second study, “Inves-
tor Perceptions of Opting Out of the EU-Regulated Market”, exploits an exogenous 
shock to the costs for opting out of the EU-regulated market, and thus extensive regula-
tion of disclosure and corporate governance. The study aims to investigate whether in-
vestors value the bonding to the extensive disclosure requirements in the EU-regulated 
market or whether investors welcome being able to opt out of the EU-regulated market 
due to an unfavorable cost-benefit tradeoff. The final and third study of this thesis, 
“Why Do Firms Downlist? Evidence on the Costs of IFRS Compliance and Enforce-
ment”, examines determinants and consequences of firms’ downlisting decision. The 
study aims to infer whether costs of disclosure, namely IFRS compliance and enforce-
ment, drive firms away from the EU-regulated market. Figure 1.1 summarizes the ob-
jectives and structure of my thesis.  
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Figure 1.1: Objectives of the thesis 
 
Study 1: Market Reactions to the Regulation of Executive Compensation (Chapter 2) 
Regulatory interference with private contracting potentially creates value if contractual 
arrangements absent regulation are inefficient. The wide body of literature on the effi-
ciency of executive compensation contracts proposes two non-exclusive explanations, 
namely the efficient contracting approach and the managerial power or rent extraction 
view (e.g., Betrand, 2009; Frydman and Jenter, 2010). Under the efficient contracting 
approach, existing contractual arrangements are regarded as an efficient solution to mit-
igate agency problems that result as shareholders entrust managers with managing their 
firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In contrast, the managerial power or rent extraction 
view proposes that observable contracts do not represent efficient contractual outcomes, 
but serve as vehicles for powerful managers to extract inappropriate compensation 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Compensation contracts are both a part and a product of 
firm-level corporate governance choices. Given the firm-level endogeneity of govern-
ance choices, the degree of cross-sectional efficiency of compensation contracts is not 
observable. Exogenous shocks to the governance system, which shake up existing con-
tractual arrangements, therefore potentially yield revealing insights (Frydman and 




Regulation of corporate governance Regulation of disclosure
Does regulation lead to (un)intended consequences?
Market Reactions to the
Regulation of Executive 
Compensation
Why Do Firms Downlist? 




Opting Out of the EU-
Regulated Equity Market
1 32
Event study design: What is the market
perception of the regulation of
executive compensation in a hitherto
unregulated, continental European 
environment?
What are the determinants of
downlisting decisions?
What is the market perception of firms
announcing their intent to downlist?
How do these firms perform in the 
periods post downlisting?
Event study design: Do investors value
the bonding to the EU-regulated equity
market with its high level of disclosure
requirements or do the costs of the
listing in the EU-regulated market
outweigh the benefits?
European Accounting Review Working PaperWorking Paper
Introduction 
 5 
of executive pay and supervisory board liability in Germany, to glean insights into the 
market perception of the economic effects of the regulation in a continental European 
setting. The underlying premise is that any regulation receives vindication only if it can 
be expected to increase welfare. 
Study 2: Investor Perceptions of Opting Out of the EU-Regulated Equity Market (Chap-
ter 3) 
A firm’s commitment to strict reporting and disclosure requirements reduces infor-
mation asymmetry, increases liquidity, and lowers costs of capital (e.g., Botosan, 1997; 
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Bonding theory suggests that monitoring imposed on firms 
by committing to a stricter listing regime that is hard to dispense with increases firm 
value (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 2002). By voluntarily subjecting themselves 
to higher disclosure requirements and higher levels of enforcement, issuers reduce in-
formation asymmetries between managers, or majority shareholders, and minority 
shareholders. Consequently, committing to a stricter listing regime increases minority 
investor protection. As this commitment is costly, it may function as a signal of positive 
future prospects of a firm (e.g., Mittoo, 1992). A firm’s listing choice is driven by eval-
uating costs (e.g., direct costs of the listing, indirect costs that result from mandatory 
reporting requirements, and voluntary disclosure expected by investors) and benefits 
(e.g., capital raising opportunities, lower information asymmetry, and hence higher li-
quidity) of the listing status (Bharath and Dittmar, 2010; Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 
2012). Since firms continuously evaluate the costs and benefits of their listing status, a 
shift in the related costs or benefits can lead to a revision in a firm’s listing choice. The 
loss of competitiveness theory suggests that a firm’s decision to discontinue its listing in 
a stricter listing regime is likely driven by an increase in compliance costs that leads to 
an unfavorable cost-benefit tradeoff (Zingales, 2007). However, if a firm faces an unfa-
vorable cost-benefit tradeoff, but costs associated with opting out of the listing regime 
are prohibitively high, the firm may choose to remain within the current listing regime. 
Thus, a reduction in the requirements for opting out of the listing regime may lead to a 
revision in the firm’s listing choice. The second study examines equity market reactions 
to recent changes in requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated market to investi-
gate whether investors value the bonding to the high level of disclosure in the EU-
regulated market or whether they welcome being able to leave the costly EU-regulated 
market, as proposed under the loss of competitiveness theory. 
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Study 3: Why Do Firms Downlist? Evidence on the Costs of IFRS Compliance and En-
forcement (Chapter 4) 
When Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 was introduced, regulators stated that mandatory 
IFRS reporting was to “contribute to the efficient and cost-effective functioning of the 
capital market” (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, p. L243/1) and that “a proper and rig-
orous enforcement regime [was] key to underpinning investors’ confidence in financial 
markets” (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, L243/2). Indeed, numerous academic stud-
ies have documented various positive effects of the adoption of mandatory IFRS report-
ing, in particular significant positive capital market effects such as increases in liquidity 
(e.g., Brüggemann et al. 2013). Also, recent evidence by Christensen et al. (2013) finds 
that the mandated strengthening of enforcement quality likely played an important role 
in generating or facilitating the observed positive liquidity effects upon IFRS adoption 
in the EU. For Germany, Hitz et al. (2012) document significant market value discounts 
upon the disclosure of accounting errors by the two-tier enforcement mechanism that 
increase with the severity of error findings. Ernstberger et al. (2012) provide evidence 
that earnings management decreases and stock liquidity and market valuation increase 
for firms that are subject to the new enforcement regime and concurrently installed audit 
oversight procedures. In contrast to this abundant evidence of positive economic effects 
that are in line with regulators’ aims, far less is known about the costs of the IFRS regu-
lation on the firm-level and for economies as a whole. One likely reason for this lack of 
pertinent research is the scarcity of information and data on costs of IFRS compliance 
and enforcement. The third study aims to fill this gap by investigating determinants and 
consequences of firms’ decisions to leave the EU-regulated market, and thus mandatory 
IFRS reporting and the enforcement mechanism, in Germany. 
1.3 Content of the thesis 
This thesis proceeds as follows. The thesis comprises three studies on the economic 
consequences of the regulation of disclosure and corporate governance. The first study 
of this thesis investigates equity market reactions to the regulation of executive com-
pensation (Chapter 2). The second study of this thesis examines investor perceptions of 
opting out of disclosure requirements of the EU-regulated market (Chapter 3). The third 
and final study of this thesis investigates determinants and consequences of firms’ 




Study 1: Market Reactions to the Regulation of Executive Compensation (Chapter 2) 
The first study investigates equity market reactions to the regulation of executive com-
pensation by exploiting a quasi-natural experimental setting in Germany, the introduc-
tion of the VorstAG in 2009. Adoption of the VorstAG represented an exogenous shock 
to the contracting environment and therefore creates a quasi-natural experimental setting 
to investigate the economic effects of a regulatory intervention with compensation ar-
rangements. The VorstAG introduced restrictions on the amount and on the components 
of board executive compensation packages, and invoked liability for the supervisory 
board in case of inappropriate remuneration arrangements. Thus, the regulation stipulat-
ed an unprecedented interference with private compensation schemes. The study uses 
this exogenous shock to the contracting environment to infer market perceptions of the 
usefulness of the regulation. Using event study methodology, the study investigates 
market reactions for the first-time announcement of regulatory intent and for a pooled 
sample of seven events leading to the adoption of the VorstAG.  
The study provides evidence that investors do not perceive the regulation of executive 
compensation value enhancing. Rather, the study provides weak evidence of an average 
negative market reaction to the proposed regulation. Multivariate analyses reveal that 
firms which were particularly affected by the regulation because board members re-
ceived high abnormal remuneration experienced larger stock price discounts on average. 
Consistent with this, the study provides evidence of a positive relation between pay-
performance sensitivity and the equity market reaction. Thus, the market reaction was 
more negative when a firm was more affected by the regulation due to a weak link of 
pay to performance. Taken together, these findings indicate that the regulation was not 
considered beneficial from a shareholder perspective. This result is consistent with the 
market perceiving the regulation of executive compensation to impose potentially inef-
ficient contractual arrangements for some firms. 
Study 2: Investor Perceptions of Opting Out of the EU-Regulated Equity Market (Chap-
ter 3) 
The second study investigates equity market reactions to changes in requirements for 
opting out of the EU-regulated market to examine whether the bonding to the EU-
regulated market is valued by investors or whether the costs of the listing under the 
stricter listing regime outweigh the benefits, as proposed by the loss of competitiveness 
theory. Following several regional court rulings, in 2012 and 2013, requirements for 
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opting out of the EU-regulated market were gradually reduced in Germany, effectively 
allowing opting out of the EU-regulated market without (minority) shareholders’ con-
sent. In 2015, stricter regulation was implemented, requiring firms to offer compensa-
tion to (minority) shareholders. This setting allows me to investigate the effect of being 
able to opt out of the EU-regulated market with its high disclosure requirements on 
shareholder welfare. Using event study methodology, the study measures market reac-
tions and determinants of market reactions around four (six) events that reduce (in-
crease) the requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated market in Germany. Market 
reactions are expected to be more pronounced for firms that are more likely to consider 
opting out of the EU-regulated market due to high compliance costs, low financing 
needs, low liquidity, more concentrated ownership, and low commitment to disclosure, 
as measured by non-compliance with reporting requirements and non-commitment to 
voluntary disclosure.  
Findings from the second study are mainly indicative of cost considerations, as pro-
posed under the loss of competitiveness theory, which are shared by investors. While 
reductions in opt out requirements seem to have an impact on investors, as reflected in 
abnormally high trading volume, increases in the requirements for opting out do not. 
Correspondingly, findings on price reactions mostly relate to events leading to reduced 
opt out requirements. Findings on the determinants of price reactions suggest that for 
firms with high ownership concentration, and firms previously censured under the Ger-
man enforcement regime, the costs of the listing seem to outweigh the benefits of the 
listing and being able to opt out might enhance shareholder welfare. Also in line with 
the loss of competitiveness theory, investors of financially distressed, leveraged firms 
seem to welcome the reduced requirements for leaving the costly EU-regulated market. 
However, findings on leveraged firms can also be reconciled with the bonding hypothe-
sis. Monitoring by banks can be interpreted as an alternative monitoring mechanism that 
makes bonding to the EU-regulated market redundant. Firms that opt out subsequently 
under the reduced regulation exhibit significantly negative price reactions to reductions 
in opt out requirements. This price reaction is likely attributable to the fact that investors 
had anticipated compensation. In many cases, investors already knew that the firm was 
intending to downlist. If investors had anticipated compensation in exchange for their 
shares, that was no longer required under the revised regulation, these investors would 
have incurred welfare decreases. 
Introduction 
 9 
Study 3: Why Do Firms Downlist? Evidence on the Costs of IFRS Compliance and En-
forcement (Chapter 4) 
The third study investigates the role of costs associated with mandatory IFRS adoption 
and pertinent enforcement activities based on a sample of all firms that announced their 
intent to downlist, that is, to migrate from the EU-regulated market to a private, ex-
change-regulated market (over-the-counter market), during the 2009-2014 period. Since 
2009, authoritative court rulings in Germany have substantially lowered the legal 
threshold for firms to downlist. While downlisting requirements were almost prohibi-
tively restrictive prior to 2009, the revised legal interpretation substantially lowered the 
bar for firms to leave the regulated market, and therefore, in essence, to opt out of the 
IFRS mandate and enforcement supervision. The study exploits the exogenous shock to 
the cost-benefit tradeoffs associated with opting out of the EU-regulated market in 
Germany, that is also investigated in the second study, and examines firms that leave 
the EU-regulated market under the reduced opt out requirements. In particular, it ex-
ploits two specific features of the German setting, the availability of error findings es-
tablished by the enforcement mechanism and the observability of market and account-
ing data after firms have downlisted, to identify drivers of firms’ decisions to opt out of 
the IFRS and enforcement mandate. The study sheds light on the cost-benefit tradeoffs 
associated with mandatory IFRS application and enforcement scrutiny using a determi-
nants model and two sets of supplementary analyses (i.e., market reactions to downlist-
ing announcements and the post-downlisting performance of downlisting firms relative 
to a sample of propensity score matched firms). 
Findings from the third study provide evidence on costs of regulation, namely the pre-
vious introduction of the IFRS mandate and the concurrent enforcement mechanism in 
the European Union. Evidence is consistent with IFRS compliance and enforcement 
related costs representing significant determinants of firms’ decisions to opt out of the 
regulated market. The likelihood for firms to opt out of the IFRS and enforcement man-
date is negatively associated with firm size and profitability, and increases for firms that 
were censured by the enforcement mechanism, in particular for firms with severe ac-
counting errors. In contrast, opt out likelihood is reduced as transparency benefits in-
crease (liquidity, voluntary IFRS adoption). These findings suggest that despite the ben-
efits that prior literature has documented, the pertinent costs of the IFRS mandate may 
be restrictively high for a substantial number of firms. The results from the first sup-
plementary analysis document large variation in market price reactions, which limits 
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inferences. Findings from the second supplementary analysis demonstrate that more 
than half of the firms that downlisted before 2013 opted to continue reporting under 
IFRS on a voluntary basis. Compared to a sample of matched firms that retained their 
listing in the regulated market, downlisting firms experienced slight decreases in size, 
liquidity, and in audit fees after migrating to the stock-exchange administered market. 
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2 Market Reactions to the Regulation of Executive Compensation 
Jörg-Markus Hitz and Stephanie Müller-Bloch
1,2
 
European Accounting Review, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 659-684 (2015)
3
 
Abstract: This paper investigates equity market reactions to the regulation of executive 
compensation. We exploit a natural experimental setting in Germany, where recent leg-
islation introduces restrictions on the amount and on the components of board executive 
compensation packages, and invokes liability for the supervisory board in case of inap-
propriate remuneration arrangements. We use this exogenous shock to the contracting 
environment to infer market perceptions of the usefulness of the regulation. Using event 
study methodology, we investigate market reactions for the first-time announcement of 
regulatory intent and for a pooled sample of seven events leading to the adoption of the 
law act. We find weak evidence of an average negative market reaction to the proposed 
regulation. Multivariate analyses reveal that firms which were particularly affected by 
the regulation because board members received high abnormal remuneration experi-
enced larger stock price discounts on average. Consistent with this, we find a positive 
relation between pay-performance sensitivity and the equity market reaction. Taken 
together, these findings indicate that the regulation was not considered beneficial from a 
shareholder perspective. This result is consistent with the market perceiving the regula-
tion of executive compensation to impose potentially inefficient contractual arrange-
ments for some firms. 
JEL Classification: M 12, M 48, M 52. 
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2.1 Introduction 
This paper investigates market reactions to the regulation of executive compensation in 
Germany. In an immediate reaction to the financial crisis and the perceived catalysing 
role of compensation contracts geared towards short-term performance, the German 
legislator in June 2009 adopted the Vorstandsvergütung-Angemessenheitsgesetz 
(VorstAG). This ‘Appropriate Director Compensation Act’ stipulates an unprecedented 
interference with private compensation schemes. While extant company law broadly 
required the supervisory board to set an ‘appropriate’ remuneration for members of the 
executive board, the VorstAG mandates that compensation (1) be ‘customary’, (2) re-
flect management performance (pay for performance), and (3) be tied to metrics of 
long-term performance. In addition, the VorstAG includes an array of specific provi-
sions on executive compensation, and the non-binding advisory vote of shareholders on 
board compensation (‘say on pay’). Also, it invokes liability for supervisory board 
members should they set inappropriate compensation. Taken together, this legal initia-
tive substantially altered the regulatory environment in Germany and impacted heavily 
on the shape of compensation contracts (Götz & Friese, 2012). 
Adoption of the VorstAG represented an exogenous shock to the contracting environ-
ment and therefore creates a natural experimental setting that allows us to shed light on 
the economic effects of a regulatory intervention with compensation arrangements. An 
exhaustive branch of literature addresses how compensation contracts evolve, providing 
two competing explanations. The ‘efficient contracting’ hypothesis asserts that observa-
ble contracts, on average, are effective in setting incentives for managers to act in the 
interest of capital providers (e.g. Bertrand, 2009). In contrast, authors such as Bebchuk 
and Fried (2003) conjecture that managers have incentives to install mechanisms of ‘en-
trenchment’ to avoid control by their principals, and to negotiate inefficient contracts 
that benefit managers at the expense of shareholders (‘pay without performance’). 
While the efficiency or inefficiency of compensation contracts in place is not observa-
ble, our objective is to infer to what extent market participants regarded the recent regu-
lation as beneficial, by forcing more firms towards efficient contracts that resolve 
shareholder-manager conflicts. 
We identify seven events on the way to the adoption of the VorstAG. These events pre-
sumably significantly altered market expectations with respect to the likelihood or the 
scope and content of the regulation of executive compensation. For a sample of firms 
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listed on the German stock market, we investigate the perceived economic effects of the 
regulation by observing market-adjusted returns (MARs) around these event dates. We 
find that over all seven events, the average MAR was negative for our sample, indicat-
ing that all in all, the equity market reacted negatively to the regulation. In a second set 
of analyses, we shed more light on market perceptions by regressing MARs on firm-
level characteristics that indicate which firms were likely to be particularly affected by 
the regulation. We hypothesize that firms with high abnormal, that is, above industry 
average, compensation arrangements specifically fall under the provision of the 
VorstAG to award no more than ‘customary’ remuneration. While abnormal compensa-
tion represents our main test variable, we also use pay-performance sensitivity as a (pre-
sumably weaker) measure of regulatory impact, since the VorstAG stipulates that remu-
neration be reflective of management’s performance, a requirement that would particu-
larly affect firms with no or only little performance-based compensation in place.  
To lend robustness to our findings and to ensure proper identification of effects induced 
by the pending regulation, we perform two sets of multivariate analyses. First, we esti-
mate our regressions for the first-time announcement of the then ruling coalition to reg-
ulate executive compensation, as this event represents the exogenous shock which sig-
nificantly increased the likelihood of regulatory interference with the amount and struc-
ture of compensation contracts. Our second set of regressions is estimated for a pooled 
sample of all seven events, from the first-time announcement to the final adoption of the 
VorstAG by the German Parliament. This pooled analysis represents our main analysis, 
as it allows for stronger statistical inferences.  
For our main test variable, abnormal pay, we document a significantly negative associa-
tion with MARs. Consistent with this, we find a significantly positive relation between 
pay-performance sensitivity and MARs. These results hold both for the single-event 
analysis and for the pooled sample regressions, and are significant using (1) conven-
tional test statistics and (2) test statistics obtained from non-event distributions of varia-
bles. These findings suggest that market participants regarded the regulation as value-
decreasing in particular for firms with highly paid executives and firms with low-
powered incentives. Such a result is consistent with shareholders expecting the 
VorstAG to impair efficient contracting for these firms.  
Our findings are in line with Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011), who investigate 
regulation of executive compensation in the USA, and document negative market reac-
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tions for firms with excess CEO compensation. However, our paper augments this prior 
evidence and makes several incremental contributions. First, our results are more ro-
bust, as we are able to triangulate our findings using single-event and pooled event 
analyses. Second, exploiting a rich hand-collected dataset, we are able to demonstrate 
that our findings translate to an alternative contractual measure, pay-performance sensi-
tivity. Third, by using a finer partitioning of our abnormal or excess compensation 
measure, we are able to demonstrate that negative market value reactions occur for pre-
sumably ‘overpaid’ managers only, but not for managers with below-average compen-
sation. 
Finally, and most importantly, we demonstrate that the Larcker et al. (2011) results 
translate to an institutional environment with particularly different features. In the Ger-
man two-tier system, an independent supervisory board sets management compensation, 
with the objective of enacting not only shareholders’ interests, but also to recognize 
other stakeholders such as creditors or employees (e.g. Haar, 2012). Supervisory boards 
are required to enact such a stakeholder model, and to ensure the long-term existence of 
the firm. Larcker and Tayan (2011, p. 44) therefore conjecture that regular shareholders 
have less influence on board matters in Germany as, for example, in the USA. If accord-
ingly, existing contracts in the German setting are on average less efficient from a 
shareholder perspective, then the VorstAG might very well have a beneficial effect. Put 
differently, it is an open empirical question whether existing contracts represent effi-
cient outcomes from a shareholder perspective, and to what extent recent regulation has 
an impact on shareholder wealth. Despite these differences in the German governance 
model, our analyses do not indicate beneficial effects of regulating executive compensa-
tion from an equity market perspective. This suggests that at least from a shareholder 
perspective, there is no evidence in support of executive compensation regulation, be it 
in a shareholder-based economy or a stakeholder-oriented system. 
Taken together, our findings are in line with concerns regarding the usefulness of inter-
fering with private contracting in the sphere of management compensation. It is up to 
future research to demonstrate whether there are areas of corporate governance where 
regulatory interference with private contracting potentially generates welfare. Therefore, 
the results of our paper should be of interest to national and supranational regulators, in 
particular the European Union, and to researchers in the field of executive compensation 
and corporate governance. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 elaborates on the regu-
latory background. Section 2.3 discusses prior literature and develops our hypotheses. 
In Section 2.4 the methodology is outlined. Section 2.5 presents and discusses the em-
pirical findings. Our final Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Background: Regulation of executive compensation in Germany 
In the wake of corporate scandals and increased awareness of the role and importance of 
governance mechanisms, various aspects of corporate governance, including disclosure 
and setting of board compensation, have been subject to hard-law regulation in Germa-
ny during recent years. The Act on Disclosure of Executive Board Remuneration 
(Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz (VorstOG)) since 2006 mandates listed firms 
to disclose for each board member the total compensation, broken down into fixed sala-
ry, short-term bonus, and long-term incentives. The Appropriate Director Compensation 
Act (VorstAG), effective since August 2009, directly affects how executive compensa-
tion is set. As our paper investigates market reactions to critical events leading to the 
adoption of the VorstAG, the remainder of the section details the state of compensation 
regulation prior to the VorstAG, and the changes introduced with this new legislation. 
 Under the German two-tier system, the executive board of a public company is charged 
with developing and implementing the firm’s strategy and managing day-to-day busi-
ness. Members of the executive board are appointed by the supervisory board. The su-
pervisory board oversees and controls the executive board (Hopt, 2011; Larcker & 
Tayan, 2011, pp. 44-46). One of the more specific tasks of the supervisory board is to 
negotiate compensation contracts with members of the executive board. Prior to the 
VorstAG, par. 87 of the securities act merely required the supervisory board to set ‘ap-
propriate’ compensation. As ‘appropriateness’ was never detailed by the lawmakers or 
the courts, this requirement effectively had no restraining influence on the setting of 
compensation contracts, which essentially followed a business judgement rule (Haar, 
2012). Complementary to this virtually ineffective hard law provision, the German Cor-
porate Governance Code since 2002 laid down detailed soft law requirements, requir-
ing, for example, compensation packages to include an appropriate portion of both fixed 
and performance-based components, and a cap to preclude excessive payments in cases 
of high firm performance (par. 4.2.3). However, in practice, a substantial portion of 
firms chose not to comply with these principles (von Werder & Talaulicar, 2009), and 
even when they stated they did, practices varied substantially, given the rather general 
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tone of the Code’s requirements (von Werder, 2011). Taken together, the overall level 
of regulation pertaining to executive board compensation was therefore relatively low 
prior to 2009. 
The VorstAG was adopted in 2009 as a response to the 2008 financial crisis, and to the 
public and political perception that compensation contracts geared towards short-term 
performance targets had played a role in the practice of excessive risk taking (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2009b). The VorstAG amended and enlarged existing company law. Most 
importantly, the requirement for the supervisory board to set ‘appropriate’ compensa-
tion was detailed along three dimensions. Under the revised legislation, appropriate 
compensation contracts (1) should not exceed ‘customary’ remuneration, (2) should be 




The legislator’s basis for conclusions to the law act and pertinent clarifications from law 
scholars shed light on the meaning of these three criteria. Accordingly, a ‘customary’ 
compensation is one that is of a comparable nature with respect to managers who hold 
similar positions with other firms. Comparability may also relate to the ratio of board 
compensation to regular employees’ compensation. However, currently, there is no con-
sensus on how high such a ratio should be. Therefore, comparability refers in particular 
to peer firms’ average executive compensation, which means that industry standards 
play an important role in setting executive compensation. The second criterion requires 
a substantial fraction of the compensation to be tied to managerial performance. While 
this requirement for executive compensation to be ‘performance-based’ can be expected 
to generally increase the proportion of variable remuneration components, the third cri-
terion emphasizes in particular the use of long-term performance targets to that end 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2009b).  
Any performance-linked compensation is additionally subjected to the requirement for 
the supervisory board to include caps that prevent excessive payments in case of an ‘ex-
traordinary development’. The legislator emphasizes the intent to substantially alter 
compensation practices by also introducing a liability clause for members of the super-
visory board for setting ‘inappropriate compensation’. Also, the supervisory board is 
                                                 
4
  While provisions (1) and (2) apply to all incorporated firms, (3) is restricted to listed corporations. 
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now explicitly required to reduce compensation, that is, to interfere with existing con-
tracts, in cases of financial / economic distress. 
The VorstAG also introduced a set of specific provisions and rules. For one thing, the 
new legislation prescribes minimum personal liability of executive board members un-
der D&O insurance of up to one and a half times the fixed portion of annual salary. Al-
so, the minimum vesting time for stock options granted is increased from two years to 
four years. Second, in contrast to the extant practice of deferring issues of executive pay 
to a compensation sub-committee of the supervisory board, contracts now must be ap-
proved by the whole supervisory board, which under the German system of co-
determination also includes employee and trade union representatives. Finally, the 
VorstAG adopts an optional advisory vote on the ‘compensation system’ for the annual 
shareholders’ meeting of listed corporations, the so-called say on pay. 
Taken together, the VorstAG introduces criteria and restrictions for executive compen-
sation that were absent in the German system prior to the regulation, accompanied by 
increasing liability for supervisory board members to set legally correct contracts. The 
regulation and its pertinent documentation reflect the legislator’s determination to sub-
stantially alter compensation practices. This expectation is confirmed by early evidence 
on the implications of the VorstAG.
5
 Götz and Friese (2010, 2011, 2012) document the 
staggered implementation of the new rules, which are binding only for contracts set af-
ter August 2009. Surveying a sample of the 80 firms listed in the blue chip indices DAX 
and MDAX, the authors find that by 2011, 56 firms had geared their performance-
related compensation components towards long-term determinants, 42 firms had in-
creased the proportion of long-term performance-related components in relation to 
short-term components, and 29 firms had introduced a cap. Share-based payment was 
modified in 22 firms, and 16 firms had introduced a compensation system that allows 
for both bonuses and reductions in compensation. 
                                                 
5
  Firms disclose in their annual reports how they implemented the VorstAG. For example, in the 2009 
annual report of Volkswagen, a German car manufacturer, it is outlined that ‘the remuneration struc-
ture is focused on ensuring sustainable business growth in accordance with the [VorstAG]’ 
(Volkswagen, 2010, p. 112). In addition to fixed compensation and a business performance-based 
bonus, Volkswagen implemented the VorstAG by adopting a new long-term incentive programme 
starting in 2010, the so-called Strategy 2018. Under this programme, long-term performance-related 
compensation of executive board members is based on the four-year average of four criteria, a cus-
tomer satisfaction index, an employee index (including employment rate, productivity, and employee 
satisfaction), sales growth, and increases in return on sales (Volkswagen, 2010, p. 113). 
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2.3 Hypotheses development 
The objective of this paper is to exploit the quasi-experimental VorstAG setting to in-
vestigate whether this regulation of executive compensation created value for share-
holders. The equity value impact is measured by stock market reactions to the (ex-
pected) regulation. On a semi-strong form efficient market, investors instantaneously 
and correctly factor such publicly available information into prices. Therefore, stock 
prices reflect the market’s joint perception of the likelihood of the regulation and of its 
economic effects. An increased likelihood of regulation c.p. accentuates impacts on firm 
value (Schwert, 1981). 
Regulatory interference with private contracting potentially creates value if contractual 
outcomes in equilibrium are inefficient. Therefore, the equity market value effect of the 
regulation is related to the unobservable efficiency of board compensation contracts. A 
rich literature examines determinants of executive compensation in the context of effi-
cient contracting. Broadly, this literature proposes two non-exclusive explanations for 
various aspects of compensation contract design, and provides evidence for both (see 
reviews, e.g. Bertrand, 2009; Frydman & Jenter, 2010). Under the efficient contracting 
approach, existing contractual arrangements are regarded as an efficient solution to mit-
igating agency problems that result as shareholders entrust managers with managing 
their firms. Observable contractual features such as bonuses tied to firm performance, or 
stock option plans, and the time-series and cross-sectional variation therein, can be rec-
onciled with the notion of principal agent theory that compensation contracts should 
align managers’ interests with the owner objective of shareholder value maximisation 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In contrast, the managerial power or rent extraction view 
proposes that observable contracts do not represent efficient contractual outcomes, but 
serve as vehicles for powerful managers to extract inappropriate compensation. Under 
this view, ‘executive compensation is viewed not only as a potential instrument for ad-
dressing the agency problem but also as a part of the agency problem itself’ (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2003, p. 72). The key assumption here is that executives are not efficiently gov-
erned, for example, due to busy or captured boards of directors. Such inefficient control 
mechanisms enable managers to extract rents via means such as excessive perquisites, 
option backdating, strategic use of compensation consultants, or ineffective stock option 
grants not sufficiently tied to managerial performance. 
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Compensation contracts are both a part and a product of firm-level corporate govern-
ance choices. In equilibrium, compensation contracts, to varying degrees, can be recon-
ciled with both the efficient contracting and the managerial power hypothesis. However, 
given the firm-level endogeneity of governance choices, the degree of cross-sectional 
efficiency of compensation contracts is not observable. Exogenous shocks to the gov-
ernance system, which shake up existing contractual arrangements, therefore potentially 
yield revealing insights (Larcker et al., 2011; Frydman & Jenter, 2010). We exploit such 
a shock, the regulation of executive pay and supervisory board liability in Germany, to 
glean insights into the market perception of the economic effects of the regulation. The 
underlying premise is that any regulation receives vindication only if it can be expected 
to increase welfare. In line with a positive case for regulation from a shareholder per-
spective, we state our first hypothesis: 
H1:  On average, firm value increases with the increased likelihood or scope / con-
tent of regulation of executive compensation. 
Given the hitherto virtually unregulated nature of compensation arrangements in Ger-
many, existing contracts show substantial heterogeneity. Accordingly, we expect firms 
to be affected by the regulation to different degrees, which should be mirrored by mar-
ket value reactions. Therefore, in a second step, we investigate the relation between ob-
servable contractual features and market value reactions. Our main test variable here is 
abnormal or ‘excess’ compensation. As noted in Section 2.2, the provisions of the 
VorstAG mandate total compensation not to exceed the ‘customary’ level, that is, the 
industry average. Therefore, firms with above-industry average compensation levels are 
particularly affected by the regulation. If such regulatory interference is greeted by 
shareholders, we predict: 
H2:  Market value reactions to the increased likelihood or scope / content of regula-
tion of executive compensation are positively associated with the degree of abnormal 
compensation. 
In addition to putting a ceiling on the total amount of compensation, the VorstAG also 
mandates compensation to be tied to (long-term) performance. Therefore, we expect 
firms to be particularly affected when they make little use of performance-based pay, 
that is, they have contracts in place with low pay-performance sensitivity. Accordingly, 
we state: 
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H3:  Market value reactions to the increased likelihood or scope / content of regula-
tion of executive compensation are negatively associated with the degree of pay-
performance sensitivity. 
However, as the VorstAG is far less prescriptive with respect to the expected extent or 
fraction of performance-based compensation, we perceive pay-performance sensitivity 
as a weaker measure of how firms were affected by the VorstAG, compared to our main 
test variable, abnormal compensation. 
While the concept of investigating market reactions to measure economic impacts of 
regulation is well established, starting with Schwert (1981), this paper is most closely 
related to the study by Larcker et al. (2011). These authors, among other things, investi-
gate for a US setting market reactions to eight events which increased the likelihood of 
regulation of executive compensation that would limit compensation or introduce 
shareholders’ non-binding vote on compensation (‘say on pay’). While Larcker et al. 
(2011) obtain no meaningful results for the respective event dates, pooled analyses over 
all these eight events yield a negative significant association between excess CEO pay 
and abnormal event-day returns. The authors interpret this finding in the light of the 
efficient contracting hypothesis as an indication of a negative regulatory impact. As 
noted in the introduction, our paper differs to Larcker et al. (2011) along several dimen-
sions. First, with respect to the analyses, we exploit a hand-collected dataset to investi-
gate a second observable compensation feature, the sensitivity of board members’ pay 
to performance. Second, and more importantly, we investigate a setting which differs 
markedly from the USA in terms of governance regulation and governance practices. In 
particular, in the German system, governance mechanisms need to reconcile the differ-
ent objectives of various stakeholders, such as shareholders, creditors, and employees. 
This is reflected in the stated objective of governance regulation to ensure the long-term 
existence of the firm, and bears down, for example, on the composition of the supervi-
sory board, where the so-called co-determination legally ensures representation of em-
ployees and their representatives (e.g. trade unions) (Haar, 2012). The efficiency of ex-
isting compensation contracts from a shareholder perspective is therefore an open em-
pirical question, and so is the impact of the regulation of executive compensation on 
equity market values. 
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2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 Measurement of market reactions to the (proposed) regulation 
To address our hypotheses, we measure MARs around seven events that significantly 
altered the probability or the scope and content of the regulation. In line with related 
prior literature (Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, & Riedl, 2010; Cai & Walkling, 2011; 
Joos & Leung, 2013), we choose a three-day window around the respective events. 
Market reactions are measured using MARs, which we calculate as the difference be-
tween three-day raw returns for the respective firm, and three-day market returns. As 
our benchmark market index, we choose the FTSE World Europe excluding Germany, 
to exclude firms that are affected by the regulation, and therefore avoid underestimating 
the effect of the regulation (Zhang, 2007). 
To address our first hypothesis, we measure the mean market reactions for each of our 
seven event dates leading to the adoption of the VorstAG (see Section 2.4.4) and for a 
pooled sample of these events. We apply three different test statistics to assess the sig-
nificance of market reactions (Armstrong et al., 2010). First, using traditional test statis-
tics, we test whether MARs around the events are significantly different from zero. 
However, the underlying assumption of traditional test statistics is that absent regulatory 
action MARs on average are zero. Thus, if MARs are not zero absent regulatory 
measures, documented market reactions could result from misspecification of test statis-
tics. To address this concern, results in the absence of regulatory action are simulated 
using Monte-Carlo simulation. The two additional test statistics from the Monte-Carlo 
simulation employ mean MARs from 53 non-overlapping three-day non-event windows 
during the period from our first to our last event. We randomly select seven non-
overlapping three-day non-event windows and calculate the mean MAR over these non-
events. We follow, for example, Armstrong et al. (2010) and Zhang (2007), and repeat 
this procedure 1000 times to simulate the distribution of mean MARs over randomly 
selected non-event windows. For the second test statistic, we test whether the mean 
MARs over the pooled events are significantly different from the distribution of the 
simulated mean MARs. For the third test statistic, we calculate the weighted bootstrap 
p-value, which is the percentage of simulated mean MARs over seven non-events that 
are higher (in case of overall positive mean MARs) or lower (in case of overall negative 
mean MARs) than the pooled mean MARs for our events. 
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2.4.2 Determinants model  
To test our hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate the following model using ordinary least 
squares regressions: 
MARit = β0 + β1 ABNORMAL PAYit + β2 PAY SENSITIVITYit + ∑γ CONTROLSit+ µ (1) 
where MAR is the market-adjusted return, calculated as described in Section 2.4.1. Our 
two test variables that capture the likelihood or extent to which firms were potentially 
affected by the regulation are our main variable of interest, the level of excess or ab-
normal pay (ABNORMAL PAY), and the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm 
performance (PAY SENSITIVITY). Under H2 (H3), we expect a positive (negative) 
and significant coefficient for ABNORMAL PAY (PAY SENSITIVITY). 
We estimate three versions of our regression model. First, we estimate the complete 
model (1) for our full sample. To capture a potentially different impact of perceived 
‘overpayment’ and ‘underpayment’, we estimate model (2), where we replace our main 
test variable ABNORMAL PAY with two binary variables for the top and the bottom 
quintile of ABNORMAL PAY (HIGH ABNORMAL PAY and LOW ABNORMAL 
PAY). Finally, as banks have been one stated main target of the regulation, and in light 
of the prominent role that high-powered incentives play in compensation arrangements 
at financial institutions, we use a third model specification, where we estimate the origi-
nal regression model (1) for a subsample of firms that excludes banks and financial in-
stitutions (model (3)). For the first-time announcement of regulatory intent, we also re-
estimate model (1) using one-day MARs to rule out that MARs around the first-time 
announcement were confounded by events related to the financial crisis. 
Our vector of control variables includes a measure of ownership concentration (FREE 
FLOAT). A large literature documents that effective ownership control, in particular 
concentrated ownership, is positively related to the efficiency of compensation ar-
rangements in place (e.g. Elston & Goldberg, 2003; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Harvey & 
Shrieves, 2001). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 754), large shareholders 
have incentives to monitor the management and sufficient control rights to put pressure 
on the management. Consistent with this, Mehran (1995) finds that ownership concen-
tration by outside investors might be a substitute for incentive pay. Also, we control for 
factors that prior literature has demonstrated to explain MARs or abnormal returns, 
namely the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (SIZE), and the market-to-book 
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ratio (MTB). Consistent with Larcker et al. (2011) and Ferri and Maber (2013), we also 
include the MAR over the prior six months (MOMENTUM). Furthermore, we use a 
binary variable that captures whether the respective firm participates in the DAX, the 
German blue chip index (DAX). DAX indicates the effect of the regulation for large 
firms with high visibility, which are likely to face particular public scrutiny and political 
pressure, which potentially accentuates market outcomes. Finally, we include industry 
controls (e.g. Cai & Walkling, 2011; Zhang, 2007). 
We follow established methodology for analysing market reactions to regulation and 
estimate our determinants model both for our key event, the first-time announcement of 
the regulation (e.g. Cai & Walkling, 2011), and for a pooled sample encompassing all 
seven events that presumably altered the likelihood or scope and content of the regula-
tion (e.g. Armstrong et al., 2010; Joos & Leung, 2013; Larcker et al., 2011).
6
 This 
pooled analysis enables us to capture effects that, although small on the individual event 
level, occur on multiple events (Larcker et al., 2011). Consequently, we obtain multiple 
observations both for the respective event dates and for the firms in our sample. As reg-
ulatory measures affect all firms on the same date, returns are likely to be cross-
sectionally correlated (e.g. MacKinlay, 1997) which might lead to biased standard errors 
(Gow, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 2010; Petersen, 2009). To address the correlation of 
MARs in the multi-event analysis, we follow the recommendation by Gow et al. (2010) 




Similar to our univariate analysis, we assess significance of our findings using tradition-
al t-statistics, and two additional test statistics from a Monte-Carlo simulation using 
non-overlapping non-event windows to address potential misspecification, that is, 
MARs being correlated with variables of interest absent regulatory action (e.g. Larcker 
et al., 2011). We simulate the distribution of the coefficients on our variables of interest 
and control variables based on randomly selected non-event windows for the pooled 
event analysis. We estimate our regression for seven randomly selected non-event win-
dows, and repeat this procedure 1000 times to generate the non-event distribution of our 
                                                 
6
  For events that decrease the likelihood / scope of the regulation, MAR is multiplied by negative one. 
7
  Joos and Leung (2013) and Larcker et al. (2011) also cluster standard errors at the event date to deal 
with the correlation of MARs in the multi-event analysis. Because we do not have a sufficient num-
ber of clusters (e.g., Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009), we bootstrap the clustered standard errors 
(Cameron et al., 2008; Gow et al., 2010). Results remain unchanged when using bootstrapped stand-
ard errors clustered by event and firm. 
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coefficients (Cai & Walkling, 2011; Zhang, 2007). For the second test, we establish 
whether the coefficient estimates based on the event-date regression differ from the 
simulated coefficient estimates obtained using non-event date returns.
8
 For the third test 
statistic, we calculate bootstrap p-values for coefficients on our variables of interest and 
control variables based on the simulated coefficient estimates. 
4.3 Variables measurement 
ABNORMAL PAY is defined as the two-year average of the residuals from estimating 
the following regression (Cai & Walkling, 2011):
9
 
AVERAGE PAYit = β0 + β1 SIZEit + β2 ROAit + β3 STOCK RETURNit + β4 MTBit + 
∑ industry + ∑ year + µ  (2) 
The underlying assumption here is that the level of executive compensation is deter-
mined by size (SIZE), accounting performance (ROA), stock performance (STOCK 
RETURN), growth opportunities (MTB) in the respective year, and industry and year 
fixed effects
10
. This is consistent with recent evidence by Rapp and Wolff (2010), who 
find that more than 60% of the variation in the level of executive compensation in Ger-
many is explained by size, year, and industry. AVERAGE PAY is defined as the natural 
logarithm of average board executive compensation (thousands of euros). Average ex-
ecutive compensation is total executive board compensation divided by the number of 
board members. Total board compensation includes fixed components, such as the sala-
ry and, for example, contributions to the D&O insurance, and variable components, 
                                                 
8
  In addition, we also apply the procedure used by Armstrong et al. (2010) and Joos and Leung (2013) 
and test whether the coefficient estimates based on the event-date regression differ from coefficient 
estimates obtained using non-event date returns for the pooled event analysis. Our results are similar 
to those obtained from the second test statistic. 
9
  Similar approaches are applied by Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Ferri and Maber 
(2013). We use the two-year average for years 2006 and 2007 to estimate the level of ABNORMAL 
PAY, since detailed disclosure of executive compensation only became mandatory in 2006, when the 
VorstOG was introduced. This restriction also applies to the estimation of PAY SENSITIVITY. Al-
so, we do not use 2008 compensation data for two reasons. First, the 2008 financial crisis is likely to 
be reflected in the level of executive compensation. Second, at least for events 1 - 3, we need to rule 
out any look-ahead bias (Larcker et al., 2011), that is, we use only data in our tests that were availa-
ble to the market participants when regulatory discussions occured. Still, we note that inferences are 
similar when using a two-year average for 2007 and 2008 instead of 2006 and 2007 when 2008 data 
are available to market participants and the re-estimated ABNORMAL PAY is significantly negative 
for the single event and pooled analysis (5% level and 1% level, respectively). 
10
  We also computed abnormal pay using an augmented version of model (2) that also includes FREE 
FLOAT and bluechip index membership (DAX) as explanatory variables. Using this augmented 
measure yielded essentially the same results for all our multivariate analyses as did the original 
measure based on model (2). 
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such as short-term cash bonuses, payments based on long-term performance, and equi-
ty-related compensation, in particular stock options granted. Not included are, for ex-
ample, pension related expenses, because they are not consistently disclosed by firms, 
and in particular severance payments, as these represent extraordinary compensation 
which is not reflective of managerial performance in the respective year. SIZE and 
MTB are defined as stated in the previous section, ROA is the return on assets (i.e. net 
income plus interest expense divided by average total assets), and STOCK RETURN is 
the stock return for the past year including dividend payments. We use binary variables 
to include industry-effects and year-effects. The level of ‘abnormal’ (excessive) pay is 
the fraction of the level of executive compensation that is not explained by the model 
outlined above. We estimate the regression model using data for the years 2006 and 
2007 for all firms listed in the Prime Standard segment on the Frankfurt Stock Ex-
change for which the required data were available.
11
 
To assess the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance, we need to 
estimate the relation of the change in board members’ wealth to the change in share-
holder wealth. Jensen and Murphy (1990) define this pay-performance sensitivity as 
‘the dollar change in the CEO’s wealth associated with a dollar change in the wealth of 
shareholders’. Ideally, we would therefore measure the sensitivity of board members’ 
equity portfolios to changes in stock price (see, e.g. Core & Guay, 1999). However, for 
the German setting, data on managers’ equity portfolios are not available.
12
 Instead, as 
noted, listed firms are mandated to disclose the total amount of compensation, which 
includes fixed payments, cash bonuses, and components related to long-term perfor-
mance. The latter category includes, for example, bonuses based on horizons of over 
one year, but also values from phantom-stocks or stock options granted. Therefore, 
while we are unable to track managers’ equity portfolios, we have available a compen-
sation metric that comprises both short-term bonus payments and long-term rewards 
from managerial effort, including equity incentives.
13
 Accordingly, we measure pay-
performance sensitivity as the percentage change of variable compensation (i.e. cash 
                                                 
11
  Results remain unchanged when restricting the sample for estimating ABNORMAL PAY to the 203 
firms included in our final sample. 
12
  Rapp, Schaller, and Wolff (2011) observe that executive compensation components based on stock 
performance were only used by 37.4% of firms listed in the Prime Standard. 
13
  In our robustness Section 2.5.3, we address potential concerns with the inclusion of the fair value of 
stock options granted by calculating the pay-performance sensitivity based on cash compensation 
only. 
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bonuses and components related to long-term performance) divided by the change in 
total shareholder return of the respective firm. However, we need to caution that this 
measure is a potentially biased or weak indicator of the construct pay-performance sen-
sitivity. First, as noted, we are unable to track the changes in managerial wealth directly. 
Second, we rely on data on compensation awarded, rather than being able to observe the 
underlying contracts and how effectively they actually tie compensation to measures of 
managerial performance. 
Free float shares (FREE FLOAT) are the percentage of shares of the respective class of 
shares available to investors, namely shares outstanding less strategic holdings. Follow-
ing the free float definition of the German Stock Exchange used since 2002, strategic 
holdings are holdings of at least 5% of the shares outstanding. We use the percentage of 
free float shares on the respective event date. Table 2.1 summarizes and details all vari-
ables used in our empirical analyses.  
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Table 2.1: Variables measurement 
Variable Definition 
MAR Market-adjusted return over a three-day window around the respective event date 
using the FTSE World Europe excluding Germany as a proxy for the market portfo-
lio, winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels1 
ABNORMAL PAY Two-year average of the residuals of the following regression: AVERAGE PAY = β0 
+ β1 SIZE + β2 ROA + β3 STOCK RETURN + β4 MTB + industry + year + µ 
  AVERAGE PAY Natural logarithm of average executive compensation (total executive compensation 
divided by the number of executive board members) in thousands of euros 
  SIZE Natural logarithm of market capitalisation in thousands of euros 
  ROA Return on assets, that is, net income plus interest expense on debt divided by average 
total assets 
  STOCK RETURN One-year stock return including dividend payments 
  MTB Market-to-book ratio, that is, market capitalisation divided by common shareholders' 
equity 
  industry Binary variables indicating the SIC division of the respective firm 
  year Binary variables indicating the respective year 
HIGH ABNORMAL PAY Binary variable indicating that the firm's ABNORMAL PAY is in the top quintile 
LOW ABNORMAL PAY Binary variable indicating that the firm's ABNORMAL PAY is in the bottom quintile 
PAY SENSITIVITY Percentage change of average variable compensation divided by the change in total 
shareholder return, winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels2 
FREE FLOAT Percentage of free-float shares, that is, shares outstanding less strategic holdings 
(holdings of at least 5% of the shares outstanding) on the respective event date 
MOMENTUM Six months MAR prior to the respective event date 
DAX Binary variable indicating the firm's participation in the German blue chip index 
DAX on the respective event date 
CAR Cumulative abnormal return over a three-day window around the respective event 
date, estimated by using the market model with a 250-trading-day estimation period 
and the FTSE World Europe excluding Germany as a proxy for the market portfolio, 
winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels1 
EXCESS PAY Two-year average of the natural logarithm of average executive compensation less 
the median natural logarithm of average executive compensation of the respective 
firm’s industry and size tercile 
ABNORMAL CEO PAY Two-year average of the residuals of the following regression: CEO PAY = β0 + β1 
SIZE + β2 ROA + β3 STOCK RETURN + β4 MTB + industry + year + µ, where CEO 
PAY equals the natural logarithm of CEO compensation in thousands of euros 
ABNORMAL PAY (Em-
ployees) 
Two-year average of the residuals of the following regression: AVERAGE PAY = β0 
+ β1 SIZE (Employees) + β2 ROA + β3 STOCK RETURN + β4 MTB + industry + 
year + µ, where SIZE (Employees) equals the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees 
ABNORMAL PAY (Sales) Two-year average of the residuals of the following regression: AVERAGE PAY = β0 
+ β1 SIZE (Sales) + β2 ROA + β3 STOCK RETURN + β4 MTB + industry + year + µ, 
where SIZE (Sales) equals the natural logarithm of sales 
CEO PAY SENSITIVITY Percentage change of CEO variable compensation divided by the change in total 
shareholder return, winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels2 
PAY SENSITIVITY (Aver-
age total compensation) 
Percentage change of average total compensation divided by the change in total 
shareholder return, winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels2 
PAY SENSITIVITY (Aver-
age cash compensation) 
Percentage change of average cash compensation (i.e., fixed salary and short-term 
bonuses) divided by the change in total shareholder return, winsorised at the 1% and 
99% levels2 
1MAR and CAR are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the impact of outliers. 
2Variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the impact of outliers. 
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2.4.3 Identification of events 
To identify events that changed the likelihood or / and the scope and content of the reg-
ulation, we adopted a two-step approach, (1) database research of governmental / legis-
lative announcements, and (2) media analysis using the LexisNexis database and the 
print version of the ‘Handelsblatt’, the major daily financial newspaper in Germany. 
The source of regulation in our setting were the conservative (CDU/CSU) and the social 
democratic (SPD) parties which formed the then ruling coalition government (in charge 
from November 2005 until October 2009). Therefore, in a first step, we conducted a 
database analysis of all official pronouncements and press releases by the coalition gov-
ernment and its two parties for the two years prior to parliament adoption of the 
VorstAG on 18 June 2009, using keywords for different phrasing of the term ‘executive 
compensation’. This search resulted in a total of 16 observations. Out of these, we elim-
inated the first seven announcements (published between 13 December 2007 and 19 
August 2008), as these reflected disagreement between the ruling coalition parties. 
While the social democrats favored regulation of executive compensation (press releas-
es from SPD, 13 December 2007, 17 January 2008, 4 April 2008, 19 August 2008), in 
particular with respect to putting a ceiling on presumably ‘excessive’ compensation, 
party officials of the conservatives publicly disagreed and stated the compensation is-
sues should better be left to private parties (press releases from CDU/CSU, 17 January 
2008, 27 April 2008, 28 April 2008). This underscores the unexpected character of the 
first event we chose to include, the joint announcement of party officials from both so-
cial democrats and conservatives on 26 September 2009 to install a coalition working 
group with the intent of regulating executive compensation (event No. 1). With this 
event, it became clear that, contrary to expectations, executive compensation would be 
regulated by the coalition government and would, among other things, involve efforts to 
meet the long-standing demands of social democrats to curb ‘excessive’ compensation 
arrangements. This event was followed by four meetings of the coalition task force. 
These meetings were concerned with drafting the proposed legislation and ensuing al-
terations and specifications (event Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 6), publication of the first draft law 
(event No. 3), and by the eventual adoption of the VorstAG by the German Parliament 
on 18 June 2009 (event No. 7). Two ensuing events which we chose not to include as 
they did not potentially bear on the regulation relate to a procedural statement by the 
second house of the German Parliament (10 July 2009) and the eventual publication of 
the law (5 August 2009). 
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Step two of our identification approach was a media analysis. Using the LexisNexis 
database, and searching ‘Handelsblatt’, we confirmed that the seven events we chose for 
our analyses received instant, broad coverage in the national news, in newspapers, and 
online media. We then applied the same keyword search as in step one to scan the two-
year period prior to adoption of the VorstAG for media mentioning of critical events 
relating to the regulation of executive compensation. This analysis yielded no additional 
events and confirmed our event selection from step one. Panel A of Table 2.2 reports 
the dates and nature of these seven events we use for our analyses. Also, it reports for 
each event whether it presumably increased or decreased the likelihood or scope of the 
regulation, based on a detailed impact assessment.  
Details of the impact assessment are reported in Panel B of Table 2.2. Following event 
identification, the impact assessment was performed to establish how or whether each of 
the seven events potentially bore down on market perceptions of regulation likelihood 
and / or the scope and content of the regulation. While events Nos. 1 (first-time an-
nouncement of the regulatory intent) and 7 (adoption of the legal act by the German 
Parliament) significantly increased the likelihood of the regulation, the five events in 
between mainly altered the expected scope and content of the regulation. For each of 
these five events, we assessed whether it increased or decreased the expected scope and 
content of the regulation. Panel B of Table 2.2 documents this assessment and gives a 
detailed account of all issues related to management compensation that were discussed 
over these events. Not untypical for law-making processes, this analysis reveals that 
following the first proposals by the task force (event No. 2), the array of proposed 
measures decreased over the following events (event Nos. 3-6).  
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Table 2.2: Events leading to the VorstAG 
Panel A: Events leading to the VorstAG                 
Event No. Date Event   
  
    
Assessed 
impact on the 
likelihood / 
scope of the 
VorstAG 
1 09/26/2008 




Proposal of amendments to the regulation of 
executive compensation 
+ 
3 03/17/2009 Publication of the draft law - 
4 04/23/2009 Specification of the draft law - 
5 05/07/2009 Specification of the draft law - 
6 05/29/2009 Specification of the draft law - 
7 06/18/2009 
Passage of the VorstAG in the German 
Parliament 
+ 
Panel B: Impact assessment                 
Measures Event No.  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
Increased and specified liability of supervisory board members 
for executive compensation 
x x x x x x x   
Regulation of executive compensation                 
1. 
Increased holding-period for stock options / long-
term incentives 
x x x x x x x   
2. 
Performance-based executive compensation 
(long-term incentives) geared towards a sustaina-
ble firm development 
  x x x x (x) (x) 
  
3. 
Executive compensation in proportion to 'cus-
tomary' executive compensation 
    x x x x     
4. 
Executive compensation should not exceed 
'customary' executive compensation 
            x   
5. 
Explicit reference to the interests of employees, 
shareholders and general public 
  o o o         
6. 
Performance-related executive compensation 
only to be paid upon expiration of the contract 
      x x x (x)   
7. 
Simplified ex-post reduction of executive com-
pensation1 
  x x x x (x) (x)   
Restriction of the tax deductibility of executive compensation o o (o)           
Extented disclosure regulation with respect to executive com-
pensation to increase transparency 
x x x x x x x 
  
Non-binding 'say on pay' o o o o o x x   
                    
Notes: Panel A shows the events leading to the VorstAG, and our assessed impact of the respective events on the likelihood or scope 
and content of the regulation based on the analysis as reported in Panel B. Panel B shows the detailed analysis of the development of 
the scope and content of the VorstAG. x indicates measures that were agreed upon and o indicates measures that were considered. 
(x) and (o) indicate that the likelihood / scope of measures was reduced. Measures that were criticised as counterproductive are in 
italic letters. 
 
1 The simplified ex-post reduction of executive compensation includes caps that prevent excessive payments in case of an 'extraor-
dinary development' and the (voluntary) requirement for the supervisory board to reduce compensation in case of financial / eco-
nomic distress. 
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2.5 Empirical findings 
2.5.1 Sample selection and data collection 
We examine market reactions for firms listed in the Prime Standard of the Frankfurt 
stock exchange. We restrict our sample to firms that were consistently listed over the 
years 2005 - 2009, because we require market data from 2005 onwards to perform our 
analyses (i.e. the calculation of MARs, the test variables, and control variables used). 
This results in an initial sample of 316 firms. We eliminate 33 foreign firms, since these 
are not affected by the VorstAG. Also, we exclude preferred shares of 22 firms to avoid 
double counting, and 9 firms that have the legal form of a KGaA (partnership limited by 
shares), with specific governance structures that limit comparability with the other sam-
ple firms. Twelve firms are eliminated due to bankruptcy or mergers. Additional sample 
reductions result from lack of data and from methodological requirements. Sixteen 
firms are eliminated due to missing compensation data, 17 firms because of missing 
market data,
14
 and 2 firms because financial reports were no longer available. Finally, 
we exclude 1 bank (Commerzbank) from our sample because executive compensation 
was capped to 500,000 euros, as the bank received state support in the wake of the fi-
nancial crisis, as stipulated under a specific law act (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz) 
in 2008.
15
 We obtain a sample of 203 firms (23 financial firms). To preclude that our 
results are driven by confounding events, we exclude firm observations if the respective 
firm published its annual or interim report in the respective event window. This leads to 
202 observations for our analysis of event No. 1, and 1,353 firm-event observations for 
the pooled event analysis. Details on the number of firms eliminated on each event can 
be inferred from Table 2.4, which displays the number of firms examined on each event. 
Market price information, balance sheet data, and the data on ownership dispersion 
(FREE FLOAT) are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The definition of 
FREE FLOAT is consistent with the definition of the stock exchange, Deutsche Börse. 
Details on management compensation are hand-collected from financial reports. For our 
main analyses, we use average board compensation metrics, that is, we divide total 
                                                 
14
  To generate reasonable estimates for the industry fixed effects, six of these firms are excluded be-
cause they operate in industries with no more than three firms. For example, Core et al. (1999, p. 
377) also exclude firms from industries with less than 10 firms in order to calculate reasonable esti-
mates for their industry effect variables. 
15
  Additionally, we exclude another firm (Conergy) that was in financial distress from November 2007 
on, requiring substantial amounts of liquidity, followed by accusations of balance sheet fraud in 
2009, and accompanied by substantial losses in market value from late 2007 on. 
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compensation (and its three components fixed salary, cash bonuses, and long-term in-
centive pay) by the number of board members. Also, for our robustness checks, we col-
lect the relevant compensation data for CEOs only. 
Panel A of Table 2.3 reports descriptive statistics for the variables of our determinants 
model based on the pooled sample (N = 1353), and Panel B of Table 2.3 reports pair-
wise Pearson correlations. Mostly, these correlations are as expected. However, we note 
a high correlation between the DAX and SIZE variables of 0.7085. Ensuing analyses 
yield variance inflation factors (VIFs) of 2.33 for SIZE and 2.23 for DAX, which raises 
no concerns with respect to multicollinearity.
16
 
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptives       
    Mean   
Standard 
deviation       
First 
quartile   Median   
Third 
quartile       N   
ABNORMAL PAY   0.0063 
 
0.4312 






   
1353   
PAY SENSITIVITY   -0.3078 
 
3.5420 






   
1353   
FREE FLOAT   0.6053 
 
0.2575 






   
1353   
SIZE (in millions)   3506.88 
 
11526.61 






   
1353   
MTB   1.7274 
 
2.1464 






   
1353   
MOMENTUM   0.0518 
 
0.3138 






   
1353   
DAX   0.1212 
 
0.3265 






   
1353   
Panel B: Correlations       
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   
ABNORMAL PAY   (1)   1.0000                           
PAY SENSITIVITY   (2)   -0.0435   1.0000                       
FREE FLOAT   (3)   0.0978   0.0543   1.0000                   
SIZE   (4)   -0.0058   -0.0035   0.1705   1.0000               
MTB   (5)   -0.0533   0.0388   -0.1031   0.0576   1.0000           
MOMENTUM   (6)   -0.0182   -0.0150   -0.0180   -0.0257   -0.0120   1.0000       
DAX   (7)   0.0396   0.0042   0.2667   0.7085   0.0190   -0.0140   1.0000   
Notes: Panel A shows descriptive statistics and Panel B reports Pearson correlations for the variables included in the regressions (N 
= 1353). Definitions of variables are reported in Table 2.1. In Panel A, SIZE is reported without the natural logarithm. In Panel B, 
bold values indicate two-tailed significance at the 10% level. 
                                                 
16
  Multicollinearity tests are performed for all explanatory variables in regression model (1) for the 
pooled sample (N=1353) without bootstrapping. VIFs for variables other than SIZE and DAX are 
below 2.00 and mean VIF is 1.39. Thus, inferences are not affected by multicollinearity concerns 
(e.g. Gujarati, 2003, p. 362). 
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2.5.2 Empirical findings 
2.5.2.1 Market reactions to regulatory events 
Table 2.4 reports the three-day MARs around the events leading to the adoption of the 
VorstAG. To ease the interpretation of the results, returns are multiplied by negative 
one for events that decreased the probability or the scope and content of the regulation. 
The analyses reveal that average MARs are negative and significantly different from 
zero only for event No. 1 (first-time announcement) and for event No. 7 (passage of the 
VorstAG in the German Parliament), the two most prominent events with respect to the 
likelihood of the regulation. The aggregate mean market reaction over all seven events 
is negative, and statistically different from zero, and also statistically different from the 
simulated mean MARs from the Monte-Carlo simulation. In contrast, our third test sta-
tistic, the weighted bootstrap p-value, indicates that 28.9% of the average MARs for 
seven random non-event windows are lower than the mean event-window return. Taken 
together, these findings document that at the aggregate market level, we find no evi-
dence of a positive reaction of shareholders to the proposed regulation.
17
 Thus, our find-
ings do not support H1 that firm value increases with the increased likelihood or scope 
and content of the regulation of executive compensation.
18
  
                                                 
17
  When we exclude financial firms from the sample, the aggregated market reaction remains negative 
and is statistically insignificant. We also re-estimate the overall market reaction using a one-day 
event window. The overall market reaction is significantly negative (10% level). 
18
  To shed further light on the market reactions conditional on the level of executive compensation, we 
form five portfolios based on quintiles for our test variable ABNORMAL PAY. In this analysis, 
which is conducted both for the first-time announcement and for the pooled sample, we find that 
market reactions are not significant for the first three portfolios. For the fourth portfolio, market re-
actions are significantly different from zero on the first-time announcement. For the portfolio with 
presumably highly overpaid executives (portfolio 5), market reactions are significantly negative for 
the first-time announcement and the pooled event analysis. This indicates that market reactions are 
mainly driven by firms with presumably overpaid executive board members. Also, this finding might 
explain why we fail to find significant market reactions based on the weighted bootstrap p-value in 
Table 2.4. The multivariate analyses in the following sections shed more light on this. 
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Scope   
Raw 








(vs. 0) N 




-0.0522 -0.0231 (-4.64)*** 202 




0.0167 0.0031 (0.87) 195 




-0.0146 -0.0029 (-0.76) 193 




-0.0338 0.0023 (0.58) 193 




-0.0265 -0.0006 (-0.13) 175 




-0.0186 0.0030 (0.96) 194 












t-statistic (vs. 0) 









Weighted bootstrap p-value (1000 repetitions) [0.289] 
  
Notes: This table reports mean three-day MARs on the respective event dates using the FTSE World Europe excluding Germany as 
the market index. The t-statistics (vs. non-events) and bootstrap p-values are obtained from Monte-Carlo simulation, that is, 1000 
repetitions of computing mean MARs  over seven randomly selected three-day non-event windows from September 2008 to June 
2009. For the t-statistics (vs. non-events) we test whether event-date MARs equal mean MARs on non-events obtained from Monte-
Carlo simulation. The weighted bootstrap p-value is the weighted percentage of simulated MARs over non-events that are lower 
than the average MARs over our seven event dates. For events that decrease the likelihood / scope and content of the regulation, 
returns are multiplied by negative one to ease interpretation. Variables are reported in Table 2.1. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. For the weighted bootstrap p-values, ***, **, and * indicate one-tailed 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
2.5.2.2 Multivariate analyses 
Single-event analysis: First-time announcement of regulatory intent 
Table 2.5 reports results from estimating our determinants model (1) for the first-time 
announcement of regulatory intent on 26 September 2008. We use four different model 
specifications, the original model (1), model (2), where we replace ABNORMAL PAY 
with two binary variables for the top and bottom quintile of ABNORMAL PAY, and 
model (3), where we estimate the original model (1) for a reduced sample of non-
financial firms.
19
 In model (4), we estimate the original model (1), but with a one-day 
event window instead of three days. This is to address a potentially confounding effect, 
as the first-time announcement of regulatory intent on Friday, 26 September 2008, was 
followed by the so-called Black Monday on the next trading day, Monday, 29 Septem-
ber 2008, one of the key events during the financial crisis (in particular in the USA, 
where the S&P 500 dropped 8.8 % on this very day). For the main model (1), adjusted 
                                                 
19
  When estimating ABNORMAL PAY for model (3), financial firms are also excluded. 






) is 0.17 (0.22), with similar values for models (2) and (4) and lower values for 
model (3). This suggests a reasonable model fit. Related studies establish comparable 
explanatory power for the analysis of single events, with adjusted R
2
s from 0.01 to 0.32 
(Zhang, 2007), and R
2
s ranging from 0.12 to 0.14 (Cai & Walkling, 2011).
20
 
Table 2.5: First-time announcement 
Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
ABNORMAL PAY   -0.025       -0.016   -0.010 
    (-2.37)**       (-1.48)   (-2.41)** 
HIGH ABNORMAL PAY       -0.020         
        (-1.77)*         
LOW ABNORMAL PAY       0.014         
        (1.23)         
PAY SENSITIVITY   -0.000   -0.000   0.000   0.001 
    (-0.20)   (-0.25)   (0.05)   (2.21)** 
Controls                 
FREE FLOAT   -0.029   -0.029   -0.042   -0.015 
    (-1.46)   (-1.44)   (-2.05)**   (-1.79)* 
SIZE   -0.003   -0.003   -0.002   -0.000 
    (-1.02)   (-1.03)   (-0.62)   (-0.26) 
MTB   -0.000   0.000   -0.000   -0.000 
    (-0.17)   (0.07)   (-0.46)   (-1.26) 
MOMENTUM   0.091   0.093   0.073   0.033 
    (3.75)***   (3.76)***   (2.63)***   (3.25)*** 
DAX   0.025   0.025   0.021   0.004 
    (0.98)   (0.98)   (0.83)   (0.57) 
Intercept                 
CONS   0.054   0.055   0.048   0.020 
    (1.36)   (1.40)   (1.25)   (1.16) 
N   202   202   179   203 
R2   0.22   0.22   0.17   0.23 
Adjusted R2   0.17   0.17   0.11   0.18 
Banks   included   included   no   included 
Event window   3 days   3 days   3 days   1 day 
Industry fixed effects   yes   yes   yes   yes 
Robust Std. Err.   yes   yes   yes   yes 
Notes: This table reports the results from regressing three-day MARs (-1/+1) (one-day MARs in model (4)) around the first-time 
announcement (09/26/2008) on proxy variables for the quality of executive compensation and various control variables using indus-
try fixed effects and robust standard errors. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 2.1. T-values are reported in parentheses.  
*** Two-tailed significance at the 1% level from testing whether coefficients are different from zero.  
** Two-tailed significance at the 5% level from testing whether coefficients are different from zero.  
* Two-tailed significance at the 10% level from testing whether coefficients are different from zero. 
 
The coefficient on our main test variable ABNORMAL PAY is significantly negative 
(5% level) for model (1), while the coefficient on PAY SENSITIVITY is insignifi-
                                                 
20
  Larcker et al. (2011) do not report R
2
s. 




 Results for model (2) yield some insights into the drivers of the negative associa-
tion of abnormal pay with market returns. We find that the coefficient on the top quin-
tile of ABNORMAL PAY is negative and weakly significant (10% level), suggesting 
that the negative association of abnormal pay and market returns is rather driven by 
firms with presumably ‘overpaid’ executives. For our analysis of non-financial firms 
only (model (3)), results are weaker than for the full sample. The coefficient on AB-
NORMAL PAY turns out negative but statistically insignificant. For model (4), which 
investigates market reactions solely on the event date, the coefficient on the test variable 
ABNORMAL PAY turns out significantly negative (5% level) and the coefficient on 
PAY SENSITIVITY becomes significantly positive (5% level).
22
 As these one-day 
event window results are consistent with the findings for the three-day event window, 
we are able to rule out that our results are confounded by contemporary events related to 
the financial crisis. 
Control variables that turn out significant are FREE FLOAT (negative coefficient, mod-
els (3) and (4)) and MOMENTUM (positive coefficient). The negative coefficient on 
FREE FLOAT indicates that firms with high ownership dispersion react more negative-
ly to the first-time announcement of the regulation. 
Pooled multi-event analysis 
Table 2.6 reports the results from estimating our determinants models for the pooled 
sample of all seven events, using bootstrapped standard errors clustered by event (Cam-






) for models (1) and (3) is 0.02 (0.03), while adjust-
ed R
2
 for model (2) is slightly larger. Again, the explanatory power of our models is in 
line with the analyses of multiple events in similar studies where adjusted R
2
s range 
from 0.01 (Joos & Leung, 2013) to 0.17 (Zhang, 2007). Armstrong et al. (2010) also 
examine multiple events and report an R
2
 of 0.03.  
                                                 
21
  We also estimate model (1) without control variables for ABNORMAL PAY and PAY SENSITIVI-
TY separately, and for both test variables. For all re-estimations, results remain basically unchanged. 
22
  When comparing coefficients from model (1) to coefficients from 21 non-overlapping non-events in 
2008, results are confirmed. The test statistic indicates that ABNORMAL PAY is different from 
ABNORMAL PAY on non-events at the 5% level. 
23
  In additional tests, we re-estimate model (1) without control variables for ABNORMAL PAY and 
PAY SENSITIVITY separately, and for both test variables. For all re-estimations, results remain ba-
sically unchanged. 
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Table 2.6: Pooled multi-event analysis 
Variables   (1)   (2)   (3) 
ABNORMAL PAY   -0.012       -0.010 
    (-2.73)***       (-3.08)*** 
HIGH ABNORMAL PAY       -0.013     
        (-2.90)***     
LOW ABNORMAL PAY       0.004     
        (1.44)     
PAY SENSITIVITY   0.001   0.001   0.001 
    (1.93)*   (1.89)*   (2.17)** 
Controls             
FREE FLOAT   -0.018   -0.017   -0.021 
    (-1.95)*   (-1.84)*   (-1.86)* 
SIZE   -0.002   -0.002   -0.002 
    (-1.39)   (-1.44)   (-1.26) 
MTB   -0.000   -0.000   -0.001 
    (-0.67)   (-0.31)   (-1.17) 
MOMENTUM   0.007   0.007   0.004 
    (0.49)   (0.55)   (0.37) 
DAX   0.011   0.010   0.008 
    (1.03)   (0.99)   (0.80) 
Intercept             
CONS   0.040   0.041   0.038 
    (1.83)*   (1.87)*   (1.75)* 
N   1353   1353   1195 
R2   0.03   0.04   0.03 
Adjusted R2   0.02   0.03   0.02 
Banks   included   included   no 
Industry fixed effects   yes   yes   yes 
Clustered Std. Err.   event   event   event 
Notes: This table reports the results from regressing three-day MARs  (-1/+1) around the identified event dates on proxy variables 
for the quality of executive compensation and various control variables using industry fixed effects and bootstrapped standard 
errors (1000 repetitions) clustered at the event-level. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 2.1. Z-values are reported in 
parentheses.  
*** Two-tailed significance at the 1% level from testing whether coefficients are different from zero. 
** Two-tailed significance at the 5% level from testing whether coefficients are different from zero.  
* Two-tailed significance at the 10% level from testing whether coefficients are different from zero.  
 
Consistent with the results for the single-event analysis, estimation of model (1) yields a 
negative and strongly significant coefficient for our main test variable ABNORMAL 
PAY. The economic effect of one standard deviation change in ABNORMAL PAY is -
0.52% and thus larger than for the other variables included in model (1). The coefficient 
estimate for the test variable PAY SENSITIVITY turns out positive and significant at 
the 10% level. For model (2), we find a significantly negative coefficient on HIGH 
ABNORMAL PAY, the indicator variable for firms in the top quintile of ABNORMAL 
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PAY (1% level). The coefficient for the lowest quintile (LOW ABNORMAL PAY) is 
insignificant. Again, this finding suggests that the negative coefficient on ABNORMAL 
PAY in model (1) is driven by firms with high levels of ‘overpayment’, which experi-
ence decreases in economic value upon announcement of regulatory intent. In contrast 
to the single-event analysis, we now also find a significant negative (positive) coeffi-
cient on our variable ABNORMAL PAY (PAY SENSITIVITY) (1% and 5% level, re-
spectively) for the subsample of non-financial firms (model (3)). This leads us to rule 
out that our main results are primarily driven by financial firms.
24
 The coefficient on 
FREE FLOAT turns out significantly negative across all models, while the coefficient 
on MOMENTUM does not.  
Results from the Monte-Carlo simulation in Table 2.7 confirm the results from tradi-
tional test statistics with respect to ABNORMAL PAY. We find that the coefficient on 
ABNORMAL PAY from model (1) in Table 2.7 is significantly smaller on the event 
dates, as compared to its non-event distribution. The coefficient on PAY SENSITIVITY 
differs significantly from the mean coefficient obtained from the Monte-Carlo simula-
tion (second test statistic).  
                                                 
24
  Untabulated pooled regression estimates for the sample of financial firms confirm this result, yield-
ing coefficient estimates in line with our full sample analyses. We also estimated models (1) and (3) 
for event Nos. 2-7 to rule out that results are driven by event 1, which may be confounded due to the 
financial crisis. We find that the coefficient on ABNORMAL PAY is significantly negative (5% lev-
el) and the coefficient on PAY SENSITIVITY is significantly positive at the 10% level (5% level) in 
model (1) (model (3)). These slightly weaker results are not surprising since the first-time an-
nouncement is our main event where the regulatory intent was announced for the first time. 
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Table 2.7: Monte-Carlo simulation for the pooled multi-event analysis 
Variables   
Coefficients from 
model (1)   
Average coeffi-
cients from the 
simulation of non-




ABNORMAL PAY   -0.012   -0.001   (0.011)** 
            (0.004)*** 
PAY SENSITIVITY   0.001   0.000   (0.044)** 
            (0.132) 
Controls             
FREE FLOAT   -0.018   -0.001   (0.059)* 
            (0.081)* 
SIZE   -0.002   -0.000   (0.202) 
            (0.176) 
MTB   -0.000   -0.000   (0.796) 
            (0.451) 
MOMENTUM   0.007   -0.012   (0.170) 
            (0.158) 
DAX   0.011   0.000   (0.301) 
            (0.166) 
Intercept           (0.307) 
CONS   0.040   0.008   (0.140) 
            (0.199) 
Banks   Included   Included     
Industry fixed effects   Yes   Yes     
Clustered Std. Err.   Event   Event     
Notes: This table compares the results from the main model (1) (Table 2.6) for the multi-event analysis to mean coefficients ob-
tained from Monte-Carlo Simulation. Simulated coefficients are average coefficients drawn from 1000 repetitions of randomly 
selecting seven non-events. P-values are the results from comparing the coefficients from model (1) to the average coefficients from 
the simulation and are reported in parentheses. Bootstrap p-values are the percentage of coefficients drawn from 1,000 repetitions of 
randomly selecting seven non-events that are higher (for positive coefficients) or lower (for negative coefficients) than those of the 
main model. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 2.1. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 




Our consistent findings of a significantly negative coefficient on our main test variable 
ABNORMAL PAY indicate that ‘excess’ compensation is negatively associated with 
market value reactions to an increased likelihood or scope and content of the regulation. 
This leads to rejecting our second hypothesis H2 that shareholders associate benefits 
with the regulation for those firms which are particularly affected. Moreover, this evi-
dence is consistent with the Larcker et al. (2011) findings for the USA, which apparent-
ly translate to other jurisdictions and governance systems such as Germany. However, 
by partitioning our measure of abnormal compensation in model (2), we go beyond 
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Larcker et al. (2011), and reveal that market value discounts for firms with ‘overpaid’ 
executives are not compensated by market value increases for firms with ‘underpaid’ 
executives. Apparently, the negative association of abnormal pay and market returns is 
driven by firms with presumably overpaid executive board members, which suggests 
that the regulation imposed costs mainly on firms with an abnormally high level of ex-
ecutive compensation. Shareholders of firms that were explicitly targeted by the regula-
tion expected the regulation to decrease firm value, which suggests that the regulation 
was not viewed as breaking up inefficient contractual arrangements, but rather the op-
posite. Although weaker in terms of significance, the positive coefficient for our varia-
ble measuring pay-performance sensitivity is consistent with that interpretation, and 
leads us to reject our third hypothesis (H3). Our subsample analysis for non-financial 
firms confirms that these effects or market perceptions are not centred on banks only, 
but appear to represent a rather general, cross-industry phenomenon.  
Taken together, our findings demonstrate an economic impact of the regulation, as re-
flected in significant market reactions both for the announcement-date analysis and for 
the pooled analysis. While the direction of the economic impact, the change in firm val-
ue, varies across firms, we are able to document in particular that the negative market 
reactions for firms with presumably overpaid managers are not compensated by ‘win-
ners’ of the regulation, as we are unable to demonstrate gains for firms with underpaid 
executives. Together with our initial finding that the mean market reaction over all 
events was not positive, we interpret our findings as evidence that overall, market par-
ticipants did not regard the regulation as beneficial. Therefore, we need to reject not 
only our hypotheses, but also the notion that regulation of executive compensation in 
the German stakeholder environment may force contractual arrangement closer to effi-
cient outcomes from a shareholder-oriented perspective. 
We note that our results are supported by various triangulations. First, we are able to 
demonstrate our main findings both for the first-time exogenous shock and for the 
pooled sample. Second, we ascertain significance of our results using three different test 
statistics. However, as noted, we cannot preclude measurement bias for our test varia-
bles, in particular for our measure of pay-performance sensitivity. Also, we caution that 
our findings do not allow for ultimate inferences with respect to the potential usefulness 
of this particular regulation, given the diverse impact on the firm level. Finally, our 
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analysis of economic effects is limited to shareholder wealth, and leaves out other con-
stituencies whose welfare might be affected by the regulation.  
2.5.3 Robustness tests 
To assess the robustness of our results, we estimate our models employing several var-
iations in the dependent variables and the test variables. Table 2.8 summarizes the re-
sults from these robustness checks, and reports the findings from our main analyses. 
With respect to our dependent variable, MAR (Table 2.8, Panel A), we alternatively use 
a five-day event window (-2/+2) instead of a three-day window. Results are similar, 
with slight variations in the significance levels. Second, we replace our dependent vari-
able MARs with cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), also for the three-day event win-
dow (e.g. MacKinlay, 1997). Consistent with our main analyses, we use as a proxy for 
the market portfolio the FTSE World Europe excluding Germany index. The estimation 
window comprises 250 trading days prior to the respective events. Again, we find re-
sults consistent with our main analyses. 
We also use alternative specifications of the two test variables, ABNORMAL PAY and 
PAY SENSITIVITY. For our main test variable ABNORMAL PAY, our main analyses 
use a definition consistent with Cai and Walking (2011). For the robustness analysis 
(Table 2.8, Panel B), we first use an alternative specification similar to Larcker et al. 
(2011) and define EXCESS PAY as the two-year average of the natural logarithm of 
average executive compensation less the median of the firm’s size tercile of the respec-
tive SIC division.
25
 Consistent with our main findings this analysis yields that, although 
negative, the coefficient for EXCESS PAY is not significant for the single-event analy-
sis, but turns out negative and significant at the 1% level in our pooled multi-event 
analysis. Second, we modify our definition of ABNORMAL PAY by using the number 
of employees instead of market capitalisation as the proxy variable for SIZE. We find 
that results remain basically unchanged, although significance levels decrease to 10% 
(5%) for the single-event (pooled) analysis. Third, we use sales instead of market capi-
talisation as the proxy variable for SIZE. While the sign of the coefficient estimate re-
mains negative, it slightly misses the significance threshold of 10%, with a p-value of 
0.107 (not tabulated). Fourth, we estimate model (1) using CEO compensation data in-
                                                 
25
  Larcker et al. (2011) use a substantially larger sample and subtract from the natural logarithm of 
CEO compensation the natural logarithm of median annual CEO compensation for all firms in the 
same industry group and size quintile. 
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stead of average board member compensation. However, we note that this analysis is 
subject to heavy selection bias. Roughly one out of five listed firms does not report re-
muneration details for single board members, thereby applying a legal ‘opt-out’ clause 
granted to firms where a majority of 75 % of shareholders supports such non-disclosure. 
As Hitz and Werner (2012) show, firms that are particularly likely to use this ‘opt-out’ 
clause are such firms that pay average ‘excess’ compensation, that is, compensation 
above the industry average.
26
 Therefore, it comes as no surprise that results for the CEO 
sample are weaker and the coefficient on ABNORMAL CEO PAY is negative but not 
significant. 
With respect to our second test variable, PAY SENSITIVITY, we use two alternative 
specifications (Table 2.8, Panel C). First, we use the percentage change in total compen-
sation instead of the percentage change in performance-based compensation compo-
nents only. Results remain unchanged, but the significance of the coefficient on PAY 
SENSITIVITY increases to the 5% level in the pooled analysis. Second, we use total 
cash compensation (i.e. fixed salary and short-term bonuses) instead of performance-
based compensation in the numerator. Again, the coefficient on PAY SENSITIVITY in 
the pooled analysis turns out significantly negative (5% level).   
                                                 
26
  Similarly, our data show that for firms with positive values for ABNORMAL PAY, and thus pre-
sumably overpaid executives, mean ABNORMAL PAY is significantly higher (5% level) for firms 
not included in this robustness test than for firms for which the relevant CEO compensation data are 
available. 
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Table 2.8: Summary of original findings and robustness tests 
  Original findings (Table 2.6)   Robustness tests 
Panel A: Alternative measures of the dependent variable (Market reactions) 






















PAY -0.012   -0.010   -0.012   -0.010   -0.013   -0.011 
  (-2.73)***   (-3.08)***   (-1.95)*   (-1.87)*   (-2.76)***   (-3.82)*** 
PAY SENSITIV-
ITY 0.001   0.001   0.001   0.002   0.001   0.001 
  (1.93)*   (2.17)**   (3.73)***   (3.62)***   (1.95)*   (2.05)** 
Panel B: Alternative measures of abnormal pay 






































ABNORMAL PAY -0.012   -0.010   -0.009   -0.008   -0.004   -0.005 
  (-2.73)***   (-3.08)***   (-2.84)***   (-2.21)**   (-1.61)   (-1.20) 
PAY SENSITIVI-
TY 0.001   0.001   0.000   0.001   0.001   0.001 
  (1.93)*   (2.17)**   (1.04)   (2.07)**   (2.26)**   (2.30)** 
Panel C: Alternative measures of pay-performance sensitivity 




































TY   
ABNORMAL PAY -0.012   -0.010   -0.012   -0.013   -0.005   
   (-2.73)***   (-3.08)***   (-2.70)***   (-3.05)***   (-1.20)   
 PAY SENSITIVI-
TY 0.001   0.001   0.003   0.002   0.001   
   (1.93)*   (2.17)**   (2.18)**   (2.31)**   (2.30)**   
 Notes: This table reports original findings from our pooled analyses (Table 2.6), and results from various robustness checks, which 
repeat the original pooled analyses employing alternative specifications of the dependent variable (market reactions), and the two 
test variables, ABNORMAL PAY and PAY SENSITIVITY. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 2.1. Z-values are reported 
in parentheses.  
***Two-tailed significance at the 1% level from testing whether coefficients are different from zero.  
** Two-tailed significance at the 5% level from testing whether coefficients are different from zero.  
* Two-tailed significance at the 10% level from testing whether coefficients are different from zero.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
This paper exploits a quasi-natural experimental setting, the recent regulation of board 
executive compensation in Germany, to shed light on how the market perceives the im-
pact of the regulation on firm value. We find that market perceptions, reflected in ab-
normal returns around the announcement of the regulation and the ensuing events that 
ultimately led to adoption of the regulation, were mildly negative on average. Detailed 
analyses shed more light on this market reaction and reveal that firms which were more 
likely to be affected by the regulation experience reductions in equity market value, in 
particular firms with high ‘abnormal’ compensation. This indicates that at least for a 
subset of firms, market participants regarded the proposed regulation as potentially 
shaking up efficient compensation contracts. 
These findings illustrate how the proposed regulation diversely affects different firms, 
depending on the nature of compensation contracts in place. On a broader level, our 
results corroborate and augment prior US evidence of a negative impact of comparable 
regulation, emphasizing how equity market participants across jurisdictions and institu-
tional environments selectively disapprove of regulating management compensation.  
Our findings are subject to limitations. First, while most provisions of the VorstAG reg-
ulation pertain to listed and private firms, our findings relate to the former only. As 
governance mechanisms and ownership structures are distinctively different for private 
firms, our findings on the impact of the regulation are not generalisable to these firms. 
Second, our measure of economic impact, firm value, reflects shareholders’ welfare 
only. Therefore, we are unable to give a thorough assessment of the usefulness of the 
regulation with respect to other stakeholders’ welfare. Third, our findings are subject to 
the quality of our empirical constructs. In particular, as we cannot observe existing con-
tracts in place, we need to rely on observable data on management compensation to 
identify firms with contracts that may provide for abnormally high remuneration or that 
may only weakly tie pay to performance. 
Overall, this paper’s findings underscore how regulation of governance mechanisms 
potentially affects economic welfare, and that it potentially does so with high variation 
on the firm level. Moreover, our findings emphasize the need to document and explore 
economic impacts of regulation in an era of increasing state intervention.  
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2.7 Appendix 
Appendix A: Descriptive statistics for the first-time announcement 
Panel A: Descriptives       
    Mean   
Standard 
deviation       
First 
quartile   Median   
Third 
quartile       N   
ABNORMAL PAY   0.0046   0.4258       -0.2747   0.0228   0.2664       202   
PAY SENSITIVITY   -0.3141   3.5141       -0.4065   0.0134   0.2095       202   
FREE FLOAT   0.6049   0.2441       0.4300   0.5800   0.8100       202   
SIZE (in millions)   5230.92   14888.85       67.83   252.70   1632.96       202   
MTB   2.6312   3.1983       1.3044   1.9250   2.9318       202   
MOMENTUM   -0.0066   0.2284       -0.1373   -0.0083   0.1172       202   
DAX   0.1188   0.3244       0.0000   0.0000   0.0000       202   
Panel B: Correlations       
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   
ABNORMAL PAY   (1)   1.0000                           
PAY SENSITIVITY   (2)   -0.0425   1.0000                       
FREE FLOAT   (3)   0.1211   -0.0943   1.0000                   
SIZE   (4)   0.0218   -0.0180   0.2746   1.0000               
MTB   (5)   0.0216   -0.0759   -0.0946   0.0129   1.0000           
MOMENTUM   (6)   -0.1646   -0.1191   -0.1218   0.0504   0.0112   1.0000       
DAX   (7)   0.0762   0.0124   0.2949   0.8121   0.0133   0.0378   1.0000   
Notes: Panel A shows descriptive statistics and Panel B reports Pearson correlations for the variables included in the regressions 
(values for event No. 1). Definitions of variables are reported in Table 2.1. In Panel A, SIZE is reported without the natural loga-
rithm. In Panel B, bold values indicate two-tailed significance at the 10% level. 
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Appendix B: Descriptive statistics for financial firms 
Panel A: Descriptives       
    Mean   
Standard 
deviation       
First 
quartile   Median   
Third 
quartile       N   
ABNORMAL PAY   0.0158 
 
0.4894 






   
158   
PAY SENSITIVITY   0.7679 
 
3.6742 






   
158   
FREE FLOAT   0.6363 
 
0.2641 






   
158   
SIZE (in millions)   4493.15 
 
10131.59 






   
158   
MTB   1.3965 
 
1.8543 






   
158   
MOMENTUM   0.0094 
 
0.2854 






   
158   
DAX   0.2152 
 
0.4123 






   
158   
Panel B: Correlations       
















ABNORMAL PAY   (1) 
 
1.0000 
             





           







         









       











     













   
















Notes: Panel A shows descriptive statistics and Panel B reports Pearson correlations for the variables included in the regressions 
(values for all seven events) for financials only. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 2.1. In Panel A, SIZE is reported 
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Abstract: This paper exploits an exogenous shock to the requirements for opting out of 
the EU-regulated equity market in Germany to investigate investor perceptions of being 
able to downlist from the highly regulated EU-regulated market to the weakly regulated 
exchange-regulated market. I examine whether investors value the bonding to the high 
level of disclosure in the EU-regulated market or whether they welcome firms being 
able to leave the costly EU-regulated market, as proposed under the loss of competitive-
ness theory. Using event study methodology, I measure market reactions and determi-
nants of market reactions around four (six) events that lead to reductions (increases) in 
the requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated market in Germany. While reduc-
tions in opt out requirements seem to matter to investors, as reflected in abnormally 
high trading volume around the respective events, subsequent increases in the require-
ments do not. My findings on price reactions are mainly indicative of cost considera-
tions that are shared by investors. Investors of firms which are considered to be more 
likely to opt out due to high ownership concentration, erroneous financial statements, 
and financial distress welcome the reduced regulation. However, in some cases, findings 
can also be aligned with bonding theory. Finally, negative price reactions for firms that 
downlist under the reduced regulation indicate that investors might have anticipated 
compensation in exchange for their shares, which was no longer possible under the re-
vised regulation. 
JEL Classification: M 48. 
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3.1 Introduction 
This paper exploits an exogenous shock to requirements for opting out of the EU-
regulated market to investigate equity investors’ perceptions of such an opt out. I inves-
tigate whether investors value the bonding to the high level of disclosure and enforce-
ment in the EU-regulated market or whether they welcome firms being able to leave the 
costly EU-regulated market, as proposed under the loss of competitiveness theory. A 
firm’s commitment to strict reporting and disclosure requirements reduces information 
asymmetry, increases liquidity, and lowers costs of capital (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 2000). Bonding theory suggests that monitoring imposed on firms by 
committing to a stricter listing regime that is hard to dispense with increases firm value 
(Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 2002). By voluntarily subjecting themselves to 
higher disclosure requirements and a higher level of enforcement, issuers reduce infor-
mation asymmetries between managers, or majority shareholders, and minority share-
holders. Consequently, committing to a stricter listing regime increases minority inves-
tor protection. As this commitment is costly, it may function as a signal of positive fu-
ture prospects of a firm (e.g., Mittoo, 1992). 
A firm’s listing choice is driven by trading off costs (e.g., direct costs of the listing, in-
direct costs that result from mandatory reporting requirements, and voluntary disclosure 
expected by investors) and benefits (e.g., capital raising opportunities, lower infor-
mation asymmetry, and hence higher liquidity) of the listing status (Bharath and 
Dittmar, 2010; Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2012). Since firms continuously evaluate the 
costs and benefits of their listing status, a shift in these related costs or benefits can lead 
to a revision in a firm’s listing choice. The loss of competitiveness theory suggests that 
a firm’s decision to discontinue its listing under a stricter listing regime is likely driven 
by an increase in compliance costs that leads to an unfavorable cost-benefit tradeoff 
(Zingales, 2007). However, if a firm faces an unfavorable cost-benefit tradeoff regard-
ing the listing per se, but costs associated with opting out of the listing regime are pro-
hibitively high, the firm may choose to remain within the current listing regime. Thus, a 
reduction in the requirements for opting out of the listing regime may lead to a revision 
in the firm’s listing choice. 
My non-exclusive predictions on investor perceptions of changes in requirements for 
opting out of the EU-regulated market follow loss of competitiveness and bonding theo-
ry, respectively. If the costs of the listing exceed its benefits, as proposed under the loss 
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of competitiveness theory, but opting out is too costly for reasons of high requirements, 
I expect that investors welcome (penalize) reduced (increased) requirements for opting 
out of the EU-regulated market. In contrast, if investors value the bonding to the EU-
regulated market, I expect that investors penalize (welcome) reduced (increased) re-
quirements for opting out of the EU-regulated market. I expect that market reactions are 
more pronounced for firms that are more likely to consider opting out of the EU-
regulated market due to high compliance costs, low financing needs, low liquidity, more 
concentrated ownership, and low commitment to increased disclosure.  
Until recently, German firms were hardly able to “regularly”
3
 opt out of the EU-
regulated market, that is, to downlist from the EU-regulated market to the exchange-
regulated market. The so-called ‘Macrotron’ principles, effective since 2002, required 
firms to provide a majority vote by the shareholders’ meeting and an offer to buy shares 
from minority shareholders in order to downlist or to delist. In contrast to the EU-
regulated market that specifies extensive disclosure requirements mandated in particular 
by the European Union, firms listed in the exchange-regulated market are only subject 
to regulation imposed by the respective stock exchange. In 2012, following several re-
gional court rulings, the German Federal Constitutional Court agreed that the ‘Macro-
tron’ principles were not applicable to downlistings to the exchange-regulated market. 
As a result, in 2013, the ‘Macrotron’ principles were revoked. These reduced opt out 
requirements led to a sharp increase in the number of downlistings. Until 2014, 93 firms 
had moved to the exchange-regulated market (Pasch et al., 2015). As this development 
was criticized as harming minority shareholders (e.g., FAZ, 2014), the German legisla-
tor started to address the regulation of opt outs in early 2015. Following a relatively 
short regulatory process, the German Parliament passed a revised regulation on October 
1, 2015 mandating firms to offer to shareholders compensation based on the average 
stock price over the past six months in case of downlistings and delistings. 
This German setting allows me to investigate whether investors welcome the reduced 
requirements for opting out of the costly EU-regulated market or whether investors val-
ue the bonding to the strict disclosure requirements. Also, it enables me to examine 
whether this notion is still shared by investors when requirements for opting out are 
increased subsequently. I identify four (six) events leading to the gradual decrease (in-
                                                 
3
  Firms that opt out “regularly” are firms whose opt out is not attributable to bankruptcy, mergers, or 
acquisitions. 
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crease) in opt out requirements from January 2012 to November 2013 (March to Octo-
ber 2015). For a sample of 2991 firm-event observations of German firms listed at FSE 
(Frankfurt Stock Exchange), I measure three-day market adjusted returns and abnormal 
trading volume. Using OLS-regression, I estimate determinants of pooled price reac-
tions for events leading to reductions (increases) in opt out requirements. 
Unlike prior U.S. findings that indicate that investors of cross-listed firms value the 
bonding to high disclosure requirements in the U.S. (Doidge et al., 2010; Fernandes et 
al., 2010), my findings are mainly indicative of cost considerations that are shared by 
investors, as proposed under the loss of competitiveness theory. I find evidence of a 
weakly positive price reaction to reductions in opt out requirements. While reductions in 
opt out requirements seem to have an impact on expectations of investors, as reflected 
in abnormally high trading volume, increases in the requirements for opting out do not. 
Similarly, results on price reactions to increases in opt out requirements are mostly in-
significant. Consequently, findings mostly relate to events leading to reduced opt out 
requirements. My findings on the determinants of price reactions suggest that for firms 
with high ownership concentration, and for firms previously censured under the German 
enforcement regime, the costs of the listing seem to outweigh the benefits, and being 
able to opt out might be beneficial from an investor perspective. Results on firms that 
have been previously censured under the enforcement regime are confirmed when opt 
out requirements are hitherto increased as investors of these firms react negatively to the 
regulation. Also in line with the loss of competitiveness theory, investors of financially 
distressed, leveraged firms seem to welcome the reduced requirements for leaving the 
costly EU-regulated market. However, findings on leveraged firms can also be recon-
ciled with the bonding hypothesis. Monitoring by banks can be interpreted as an alterna-
tive monitoring mechanism that makes bonding to the EU-regulated market redundant. 
In line with this notion, investors of less leveraged firms react less positively to reduced 
opt out requirements. Also in line with bonding theory, firms that opt out subsequently 
exhibit significantly negative price reactions to reductions in opt out requirements. This 
finding might indicate that investors in fact value the bonding to stricter disclosure and 
reporting requirements in the EU-regulated market. However, it is also possible that this 
price reaction is attributable to the fact that investors had anticipated compensation. In 
many cases, investors already knew that the firm was intending to downlist. Prior to the 
reduced regulation, investors of downlisting firms were able to hope for compensation 
as required under the ‘Macrotron’ principles. If investors had anticipated compensation 
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that was no longer required under the revised regulation, these investors would have 
incurred wealth decreases. The weak findings on increases in opt out requirements 
might be attributable to the fact that revised requirements could have been stricter, or to 
the fact that firms eligible to opting out had already done so under the reduced regula-
tion. 
Overall, this paper’s findings extend prior U.S. evidence as they show that, in some cas-
es, investors seem to welcome being able to opt out of the EU-regulated market, as pro-
posed under the loss of competitiveness theory. In the German continental European 
setting, in contrast to the U.S. cross-listing setting, firms that opt out remain within the 
same jurisdiction. Therefore, investors do not need to fear that they will be less in-
formed due to an increased regional distance to the stock exchange location. Also, visi-
bility to competitors or customers in another jurisdiction does not need to be taken into 
consideration by investors. This paper cautions that, in the German continental Europe-
an setting, the negative cost-benefit tradeoff seems to occasionally outweigh the bond-
ing to stricter disclosure requirements in the EU-regulated market. Consequently, U.S. 
findings on changes in opt out requirements do not necessarily translate to the continen-
tal European environment, where a substantial number of firms has recently opted out 
of increased disclosure requirements (Fiechter et al., 2016; Pasch et al., 2015). Findings 
should also be of interest to regulators, who argued that higher opt out requirements 
increase investor protection (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015). However, weak trading vol-
ume reactions around events related to increases in opt out requirements indicate that 
the regulation did not matter much to investors. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 3.2, I outline the institutional back-
ground in Germany. Section 3.3 summarizes the theoretical background, related litera-
ture, and develops my predictions. The research design of the paper is outlined in sec-
tion 3.4 and results are presented and discussed in section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes. 
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3.2 Institutional background 
3.2.1 Disclosure requirements of market segments at FSE 
I examine firms listed at Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE), the most prominent German 
stock exchange, which comprises most German listed firms.
4
 FSE offers two types of 
capital market access: the EU-regulated market and the exchange-regulated market 
(open market). Firms that “regularly” opt out of the EU-regulated market of FSE usual-
ly downlist to the exchange-regulated market at FSE (Pasch et al., 2015).
5
 Disclosure 
requirements between the EU-regulated market and the exchange-regulated market dif-
fer substantially. In order to emphasize the impact of opting out of the EU-regulated 
market on the level of disclosure, this section summarizes disclosure requirements of 
firms listed in the EU-regulated and exchange-regulated market of FSE, respectively. A 
detailed overview of the reporting requirements at FSE during the period of interest is 
given by Hitz and Müller-Bloch (2016). 
Firms listed in EU-regulated market segments are subject to mandatory IFRS reporting 
for consolidated financial accounts (sec. 315 Commercial Code (CC)) and enforcement 
of accounting standards by FREP and BaFin (sec. 342b CC, sec. 37n-37u Securities 
Trading Act (STA)). These firms have to prepare annual financial reports within four 
months after fiscal year end (sec. 37v, 37y STA) and semi-annual financial reports with-
in two months after the end of the second quarter (sec. 37w, 37y STA). FSE not only 
offers the regular EU-regulated market, the General Standard, but also a premium seg-
ment, the Prime Standard.
6
 According to FSE (2016a), the Prime Standard segment 
aims at firms that intend to target also international investors. During the period of in-
terest, firms listed in the General Standard segment had to publish interim announce-
ments around the end of the first and third quarter (sec. 37x STA, old version), while 
firms listed in the Prime Standard had to prepare interim financial reports within two 
months after the end of the first and third quarter (§ 51 Stock Exchange Rules (SER), 
                                                 
4
  As of July 2015, out of 686 firms listed in the German EU-regulated market with equity or debt 
instruments, 473 firms were listed at FSE with equity instruments. 
5
  Pasch et al. (2015) also give an overview of other regional stock exchanges in Germany. 
6
  Sec. 42 of the Stock Exchange Act (SEA) explicitly introduces the possibility for stock exchanges to 
establish sub-segments of the EU-regulated market with additional post-admission obligations. 
Based on this rule, the FSE not only offers the regular EU-regulated market, the General Standard, 
but also a premium segment, the Prime Standard. 




 Apart from financial reports, firms listed in EU-regulated market seg-
ments have to fulfil additional disclosure requirements, such as ad hoc announcements 
(sec. 15 STA) and director’s dealings (sec. 15a STA).  
The exchange-regulated market of FSE comprises the Entry Standard segment.
8
 The 
Entry Standard segment was established to ease capital market access for small and me-
dium sized firms (FSE, 2016b). Firms listed in the Entry Standard have to prepare fi-
nancial statements (consolidated financial statements) and a management report accord-
ing to German GAAP (sec. 264, 290 CC). The General Terms and Conditions of the 
Open Market (GTC) mandate them to publish an audited financial statement and the 
management report within six months after fiscal year end (sec. 19 GTC), and to pre-
pare semi-annual financial statements within three months after the end of the second 
quarter (sec. 19 GTC). In addition, during the period of interest, firms listed in the Entry 
Standard segment had to publish important information regarding securities and the 
issuers (“quasi ad hoc announcements”) (sec. 19 GTC).
9
 
3.2.2 Regulation of requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated market and iden-
tification of events 
This paper exploits an exogenous shock to the requirements for opting out of the EU-
regulated market, namely the decrease in opt out requirements in 2012 and 2013 due to 
court rulings, and the subsequent increase in opt out requirements in 2015 due to a revi-
sion in the regulation. As these events exogenously altered the costs associated with 
opting out, these regulatory changes in Germany present an interesting setting to inves-
tigate whether investors value the bonding to the EU-regulated market or whether inves-
tor perceptions rather follow cost considerations. 
                                                 
7
  As of November 2015, firms listed in the General Standard are no longer required to publish interim 
announcements, whereas firms listed in the Prime Standard are no longer required to publish interim 
financial reports, but have to publish interim announcements instead (sec. 51a SER). 
8
  Sec. 48 SEA enables stock exchanges to introduce exchange-regulated market segments with addi-
tional post-admission obligations within the open market, as long as these additional obligations do 
not apply to issuers that are included in the exchange-regulated market without the issuers consent. 
Consequently, the FSE offers a qualified exchange-regulated market segment with additional post-
admission obligations, the Entry Standard, in which stocks are only included on request of the issuer 
according to sec. 16 GTC. Apart from the Entry Standard, the FSE also offers an open market Seg-
ment for stocks that are also listed at other ‘qualified’ stock exchanges, the Quotation Board, in 
which stocks can be included without the issuer’s consent (sec. 10 GTC). 
9
  As of July 2016, firms listed in exchange-regulated market segments are subject to sec. 17 and 19 of 
the market abuse regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 (MAR)) (sec. 39 MAR). As a result, 
these firms are now mandated to publish ad hoc announcements and director’s dealings. 
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Until 2015, opting out of the EU-regulated market was possible, on the premise that 
investors were not harmed, consistent with investor protection (sec. 39 SEA). In 2002, 
this led to the so-called ‘Macrotron’ ruling, which established that delisting was condi-
tional on a majority vote of the shareholders’ meeting and an offer to buy shares from 
minority shareholders. This offer had to be based on a valuation of the firm with the 
current stock price serving as the minimum firm value. In the ‘Macrotron’ ruling, the 
German Federal Court of Justice stated that liquidity and additional listing obligations 
in the open market were not comparable to those in the EU-regulated market. Therefore, 
the ‘Macrotron’ principles were also applicable to downlistings. Consequently, since 
downlisting was costly under the ‘Macrotron’ principles, and costs were somewhat un-
predictable, opting out of the EU-regulated market was effectively impossible (e.g., 
Holzborn and Hilpert, 2010).
10
 
On January 10, 2012, an oral hearing on downlistings and delistings took place at the 
German Federal Constitutional Court (event No. 1).
11
 In this hearing, judges voiced 
doubts that downlistings lead to economic losses for investors. On July 11, 2012, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the ‘Macrotron’ principles were not 
applicable to downlistings to exchange-regulated market segments (event No. 2) and it 
was up to the German Federal Court of Justice to potentially revoke the ‘Macrotron’ 
principles. The German Federal Court of Justice revoked these principles on October 8, 
2013 (event No. 3), which was also published in a press release on November 12, 2013 
(event No. 4). Effectively, all German firms were now able to opt out of the EU-
regulated market upon decision of the executive directors. 
  
                                                 
10
  From 2007 on, this regulation started to dissolve. In July 2007 and May 2008, regional courts in 
Munich ruled that the ‘Macrotron’ principles were not applicable to downlistings to the exchange-
regulated market. In similar rulings in June 2008 and April 2009 by regional courts in Berlin, the 
courts followed the rulings from Munich. Consequently, from April 2009 on, firms were effectively 
able to downlist without facing the costs imposed by the ‘Macrotron’ principles (Hitz and Müller-
Bloch, 2016). In a semi-strong efficient market, information is immediately incorporated into prices, 
when it is publicly available. Nevertheless, since there were no press releases published in the course 
of these court decisions, it is not possible to determine, when these events became publicly available 
information. Therefore, they are not included in my analysis. 
11
  I identify events that changed the extent or likelihood of the regulation of delisting and downlisting 
requirements. Since requirements were altered by court decisions as well as regulatory action, I first 
search legislative announcements and press releases by German regulators and press releases on 
court rulings dealing with delisting or downlisting requirements. Secondly, I perform a media analy-
sis using the LexisNexis database and the print versions of ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)’ 
and ‘Handelsblatt’ to identify potential events not identified in the first analysis, and to ensure that 
the events were covered by the media and, thus, information on these events was publicly available. 
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Table 3.1: Events leading to changes in opt out requirements 
Event Date Type Content 
Impact on level 
of regulation 
1 Jan 10, 2012 Oral hearing (German 
Federal Constitutional 
Court) 
Results of the court proceedings is un-
clear but judges doubt that downlistings 
lead to economic losses for investors 
- 
2 July 11, 2012 Court decision (German 
Federal Constitutional 
Court) 
Previous requirements for delistings are 
no longer applicable to downlistings. 
German Federal Court of Justice is asked 
to consider revoking previous delisting 
requirements 
- 
3 Oct 8, 2013 Court decision (German 
Federal Court of Justice) 
Court decision to revoke previous delist-
ing requirements 
- 
4 Nov 12, 2013 Press release (German 
Federal Court of Justice) 
Press release on court decision of Oct 8, 
2013 
- 
5 Mar 6, 2015 Response to draft law 
(German Federal Coun-
cil) 
German Federal Council asks German 
Parliament to consider stricter require-
ments for delistings to protect minority 
shareholders 
+ 
6 May 6, 2015 Press release 
(CDU/CSU) 
Expert hearing in the legal committee of 
the German Parliament: The German 
Parliament is supposed to deal with delist-
ing requirements shortly 
+ 
7 May 28, 2015 Press release (SPD) Expert hearing: Experts agree that minori-
ty shareholders need to be compensated in 
case of a delisting 
+ 
8 Sept 7, 2015 Parliament hearing Expert hearing: Compensation depending 
on average prices over the past three 
months is considered 
+ 
9 Sept 24, 2015 Press release (SPD) Coalition agrees on increasing period for 
average prices to sixth months and stricter 
delisting requirements will be introduced 
in a week's time 
+ 
10 Sept 30, 2015 Parliament passage Passage of the law in the German Parlia-
ment 
+ 
This table summarizes events identified that led to changes in opt out requirements. 
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This regulation was criticized as harming minority shareholders from the beginning 
(e.g., FAZ, 2014) and German policy makers consequently started to consider to regu-
late opting out of the EU-regulated market in order to protect minority shareholders 
(e.g., Bayer and Hoffmann, 2015; FAZ, 2015a). On March 6, 2015, the German Federal 
Council asked the German Parliament to consider stronger regulation of opt outs to pro-
tect minority investors (event No. 5). On May 6, 2015, the conservatives issued a press 
release stating that the German Parliament was supposed to deal with compensation for 
minority shareholders in case of opt outs shortly (event No. 6). On May 28, 2015, the 
social democrats issued a press release noting that experts had agreed that compensation 
for minority shareholders was necessary (event No. 7). In a parliament hearing on Sep-
tember 7, 2015, compensation based on average stock prices over the past three months 
prior to announcing the intent to opt out was considered (event No. 8). Since the three 
months period was criticized by investor protection institutions, a press release issued 
by the social democrats on September 24, 2009 stated that the period would be in-
creased to six months (event No. 9). On September 30, 2015, the final version of the 
law was published and it was passed in the German Parliament on October 1, 2015. I 
include September 30, 2015 as the final event, since the governing parties and the media 
already noted on September 30, 2015 that the level of regulation had been increased 
(event No. 10). Effective retroactively to September 7, 2015, the executive board is still 
able to revoke a firm’s listing if investor protection is maintained. However, the with-
drawal is only legitimate if compensation is offered to investors. This compensation 
needs to be at least the average weighted domestic share price over the past six 
months.
12
 A majority vote by the shareholders meeting is not required. Table 3.1 sum-
marizes all events leading to changes in the level of the regulation of opt out require-
ments. 
3.3 Theoretical background, related literature, and predictions 
3.3.1 Theoretical background of listing decisions 
This paper focuses on firms that downlist, that is, firms that continue to be publicly 
traded but switch to a less liquid market with reduced reporting and compliance re-
quirements. Consequently, this paper is most closely related to the literature on cross-
(de)listings and voluntary (non-)disclosure. Prior literature suggests that a firm’s com-
                                                 
12
  In case of previous market abuse, the assessment has to be based on an income capitalization ap-
proach. 
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mitment to strict reporting and disclosure requirements reduces information asymmetry, 
increases liquidity, and lowers costs of capital (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Leuz and Verrec-
chia, 2000). Lambert et al. (2007) provide a theoretical framework that demonstrates 
that the quality of accounting information affects cost of capital. Balakrishnan et al. 
(2014) show empirically that increased disclosure improves liquidity, and thus increases 
firm value. Bharath and Dittmar (2010) outline that a firm’s listing choice is based on 
information considerations, access to capital, control, liquidity, and agency considera-
tions. Cross-listing can lead to more frequent trading of stocks, in particular, if liquidity 
in the domestic market is relatively low (e.g., Bancel and Mittoo, 2001; Mittoo, 1992; 
Pagano et al., 2002). According to Pagano et al. (2002), reasons for cross-listing include 
raising capital, liquidity, a positive cost-benefit tradeoff, and a commitment to disclo-
sure and governance standards, also referred to as signaling or bonding theory (e.g., 
Coffee, 1999; Coffee, 2002; Mittoo, 1992; Stulz, 1999). The ensuing sections outline 
two complimentary theories relating to the economic impact of reducing listing re-
quirements. 
3.3.1.1 Bonding theory 
In attempting to raise capital, managers, or majority shareholders,
13
 have to convince 
potential (minority) shareholders that they will receive higher cash flows from investing 
in the firm than from investing in an alternative investment with the same risk. Difficul-
ties in convincing potential shareholders stem from the information asymmetry between 
managers, or majority shareholders, and potential (minority) shareholders about the 
firm’s investments, and from the fact that managers might also engage in projects that 
do not increase (minority) shareholder welfare (Stulz, 1999). These problems can be 
mitigated by increased monitoring, which can, among other things, result from the legal 
system, for example, listing regimes with strong protection of (minority) shareholders, 
and from increased disclosure required by the listing regime (Stulz, 1999). Bonding 
theory suggests that listing under a stricter listing regime increases firm value, because, 
by voluntarily subjecting themselves to higher disclosure requirements and a higher 
level of enforcement, issuers compensate for weak protection of minority shareholders 
(Coffee, 2002). As committing to a stricter listing regime is costly, it may be regarded 
as a signal of positive future prospects of a firm (e.g., Mittoo, 1992). Such a listing re-
                                                 
13
  Note that the presence of large shareholders can also lead to increased monitoring of managers. 
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gime could be characterized either by a stricter regulatory environment or by an ex-
change with stricter disclosure requirements. 
Primarily, bonding theory is applied to cross-listings, that is, firms that remain listed at 
their domestic market and cross-list in the U.S. Empirically, Doidge et al. (2004) find 
that cross-listing firms have a higher valuation than single-listed firms and that control-
ling shareholders have only incentives to cross-list if they want to raise capital. Doidge 
et al. (2009) find that firms that have controlling shareholders, and firms that are con-
trolled by managers or their families, are less likely to cross-list, since U.S. securities 
law and enforcement seems to constraint the controlling shareholders’ ability to extract 
private benefits. In my downlisting setting, bonding relates to the commitment to an 
increased disclosure and enforcement regime that results from being listed in the EU-
regulated market instead of the exchange-regulated market. 
3.3.1.2 Loss of competitiveness theory 
Costs associated with being committed to a stricter listing regime are the direct costs of 
the listing (e.g., Mittoo, 1992) as well as indirect costs that result from increased finan-
cial disclosure such as mandated accounting, listing and regulatory requirements, and 
voluntary disclosures expected by market participants (Biddle and Saudagaran, 1989). 
From a theoretical perspective, firms will opt out of a listing regime if the costs of the 
listing outweigh the benefits (Bharath and Dittmar, 2010; Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 
2012). Since firms continuously evaluate the costs and benefits of their listing status, a 
shift in the costs or benefits of the listing status can lead to a revision in a firm’s listing 
choice. The loss of competitiveness theory suggests that a firm’s decision to discontinue 
its listing in a stricter listing regime, for example the U.S., is likely driven by increases 
in compliance costs that lead to an unfavorable cost-benefit tradeoff (Zingales, 2007). A 
similar argument applies to changes associated with the barriers for opting out of the 
current listing regime. If the costs of the listing exceed the benefits, but costs associated 
with opting out of the listing regime are prohibitively high, the firm might choose to 
remain within the current regime. Correspondingly, if the costs for opting out of the 
listing regime are reduced, the firm might use the opportunity and leave the current re-
gime, and thus increase firm value. 
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3.3.2 Related literature 
This paper relates most closely to the body of literature on market reactions to changes 
in requirements for opting out of specific listing requirements. Prior literature focuses 
on the introduction of Rule 12h-6, that allows cross-listed firms to deregister from the 
SEC, and thus to opt out of extensive disclosure requirements. Fernandes et al. (2010) 
investigate market reactions to the introduction of Rule 12h-6 and find an overall nega-
tive response to the introduction of Rule 12h-6 for firms cross-listed in the U.S. This 
reaction is particularly pronounced for firms that would be subject to weak disclosure 
requirements post deregistration from the SEC, since legal protection in the country of 
origin and disclosure requirements at the domestic exchange are low. The market reac-
tion is insignificant for firms that would be subject to a high level of legal protection 
and disclosure requirements post deregistration. Consequently, findings support bond-
ing theory, since investors of firms from weaker listing regimes value the cross-listing 
in the U.S. With respect to firm characteristics, the market reaction is incrementally 
more negative for larger firms, firms with high foreign sales, and firms with high inside 
ownership. The latter finding suggests that investors of firms with controlling share-
holders value the bonding to the U.S. disclosure and enforcement regime. Apart from 
determinants of cross-delisting decisions and market reactions to cross-delisting an-
nouncements, Doidge et al. (2010) examine market reaction to the passage of Rule 12h-
6 for a sample of firms that subsequently deregistered under the new rule. They docu-
ment no significant overall market reaction. In line with Fernandes et al. (2010), the 
market reaction is significantly negative for firms with high agency costs, for example, 
firms with high ownership concentration, which suggests that bonding is beneficial for 
these firms from a (minority) shareholder perspective. Market reactions do not depend 
on firm characteristics that explain a firm’s decision to deregister from the SEC. For a 
sample of German firms cross-listed at U.S. stock exchanges, Bessler et al. (2012) find 
a significantly positive market reaction to the introduction of Rule 12h-6, with 15 (two) 
firms exhibiting positive (negative) market reactions. This finding might suggest that 
for the majority of German cross-listed firms, being able to opt out of the U.S. listing is 
valued by investors, which would be in line with the loss of competitiveness theory. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, this paper contributes to the literature 
on market reactions to changes in opt out requirements, as the setting allows me to in-
vestigate firms that will remain within the same jurisdiction after opting out. This re-
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stricts motives for listing under a stricter listing regime to financing, liquidity, and 
bonding considerations. Regional motives for listing under a stricter listing regime, such 
as visibility to customers or competitors in the U.S. or growth of sales in the U.S. (Mit-
too, 1992; Pagano et al., 2002), do not need to be taken into consideration by investors 
when evaluating changes in opt out requirements. Similarly, investors do not need to 
fear that they will be less informed due to an increased regional distance to the stock 
exchange location. Second, in the past few years, an increasing number of firms has 
decided to opt out of stricter disclosure regimes in continental Europe (Fiechter et al., 
2016; Pasch et al., 2015). Still, evidence on investor perceptions of changes in opt out 
requirements is limited to the U.S. cross-listing setting. Prior U.S. evidence indicates 
that while most investors perceive reduced opt out requirements as value decreasing 
(Doidge et al., 2010; Fernandes et al., 2010), investors of German firms do not (Bessler 
et al., 2012). Thus, it is of interest, in particular to regulators in the European Union, 
whether prior U.S. findings translate to the German continental European setting. At 
last, this paper extends prior U.S. evidence on the introduction of Rule 12h-6 as it not 
only investigates reductions in opt out requirements but also investor perceptions of 
subsequent increases in opt out requirements.  
3.3.3 Development of empirical predictions 
The literature proposes two complimentary lines of thought on investors’ perceptions of 
opting out of a stricter disclosure and enforcement regime that stem from the cost-
benefit tradeoff of the listing status (loss of competitiveness theory) and bonding theory. 
If a firm’s decision to downlist results from a rational cost-benefit tradeoff from a (mi-
nority) shareholder perspective, (minority) shareholders should welcome the value-
enhancing decision to downlist. In contrast, higher agency costs associated with a listing 
in a less regulated segment might lead to negative stock price reactions (Leuz et al., 
2008). In a similar fashion, Doidge et al (2010) predict that under the loss of competi-
tiveness theory, firm that deregister to save listing costs experience a positive market 
reaction to the passage of Rule 12h-6. Under the bonding theory, in case of firms with 
greater potential for agency conflicts post deregistration, (minority) shareholders are 
expected to react negatively to the passage of Rule 12h-6. This line of thought can also 
be applied to the changes in the requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated market. 
Although market reactions to German firms’ announcements to downlist are, on aver-
age, significantly negative, almost half of the firms experience a positive market reac-
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tion (Hitz and Müller-Bloch, 2016). This pattern suggests that, for some firms, opting 
out of the EU-regulated market is perceived to be beneficial by investors, while it is 
costly for other firms. Building on the cost-benefit tradeoff or loss of competitiveness 
and the bonding rationale, I expect investors to welcome the possibility to opt out of 
EU-regulated market if the costs of the listing exceed the benefits of the listing, but opt-
ing out was too costly pre deregulation. In contrast, if investors value the firm’s bonding 
to the stricter disclosure requirements and enforcement in the EU-regulated market, and 
perhaps fear that the firm might opt out due to managerial discretion, I expect a negative 
market reaction to the deregulation. Vice versa, if barriers for opting out of the EU-
regulated market are increased, bonding theory proposes that the regulation is greeted 
by investors if they value the bonding to the requirements of the EU-regulated market. 
If firms face an unfavorable cost-benefit tradeoff, investors are expected to react nega-
tively to increased barriers for opting out of the EU-regulated market. 
Prior evidence suggests that a firm’s likelihood to opt out of a stricter listing regime 
varies among firm characteristics. Consequently, changes in the requirements for opting 
out of the EU-regulated market most likely do not affect all firms listed in the EU-
regulated market similarly. I differentiate firm characteristics that relate to a firm’s cost-
benefit tradeoff of the listing status and firm characteristics that relate to a firm’s bond-
ing to the current listing regime. Larger firms have higher needs to raise capital and in-
cremental costs of the listing in a stricter listing regime are relatively low (Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2001; Pagana et al., 2002). The benefit of being listed at a more liquid exchange 
increases with a firm’s level of liquidity (Bancel and Mittoo, 2001; Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand, 2012). In line with theoretical considerations, evidence by Hitz and Müller-
Bloch (2016) suggests that firms are more likely to downlist when compliance costs are 
relatively high and transparency benefits are relatively low. Similarly, Doidge et al. 
(2010) document that cross-delisting firms are relatively small and have lower sales 
growth. Leuz et al. (2008) find that firms that deregister from the SEC are relatively 
small, weak performing, and highly leveraged with low growth prospects. High lever-
age can indicate financial distress (e.g., Bechmann and Hjortshoj, 2009; Brealey et al., 
2014), which makes incremental costs of the listing more burdensome. Marosi and 
Massoud (2008) provide evidence that costs imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
have reduced benefits of cross-listing for smaller and less liquid firms. Consequently, I 
expect that firms with high Compliance costs, low Financing needs, and low Liquidity 
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are more affected by the changes in requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated 
market. 
Bonding to a stricter disclosure regime is particularly valuable for investors of firms 
with high inside ownership and less dispersed ownership (Doidge et al., 2010; Fer-
nandes et al., 2010). However, stricter listing regimes are also more costly for firms 
with stronger insider control (Marosi and Massoud, 2008). In line with this argument, 
evidence on the ownership structure across market segments of FSE reveals that owner-
ship is more dispersed in the EU-regulated market, while firms with high individual 
holdings are most likely listed in the exchange-regulated market.
14
 In line with these 
considerations, I expect that firms are more affected by the regulation when ownership 
dispersion is low and individual ownership is high (Ownership structure). Firms that 
have voluntarily committed to reporting more than required by the listing regime, e.g., 
by being listed in the Prime Standard segment or by voluntarily reporting under IFRS 
prior to 2005, are less likely to be affected by the regulation. In contrast, firms that did 
not fulfill reporting requirements by the listing regime in the past, for example, by re-
porting after the legal deadline or publishing erroneous financial statements, are more 
likely to be affected by the regulation as they show a low level of commitment (Com-
mitment). This is in line with evidence by Hitz and Müller-Bloch (2016), who document 
that firms are significantly more likely to downlist, when they have been censured under 
the enforcement regime in the past fiscal year. At last, firms that downlist subsequently 
under the reduced requirements are affected by the regulation, either because opt out 
requirements are reduced unexpectedly or because managers or majority shareholders 
decide to downlist in the light of the reduced regulation. 
3.4 Research design 
3.4.1 Measurement of market reactions to the (proposed) regulation 
To test my predictions, I measure market adjusted returns (CMARs) around ten events 
that significantly altered the requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated market. I 
                                                 
14
  Ownership structure across market segments at FSE as of June 10, 2016 is summarized in Appendix 
A. The percentage of free floating shares is significantly higher for firms listed in the EU-regulated 
market, whereas firms listed in the exchange-regulated market are significantly more often owned by 
natural persons, in particular family members. This pattern also applies to firms that were initially 
listed in the EU-regulated market and downlisted to the exchange-regulated market, but is less pro-
nounced when comparing General Standard and Entry Standard firms. In particular, firms that down-
listed previously barely differ from those listed in the General Standard. 
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choose a three-day window around the respective events, which is in line with prior 
literature (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2010; Fernandes et al., 2010; Joos and Leung, 2013). 
Further, the choice of a three-day event window is underpinned by the fact that most 
press coverage occurs the day after the event (see section 3.2.2). CMARs are measured 
as the difference between three-day raw returns for the respective firm and three-day 
market returns. I estimate market adjusted returns relative to the FTSE World Europe 
index excluding German firms, since German firms are affected by the regulation and, 
consequently, including German firms in the benchmark index would bias market ad-
justed returns, leading me to underestimate the effect of the regulation (Zhang, 2007). In 
order to examine whether firms are affected by the regulation, I also measure cumula-
tive abnormal trading volume (CAVol) around the ten events of interest (Bamber, 1987). 
Reactions in trading volume are likely to be high relative to price reactions when per-
ceptions among investors differ with respect to the consequences of the event (Bamber 
and Cheon, 1995). CAVol is measured as the sum of the difference between the daily 
relative trading volume, that is, the number of shares traded less the number of free 
floating shares outstanding, less the median relative trading volume estimated over a 
250 trading day window prior to the respective event.
15
 
I measure the mean market reaction for each of the ten events that lead to changes in 
requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated market (see section 3.2.2). Similar to 
Armstrong et al. (2010), Joos and Leung (2013), and Larcker et al. (2011), I also meas-
ure pooled market reactions. I measure mean market reactions for all four (six) events 
found to reduce (increase) requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated market. 
Apart from traditional test statistics, I also estimate market reactions absent regulatory 
action using Monte-Carlo simulation (Armstrong et al., 2010; Zhang, 2007). Using tra-
ditional test statistics, the underlying assumption is that mean market reactions are zero 
absent regulatory action. If market reactions absent regulatory action differ from zero, 
results might be attributable to misspecification. For the Monte-Carlo simulation, I ran-
domly select four (six) non-overlapping three-day non-event windows during the period 
from event No. 1 to event No. 4 (event No. 5 to event No. 10) and calculate pooled 
market reaction over these non-event windows. I repeat this procedure 1000 times to 
simulate the distribution of pooled market reactions across randomly selected non-event 
                                                 
15
  Since the data on trading volume available in Datastream is incomplete, I require data to be available 
on at least 75% of trading days during the 250 trading day window. Nevertheless, the sample for the 
analysis of CAVol only compromises 56.5% of the final sample. 
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windows. As an additional test statistic, I then calculate the bootstrap p-value, i.e., the 
percentage of pooled simulated market reactions that are higher (lower) than pooled 
market reactions around the event windows of interest if the pooled market reactions are 
positive (negative). 
3.4.2 Determinants model 
To test my predictions, I estimate the following model using OLS-regression and re-
gress CMAR on variables that capture whether a firm is presumably affected by the reg-
ulation: 
(1) CMARit = ∑ Compliance costsit +∑ Financing needsit + ∑ Liquidityit + ∑ Owner-
ship concentrationit + ∑ Commitmentit + Momentumit + industry fixed effects + ɛ 
The first dimension, Compliance costs is a vector variable that comprises Size, that is, 
the natural logarithm of total assets, ROA, that is, return on assets calculated as the dif-
ference between net income and interest expense on debt divided by average total assets 
during the fiscal year, and Leverage, that is, total assets less common equity divided by 
total assets. The second dimension, Financing needs, comprises Sales growth, that is, 
the two-year average of sales growth. The third dimension, Liquidity, comprises two 
measures of liquidity measured over a 250 trading days prior to the respective event 
date, namely the Bid-ask spread, that is, the natural logarithm of the median bid-ask 
spread mid-point scaled (e.g., Christensen et al., 2013), and the percentage of zero re-
turn days (% zero return days). As outlined in section 3.3.3, firms are more likely to opt 
out of the EU-regulated market if they are small, less profitable, more leveraged, have 
less financing needs, and are less liquid. Consequently, if a firm suffers from an unfa-
vorable cost-benefit tradeoff of the listing in the EU-regulated market, and that view is 
shared by investors, the market reaction to decreases (increases) in opt out requirements 
is negatively (positively) associated with Size, ROA, and Sales growth, and positively 
(negatively) associated with Leverage, Bid-ask-spread, and % zero return days. In con-
trast, if investors of these firms value the bonding of the respective firm to the EU-
regulated market, and fear that the firm might leave the EU-regulated market under re-
duced opt out requirements, the association with the above mentioned variables is re-
versed. 
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The fourth dimension, Ownership concentration, is measured at the respective event 
date and comprises Free Float, that is, the percentage of free floating shares, and Indi-
vidual holdings, that is, the percentage of shares strategically held by individuals (own-
ers and employees). The final vector variable, Commitment, measures the level of com-
mitment to increased disclosure. Commitment comprises Prime Standard, a binary vari-
able indicating that a firm is listed in the Prime Standard segment of FSE, Voluntary 
IFRS adoption, a binary variable indicating that a firm voluntarily adopted IFRS prior to 
2005, Error announcement, a binary variable indicating that a firm has been censured 
under the enforcement mechanism in the past fiscal year, and Delayed reporting, a bina-
ry variable indicating that a firm published at least one of the last two financial reports 
after the legal deadline of fourth months. As elaborated in section 3.3.3, firms are pre-
sumably more likely to opt out of the EU-regulated market when ownership concentra-
tion is high and the firm’s level of commitment to increased disclosure is low. If inves-
tors of these firms value the bonding of the respective firm to the EU-regulated market, 
and fear that the firm might leave the EU-regulated market under reduced opt out re-
quirements, the market reaction to decreases (increases) in opt out requirements is nega-
tively (positively) associated with Individual holdings, Error announcement, and De-
layed reporting and positively associated with Free Float, Prime Standard, and Volun-
tary IFRS adoption. If investors share the view of an unfavorable cost-benefit tradeoff 
for these firms, the association with the above mentioned variables is reversed. For 
events that relate to the decrease in the degree of regulation (event No. 1 – event No. 4), 
the last dimension also includes Downlisting, a binary variable indicating that a firm 
subsequently downlisted under the reduced regulation. If investors already suspect that 
the firm is a likely downlisting candidate, and investors value the bonding to the EU-
regulated market (share the view of an unfavorable cost-benefit tradeoff), Downlisting is 
negatively (positively) associated with reduced opt out requirements.  
I follow Larcker et al. (2011) and Ferri and Maber (2013) and include Momentum, that 
is, the market adjusted return over 250 trading days prior to the respective event, as a 
control variable. Finally, I follow Cai and Walkling (2011) and Zhang (2007) and in-
clude industry controls. In order to ensure that data from financial statements was al-
ready publicly known at the respective event date, data from financial statements is 
measured at the last fiscal year end for which the financial statement has already been 
published at the respective event date. Definitions of variables are summarized in Table 
3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Variables 
Variables Description 
CMAR Three-day [-1;1] market adjusted return relative to the FTSE Europe exclud-
ing Germany around the respective event date 
CAVol Three-day [-1;1] relative abnormal trading volume, i.e., trading volume less 
250 trading day mean trading volume, around the respective event date. Trad-
ing volume is the number of shares traded divided by the number of free float 
shares 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets at the last fiscal year end, winsorized at the 
1% and 99% level  
ROA Return on assets (net income less interest expense on debt divided by average 
total assets) at the last fiscal year end, winsorized at the 1% and 99% level  
Leverage Total assets less common equity divided by total assets at the last fiscal year 
end, winsorized at the 1% and 99% level  
Sales growth Two-year average of sales growth at the last fiscal year end, winsorized at the 
1% and 99% level  
Bid-ask spread Natural logarithm of median bid-ask spread over 250 trading days prior to the 
respective event (i.e., price ask minus price bid divided by price bid plus half 
the difference between price ask and price bid) 
% zero return days Percentage of zero return days over 250 trading days prior to the respective 
event 
Free float Percentage of free float shares (i.e., ownership of less than 5%) on the respec-
tive event date 
Individual holdings Percentage of shares strategically held (i.e., ownership of at least 5%) by natu-
ral persons (owners and employees) on the respective event date 
Prime Standard Binary variable indicating that a firm is listed in the Prime Standard segment 
of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) 
Voluntary IFRS adoption Binary variable indicating that a firm voluntarily applied IFRS or US-GAAP 
in 2004 
Error announcement Binary variable indicating that a firm had to publish an error announcement 
following an investigation by FREP/BaFin in the last fiscal year 
Delayed reporting Binary variable indicating that a firm published one or two financial reports 
after the legal deadline of four months in the last two fiscal years 
Downlisting Binary variable indicating that a firm downlisted subsequently 
Momentum Market adjusted return over 250 trading days prior to the respective event 
This table summarizes all variables used in Tables 3.5, 3.6, 3.8, and 3.9. 
 
I estimate the determinants model for a pooled sample compromising all four (six) 
events leading to the decline (increase) in opt out requirements (e.g., Armstrong et al., 
2010; Joos and Leung, 2013). This pooled analysis enables me to capture effects that 
are small on the individual event level but occur on multiple events (Larcker et al., 
2011). Since I obtain multiple observations for each firm and each event in the pooled 
analysis, standard errors are likely to be cross-sectionally correlated, which might lead 
to biased standard errors (e.g., Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). In order to address 
this, I use bootstrapped standard errors clustered by event (Cameron et al., 2008). Simi-
lar to the analysis of pooled market reactions, I also estimate bootstrap p-values ob-
tained from Monte-Carlo simulation to rule out that CMARs are also correlated with 
variables of interest absent regulatory actions. I estimate the regression model for four 
Investor Perceptions of Opting Out of the EU-Regulated Equity Market 
 67 
(six) randomly selected non-event windows and repeat this procedure 1,000 times to 
generate the distribution of non-event coefficients (Cai and Walkling, 2011; Zhang, 
2007) and calculate bootstrap p-values. 
3.4.3 Sample selection and data collection 
I use a sample of firms listed in the EU-regulated market at the FSE at the respective 
events, that is, from January 10, 2012, to September 30, 2015. All German firms listed 
in the EU-regulated market are included in the CDAX segment, which compromises the 
Prime Standard and the General Standard segment. I identify 4191 firm-event observa-
tions of firms listed in the CDAX for which matched financial reports are available. I 
exclude 240 firm-event observations because of “irregular” delistings, for example, cas-
es of bankruptcy and mergers. Next, I exclude 206 firm-event observations because 
these firms are listed with preferred shares to avoid double counting, and 47 firm-event 
observations that have the legal form of a partnership limited by shares (‘KGaA’) with 
specific governance structures that would limit comparability with the rest of the sam-
ple. I also exclude 161 firm-event observations of banks, 319 firm-event observations 
due to missing data, and 216 firm-event observations because data was missing for 
some events for these firms thus limiting comparability over events. For events leading 
to increases in opt out requirements, I exclude seven firm-event observations of three 
firms that downlisted after event No. 5 and I also exclude one firm that performed a 
delisting under the reduced opt out requirements.
16
 This leads to a final sample of 2991 
firm-event observations, which compromises 281 firms (or 2810 firm-event observa-
tions) that were continuously listed over all ten events and 101 (18) firm-event observa-
tions (firms) that went public during the period of interest. Further, I include 80 (26) 
firm-event observations (firms) that downlisted during the period of interest. While I 
can only control for firm characteristics presumably associated with opting out of the 
EU-regulated market for most firms, including these firms allows me to clearly identify 
a set of firms that opted out of the EU-regulated market. Data on market prices, trading 
volume, and financial statements is obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Data 
on erroneous financial statements and downlistings is hand collected from Bundesan-
zeiger (http://www.bundesanzeiger.de) and ad hoc announcements, respectively. The 
                                                 
16
  I exclude firms that downlisted during the regulatory process of increased opt out requirements, 
because these firms had announced their intent to downlist before the regulatory process started and 
downlisted in the early stages of the regulatory process and were thus not affected by the regulation. 
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composition of CDAX is obtained from Deutsche Börse (http://www.dax-indices.com). 
The sample selection process is summarized in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Sample selection 
  N (obs.)   N (firms) 
Total CDAX with matched financial reports 4191   524 
./. Irregular delisting (e.g., bankruptcy) 240   75 
./. Preferred shares 206   22 
./. Partnership limited by shares ('KGaA') 47   6 
./. Banks 161   18 
./. Missing data 319   41 
./. Balance sample 216   36 
./. Regular delisting 4   1 
./. Downlisting after event No. 4 7   0 
Final sample (all events) 2991   325 
Thereof…       
…continuously listed 2810   281 
…subsequent downlistings 80   26 
…previous IPOs 101   18 
        
Final sample (event No. 1 - event No. 4) 1216   314 
Final sample (event No. 5 - event No. 10) 1775   297 
This table summarizes the sample selection process. 
 
3.5 Empirical findings 
3.5.1 Decrease in opt out requirements (event No. 1 to event No. 4) 
3.5.1.1 Market reactions 
Table 3.4 summarizes the overall market reactions to reductions in opt out require-
ments. I find that the overall price reaction (CMAR) is significantly positive at the 1% 
level, when applying traditional parametric and non-parametric test statistics. However, 
pooled CMARs are not significantly higher than those obtained from the Monte-Carlo 
simulation (insignificant bootstrap p-value) during the same period. The pooled abnor-
mal trading volume (CAVol) around events leading to reductions in requirements for 
opting out of the EU-regulated market is significantly positive based on traditional test 
statistics (5% and 1% levels, respectively), and also relative to pooled abnormal trading 
volume around non-event windows (1% level). In fact, pooled CAVol is higher than 
around all simulated pooled non-event windows, which indicates that the regulation 
does have an impact on investors.  
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Table 3.4: Market reactions around event dates (reduced requirements) 







ex. Ger CMAR t-stat. 
Wilkoxon z-
stat. N 
1 - 0.016 0.018 -0.001 (-0.56) (-1.87)* 307 
2 - 0.003 -0.002 0.005 (1.58) (2.60)*** 305 
3 - 0.001 -0.008 0.009 (4.03)*** (5.51)*** 301 
4 - 0.007 -0.002 0.009 (2.60)***  (2.22)** 303 
    Pooled CMAR 0.005     1216 
    t-stat.  (3.61)***       
    Wilkoxon z-stat. (3.85)***       
    Bootstrap p-value (0.160)       
                





tion     CAVol t-stat. 
Wilkoxon z-
stat. N 
1 -     0.00018 (2.00)** ( 0.62) 170 
2 -     0.00143 (1.01) ( -1.39) 164 
3 -     0.00023 (2.46)**  ( 0.31) 166 
4 -     0.00096 (3.92)*** (6.42)*** 173 
    Pooled CAVol 0.00070     673 
    t-stat. (1.98)**       
    Wilkoxon z-stat. (3.26)***       
    Bootstrap p-value (0.000)***       
                
This table summarizes market reactions around events that lead to reductions in downlisting and delisting requirements. The boot-
strap p-values are obtained from Monte-Carlo simulation, that is, 1000 repetitions of computing mean market reactions over four 
randomly selected three-day non-event windows from January 2012 to November 2013. The bootstrap p-value is the percentage of 
simulated market reactions over non-events that are higher than the average market reaction over the four event dates. ***, **, and * 
indicate two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. For the bootstrap p-value, ***, **, and * indicate one-
tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
 
In a second step, and similar to Fernandes et al. (2010), I test whether market reactions 
differ among firm characteristics of interest that are presumably associated with a firm’s 
likelihood to be affected by the regulation. For continuous variables, I split the variables 
into the top and bottom half. Results documented in Table 3.5 Panel A reveal that 
CMARs are significantly higher if ownership dispersion is low (Free float) (1% level). 
Mean CMARs are also significantly higher if the percentage of individual investors (In-
dividual holdings) is high (5% level) and recent financial reports have been published 
after the legal deadline (Delayed reporting) (5% level), while mean CMARs are weakly 
significantly lower (10% level) for firms that downlist subsequently. With respect to the 
trading volume (Panel B), CAVol differs most profoundly among firms listed in the 
Prime Standard and General Standard, since CAVol is significantly higher (1% and 5% 
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levels, respectively) for firms listed in the General Standard segment. For firms that 
downlist subsequently (Downlisting), mean CAVol is significantly higher than for firms 
that remain listed (1% level), but median CAVol does not differ significantly. 
Table 3.5: Pooled market reactions (reduced requirements) 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns (CMAR)           
  high (50%)   low (50%)   Diff. 
Compliance costs 
CMAR N   CMAR N   Diff. t-stat Wilkoxon 
z-stat 
Size 0.004 608  0.006 608  0.002 (0.79) (-0.90) 
ROA 0.003 608  0.007 608  0.004 (1.45) ( 0.33) 
Leverage 0.007 608  0.003 608  -0.003 (-1.19) (-1.48) 
Financing needs          
Sales growth 0.003 608  0.007 608  0.004 (1.41) (1.03) 
Liquidity          
Bid-ask spread 0.007 606  0.004 610  -0.003 (-1.11) (0.11) 
% zero return days 0.008 626  0.002 590  -0.005 (-1.84)* (0.51) 
Ownership structure          
Free float 0.001 618  0.010 598  0.009 (3.29)*** (2.96)*** 
Individual holdings
1
 0.008 596  0.002 620  -0.006 (-2.15)** (-1.17) 
                    
  x=1   x=0   Diff. 
Commitment 
CMAR N   CMAR N   Diff. t-stat Wilkoxon 
z-stat 
Prime Standard 0.005 878  0.006 338  0.001 (0.43) (0.08) 
Voluntary IFRS adoption 0.005 808  0.006 408  0.002 (0.60) (0.31) 
Error announcement 0.020 30  0.005 1186  -0.015 (-1.59) (-0.99) 
Delayed reporting 0.015 126  0.004 1090  -0.011 (-2.36)** (-1.15) 
Downlisting -0.005 80  0.006 1136  0.010 (1.79)* (1.26) 
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(Table 3.5 continued) 
 
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal trading volume (CAVol) 
  high (50%)   low (50%)   Diff. 
Compliance costs 
CAVol N   CAVol N   Diff. t-stat Wilkoxon 
z-stat 
Size 0.00069 464  0.00070 209  0.00001 (0.01) (1.77)* 
ROA 0.00030 389  0.00124 284  0.00094 (1.32) (0.55) 
Leverage 0.00094 364  0.00041 309  -0.00052 (-0.74) (1.30) 
Financing needs          
Sales growth 0.00099 385  0.00030 288  -0.00069 (-0.96) (1.42) 
Liquidity          
Bid-ask spread 0.00079 143  0.00067 530  -0.00012 (-0.13) (-3.46)*** 
% zero return days 0.00084 148  0.00066 525  -0.00019 (-0.22) (-2.80)*** 
Ownership structure          
Free float 0.00039 418  0.00120 255  0.00081 (1.12) (1.81)* 
Individual holdings
1
 0.00054 312  0.00083 361  0.00030 (0.42) (-2.31)** 
 
  x=1   x=0   Diff. 
Commitment 
CAVol N  CAVol N 
  
Diff. t-stat Wilkoxon 
z-stat 
Prime Standard 0.00033 625  0.00553 48  0.005 (3.84)*** (2.35)** 
Voluntary IFRS adoption 0.00082 540  0.00020 133  -0.001 (-0.70) (1.12) 
Error announcement 0.00003 13  0.00071 660  0.001 (0.27) (1.37) 
Delayed reporting 0.00128 10  0.00069 663  -0.001 (-0.20) (-2.10)** 
Downlisting 0.01570 15  0.00035 658  -0.015 (-6.63)*** (-0.73) 
                    
This table compares market reactions across firm characteristics presumably associated with a firm's likelihood to opt out of the EU-
regulated market for events that lead to reductions in the requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated market. Continuous varia-
bles are split into the top and bottom half. For the analysis of CAVol in Panel B, the top and bottom half from Panel A are main-
tained. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
1For Individual holdings, "high" is holdings of 5% or more, "low" is holdings below 5%. 
 
3.5.1.2 Determinants model 
In the multivariate analyses, I first estimate coefficients for all variables of interest sepa-
rately, including only the respective variable of interest and Momentum, to rule out that 
coefficients are affected by correlated variables of interest. Coefficients from these 
analyses are reported in Model (1) in Table 3.6. In a second step, I estimate the full 
model (Model (2) in Table 3.6).
17
 Descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix B. 
Since the full model mostly confirms findings from the separate estimations in Model 
(1), I confine the discussion of the results to Model (2), which mostly confirms univari-
                                                 
17
  Since Bid-ask spread and % zero return days both capture liquidity and are highly correlated 
(0.591), I only include Bid-ask spread in the full model. However, I re-estimate the model using % 
zero return days instead of Bid-ask spread and inferences remain unchanged. 
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ate findings reported in Table 3.5 Panel A. Based on both test statistics, the traditional 
z-statistic and the bootstrap p-value, CMARs are significantly more positive when Lev-
erage is high (1% and 5% levels, respectively), ownership dispersion is low (5% level), 
and the percentage of individual investors is high (5%). Investors of firms that have 
been censured under the enforcement regime (Error announcement) also react signifi-
cantly more positive to the decrease in opt out requirements (5% level), while investors 




Table 3.6: Determinants of market reactions (reduced requirements) 
  Dependent variable: CMAR 
  Model (1)   Model (2) 
Compliance costs 
Coeff. z-stat.   Coeff. z-stat. bootstrap p-
value 
Size 0.000 (-0.14)  0.001 (1.26) (0.282) 
ROA -0.017 (-1.49)  -0.009 (-1.46) (0.176) 
Leverage 0.019 (3.31)***  0.016 (2.79)*** (0.034)** 
Financing needs       
Sales growth 0.000 (-0.09)  0.002 (0.44) (0.316) 
Liquidity       
Bid-ask spread 0.002 (0.65)  0.003 (0.65) (0.373) 
% zero return days 0.016 (1.07)     
Ownership structure       
Free float -0.018 (-2.84)***  -0.012 (-2.35)** (0.037)** 
Individual holdings 0.021 (4.19)***  0.014 (2.23)** (0.024)** 
Commitment       
Prime Standard -0.002 (-0.42)  0.005 (1.82)* (0.109) 
Voluntary IFRS adoption -0.002 (-1.15)  -0.001 (-0.48) (0.289) 
Error announcement 0.015 (2.07)**  0.014 (2.04)** (0.032)** 
Delayed reporting 0.012 (1.23)  0.012 (1.53) (0.029)** 
Downlisting -0.012 (-1.98)**  -0.013 (-1.90)* (0.020)** 
N 1216  1216 
Adjusted R
2
 -  0.02 
Industry-fixed effects yes  yes 
Controls yes  yes 
Standard errors clustered (event)  clustered (event) 
This table summarizes results on estimating the determinants of CMARs, for events leading to reductions in opt out requirements 
using bootstrapped standard errors (1000 reps.) clustered by event. Model (1) displays the coefficients from estimating the model for 
each variable separately using controls and industry-fixed effects. Coefficients for Model (2) are obtained from estimating the full 
model. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. Bootstrap p-values are the percentage of coefficients drawn from 1,000 repetitions of randomly selecting four non-
events and estimating Model (2) across these non-event windows that are higher (for positive coefficients) or lower (for negative 
coefficients) than those of Model (2). For the bootstrap p-values, ***, **, and * indicate one-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
  
                                                 
18
  Apart from using variables that capture firms that are presumably more affected by the regulation, I 
also build on results from Hitz and Müller-Bloch (2016) and calculate the estimated downlisting 
likelihood based on variables that Hitz and Müller-Bloch (2016) have documented to have an impact 
on a firm’s likelihood to downlist. I do not find that market reactions differ among the perceived 
likelihood of a firm to downlist. 
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3.5.1.3 Robustness test 
To assess the robustness of the results, I re-estimate Model (2) using three-day cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAR), as proposed by MacKinlay (1997) (untabulated). CARs are 
estimated over 250 trading days prior to the respective event using the FTSE Europe 
excluding Germany as the market index. I find that the pooled price reaction to events 
leading to reductions in opt out requirements is positive but insignificant. When re-
estimating the full model using CARs instead of CMARs, results mostly persist. CARs 
are significantly more positive when Leverage is high (5% level), Individual holdings 
are high (5% level), and the firm has been censured by FREP or BaFin in the past fiscal 
year (Error announcement) (5% level). Although insignificant, results on ownership 
dispersion and subsequent downlistings point into the same direction as the results doc-
umented in Table 3.6 Model (2). 
3.5.2 Increase in opt out requirements (event No. 5 to event No. 10) 
3.5.2.1 Market reactions 
For events leading to increases in requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated mar-
ket, mean CMARs are slightly positive but insignificant using traditional test statistics 
and bootstrap p-values (Table 3.7 Panel A). Pooled CAVols are also slightly positive 
and, using traditional test statistics, differ significantly from zero (1% level) (Panel B). 
Nevertheless, they do not differ significantly from CAVols obtained from Monte-Carlo 
simulation of non-event dates. Non-parametric test statistics are also insignificant. 
Hence, no inferences can be drawn from overall market reactions around events leading 
to increases in requirements. 
When examining whether market reactions vary across firm characteristics, the analysis 
of CMARs as reported in Table 3.8 Panel A reveals that CMARs are significantly more 
negative if the firm has been censured under the enforcement mechanism in the past 
fiscal year (10% level). When assessing statistical significance based on parametric and 
non-parametric test statistics, CAVol does not differ significantly across firm character-
istics.   
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Table 3.7: Market reactions around event dates (increased requirements) 







ex. Ger CMAR t-stat. 
Wilkoxon z-
stat. N 
5 + 0.013 -0.002 0.015 (5.96)*** (5.94)*** 294 
6 + 0.001 -0.003 0.004 (1.50) (1.73)* 294 
7 + -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 (-0.92) (3.45)*** 296 
8 + 0.016 0.004 0.011 ( 5.28)*** (5.25)*** 297 
9 + -0.029 -0.017 -0.012 (-4.89)*** (-6.40)*** 297 
10 + 0.017 0.023 -0.006 ( -2.19)** ( -4.10)*** 297 
    Pooled CMAR 0.002     1775 
    t-stat. ( 1.51)       
    Wilkoxon z-stat. (-0.54)       
    Bootstrap p-value (0.427)       
                





tion     CAVol t-stat. 
Wilkoxon z-
stat. N 
5 +     0.00055 (3.72)*** ( 6.16)*** 176 
6 +     0.00035 (3.25)*** ( 3.28)*** 174 
7 +     0.00008 (1.33) (-0.98) 172 
8 +     -0.00007 (-1.62) (-4.50)*** 157 
9 +     0.00003 (0.60) (-2.88)*** 174 
10 +     0.00001 (0.16) (-2.01)** 163 
    Pooled CAVol 0.00016     1016 
    t-stat. (4.57)***       
    Wilkoxon z-stat. (0.27)       
    Bootstrap p-value (0.895)       
                
This table summarizes market reactions around events that lead to increases in downlisting and delisting requirements. The boot-
strap p-values are obtained from Monte-Carlo simulation, that is, 1000 repetitions of computing mean market reactions over six 
randomly selected three-day non-event windows from March 2015 to September 2015. The bootstrap p-value is the percentage of 
simulated market reactions over non-events that are higher than the average market reaction over the six event dates. ***, **, and * 
indicate two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. For the bootstrap p-value, ***, **, and * indicate one-
tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.8: Pooled market reactions (increased requirements) 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns (CMAR)           
  high (50%)   low (50%)   Diff. 
Compliance costs 
CMAR N   CMAR N   Diff. t-stat Wilkoxon 
z-stat 
Size 0.001 887  0.002 888  0.001 (0.34) (-0.57) 
ROA 0.001 886  0.002 889  0.001 (0.54) (-0.06) 
Leverage 0.001 892  0.002 883  0.000 (0.23) (0.22) 
Financing needs          
Sales growth 0.002 888  0.001 887  -0.002 (-0.84) (-1.36) 
Liquidity          
Bid-ask spread 0.002 888  0.001 887  -0.001 (-0.62) (0.93) 
% zero return days 0.003 955  0.000 820  -0.003 (-1.60) (-0.62) 
Ownership structure          
Free float 0.001 904  0.003 871  0.002 (1.00) (0.92) 
Individual holdings
1
 0.003 879  0.000 896  -0.003 (-1.50) (-1.02) 
                    
  x=1   x=0   Diff. 
Commitment 
CMAR N  CMAR N 
  
Diff. t-stat Wilkoxon 
z-stat 
Prime Standard 0.001 1328  0.004 447  0.004 (1.55) (-0.04) 
Voluntary IFRS adoption 0.001 1176  0.002 599  0.001 (0.62) (-1.72)* 
Error announcement -0.014 30  0.002 1745  0.016 (1.96)* (1.93)* 
Delayed reporting 0.009 192  0.001 1583  -0.009 (-2.67)*** (-0.47) 
                    
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal trading volume (CAVol)           
  high (50%)   low (50%)   Diff. 
Compliance costs 
CAVol N  CAVol N 
  
Diff. t-stat Wilkoxon 
z-stat 
Size 0.00006 682  0.00037 334  0.00030 (4.00)*** (-0.72) 
ROA 0.00013 558  0.00021 458  0.00008 (1.07) (-0.14) 
Leverage 0.00013 548  0.00020 468  0.00007 (0.98) (0.17) 
Financing needs          
Sales growth 0.00018 534  0.00014 482  -0.00004 (-0.61) (-0.12) 
Liquidity          
Bid-ask spread 0.00049 267  0.00005 749  -0.00045 (-5.62)*** (-0.46) 
% zero return days 0.00036 337  0.00007 679  -0.00029 (-3.91)*** (0.85) 
Ownership structure          
Free float 0.00011 656  0.00027 360  0.00016 (2.16)** (0.84) 
Individual holdings
1
 0.00024 477  0.00010 539  -0.00015 (-2.03)** (1.63) 
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(Table 3.8 continued) 
  x=1   x=0   Diff. 
Commitment 
CAVol N  CAVol N 
  
Diff. t-stat Wilkoxon 
z-stat 
Prime Standard 0.00015 932  0.00034 84  0.000 (1.47) (-1.23) 
Voluntary IFRS adoption 0.00017 754  0.00015 262  0.000 (-0.15) (-2.14)** 
Error announcement -0.00018 15  0.00017 1001  0.000 (1.18) (3.25)*** 
Delayed reporting 0.00017 37  0.00016 979  0.000 (-0.03) (1.22) 
                    
This table compares market reactions across firm characteristics presumably associated with a firm's likelihood to opt out of the EU-
regulated market for events that lead to increases in the requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated market. Continuous varia-
bles are split into the top and bottom half. For the analysis of CAVol in Panel B, the top and bottom half from Panel A are main-
tained. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
1For Individual holdings, "high" is holdings of 5% or more, "low" is holdings below 5%. 
 
3.5.2.2 Determinants model 
Table 3.9 reports the multivariate results, both for the individual variables of interest 
(Model (1)) and for the full model (Model (2)).
19
 Descriptive statistics are reported in 
Appendix C. Again, findings are in line with those from the univariate analysis as re-
ported in Table 3.8 Panel A. The only coefficient on a variable of interest that is signifi-
cantly different from zero in Model (1) and Model (2), and significantly different from 
its non-event distribution obtained from Monte-Carlo simulation, is Error announce-
ment. Investors of firms that have been censured under the enforcement regime in the 
past fiscal year react significantly more negative to increases in the requirements for 
opting out of the EU-regulated market.
20
 
3.5.2.3 Robustness test 
Again, I re-estimate my analyses using CARs instead of CMARs (untabulated). I find 
that mean CARs are slightly positive but insignificant, while median CARs are slightly 
negative and weakly significant (10% level), which is in line with the inconclusive find-
ings reported in Table 3.7 Panel A. When re-estimating Model (2) from Table 3.9 using 
CARs, findings on Error announcement are confirmed. The coefficient on Error an-
nouncement is significantly negative at the 10% level. The coefficient on Delayed re-
porting is also weakly significantly positive (10% level).  
                                                 
19
  As outlined in footnote 17, I estimate the full model (Model (2)) using Bid-ask spread only. Infer-
ences remain the same, except for the fact that Free float is also significant in the full model when 
using % zero return days. 
20
  Again, market reactions do not differ among the perceived downlisting likelihood as outlined in 
footnote 18. 
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Table 3.9: Determinants of market reactions (increased requirements) 
  Dependent variable: CMAR 
  Model (1)   Model (2) 
Compliance costs 
Coeff. z-stat.   Coeff. z-stat. bootstrap p-
value 
Size 0.000 (-0.31)  0.002 (2.37)** (0.132) 
ROA -0.013 (-1.38)  -0.016 (-1.68)* (0.205) 
Leverage 0.004 (1.51)  -0.001 (-0.17) (0.716) 
Financing needs       
Sales growth 0.004 (0.99)  0.003 (0.72) (0.102) 
Liquidity       
Bid-ask spread 0.002 (1.25)  0.004 (1.60) (0.235) 
% zero return days 0.012 (1.47)     
Ownership structure       
Free float -0.006 (-1.89)*  -0.003 (-0.88) (0.108) 
Individual holdings 0.004 (1.02)  0.003 (0.95) (0.529) 
Commitment       
Prime Standard -0.004 (-1.33)  0.001 (1.00) (0.146) 
Voluntary IFRS adoption -0.003 (-1.17)  -0.001 (-0.59) (0.127) 
Error announcement -0.015 (-1.73)*  -0.016 (-1.79)* (0.010)** 
Delayed reporting 0.008 (1.38)  0.008 (1.52) (0.059)* 
N 1775  1775 
Adjusted R
2
 -  0.01 
Industry-fixed effects yes  yes 
Controls yes  yes 
Standard errors clustered (event)  clustered (event) 
This table summarizes results on estimating the determinants of CMARs, for events leading to increases in opt out requirements 
using bootstrapped standard errors (1000 reps.) clustered by event. Model (1) displays the coefficients from estimating the model for 
each variable separately using controls and industry-fixed effects. Coefficients for Model (2) are obtained from estimating the full 
model. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. Bootstrap p-values are the percentage of coefficients drawn from 1,000 repetitions of randomly selecting four non-
events and estimating Model (2) across these non-event windows that are higher (for positive coefficients) or lower (for negative 
coefficients) than those of Model (2). For the bootstrap p-values, ***, **, and * indicate one-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
 
3.5.3 Discussion 
Findings on mean market reactions around events leading to reductions in requirements 
for opting out of the EU-regulated market indicate that reductions in these requirements 
matter to investors, since CAVol around the event dates is significantly positive. In par-
ticular, firms listed in the General Standard segment, that is, firms that have not bonded 
to the premium segment, the Prime Standard, experience a significantly higher CAVol. 
This evidence is in line with the expectation that these firms are more affected by the 
regulation, since they did not commit to bonding to even stricter requirements prior to 
the regulation, and are thus presumably more likely to opt out. In fact, out of 26 firms in 
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the final sample that downlist, 15 firms are listed in the General Standard segment, that 
is, 16.5% of the General Standard firms downlist. In contrast, only 4.7% of sample 
firms listed in the Prime Standard segment downlist during the period of interest. Firms 
that downlist subsequently under the reduced regulation also seem to be, on average, 
more affected by the reduced regulation. 
Trading volume reactions around increases in opt out requirements are insignificant, 
indicating that increases in opt out requirements matter less to investors. This might be 
attributable to the fact that increases in requirements could have been stricter, by, for 
example, requiring firms to provide a majority vote by the shareholders’ meeting or to 
determine compensation for minority investors in a so-called “Spruchverfahren”, a court 
procedure to verify the adequacy of the compensation offer that can easily take years 
(e.g., Loosen, 2013). Another explanation for the little significance of the results might 
be that firms eligible to opt out of the EU-regulated market had already done so prior to 
the increased regulation. 
Under the bonding hypothesis, market reactions to reductions in opt out requirements 
are expected to be negative, while market reactions are expected to be positive if inves-
tors share considerations of an unfavorable cost-benefit tradeoff, as proposed under the 
loss of competitiveness theory. Evidence on CMARs reveals that, although mean 
CMARs are positive, they do not differ significantly from simulated non-event CMARs. 
This is not necessarily surprising, since market reactions are likely to differ across firms 
characteristics depending on whether a firm is affected by the regulatory changes. In-
vestors of firms that are presumably more affected by the regulation, as stricter listing 
regimes are more costly for firms with stronger insider control (Marosi and Massoud, 
2008), react more positively to the regulation. This finding indicates that, for these 
firms, being able to opt out of the EU-regulated market might increase firm value from 
an investor perspective, which points towards potential cost considerations regarding 
the listing in the EU-regulated market. The finding contradicts findings by Fernandes et 
al. (2010) and Doidge et al. (2010), who both provide evidence that the market reaction 
to reduced opt out requirements is more positive if ownership concentration is high. 
Consequently, the rationale that investors of firms with high ownership concentration, 
and thus presumably more agency problems, value the bonding to increased disclosure 
requirements does not translate to the German setting. 
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Investors of firms that have been censured by FREP or BaFin react significantly more 
positive to the reduced regulation. These firms have shown low commitment to in-
creased disclosure by not sticking to mandated disclosure and reporting requirements. 
Consistent with this observation, the market reaction to increases in opt out require-
ments is significantly negative if the firm has been recently censured. As documented 
by Hitz and Müller-Bloch (2016), these firms are more likely to opt out of the EU-
regulated market, and are thus more affected by the regulation. For these firms, being 
able to opt out at low costs might be valuable from an investor perspective, which sup-
ports the loss of competitiveness theory. 
Price reactions to reductions in opt out requirements are also significantly more positive 
if leverage is high. If leverage is interpreted as a measure of financial distress, this find-
ing is in line with the loss of competitiveness theory as investors of these firms seem to 
welcome being able to opt out of the costly listing in the EU-regulated market. Never-
theless, a strong banking relationship as reflected in high leverage can also be interpret-
ed as a monitoring device that prevents opportunistic behavior (e.g., Diamond, 1984). In 
that case, investors of these firms might attribute less value to the costly bonding to the 
EU-regulated market, since firms are already monitored by banks. Following this line of 
thought, the finding on leverage can also be aligned with the bonding hypothesis as the 
market reaction is less positive for less leveraged firms, that is, firms for which the 
bonding to the EU-regulated market is valuable from an investor perspective. Note 
though that Hitz and Müller-Bloch (2016) do not find evidence that downlisting firms 
are more leveraged than firms that remain in the EU-regulated market. Similarly, Pasch 
et al. (2015) document that downlisting firms are not characterized by abnormally high 
leverage. Also, Fernandes et al. (2010) and Doidge et al. (2010) do not find evidence of 
an impact of leverage on market reactions to reductions in opt out requirements. 
Investors of firms that downlist under the reduced regulation react significantly more 
negative to the regulatory changes. This finding points towards potential agency consid-
erations of investors, which would be in line with prior evidence on cross-listings 
(Doidge et al., 2010; Fernandes et al., 2010). Consequently, investors of these firms 
value the bonding to the EU-regulated market. Another likely explanation for the nega-
tive price reaction is that investors anticipated, or knew, that these firms were going to 
downlist and were hoping for compensation. While investors were still able to hope for 
compensation prior to the ruling of the German Constitutional Court, the court decision 
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established that downlisting did not interfere with ownership rights, and consequently 
no offer for compensation was required.
21
 In line with this, 12 out of the 26 firms that 
downlisted subsequently had already announced their intent to downlist prior to event 
No. 4. For these investors, reduced requirements for opting out of the EU-regulated 
market meant that potentially anticipated wealth increases from compensation were no 
longer possible. 
Overall, findings on determinants of market reactions to reduced opt out requirements 
can be mainly aligned with the loss of competitiveness theory, while some findings can 
also be aligned with the bonding theory. Little inferences can be drawn from market 
reactions to increases in opt out requirements. Even though findings on variables of in-
terest are mostly insignificant, they partly point into the same direction as around the 
events leading to reductions in opt out requirements. One explanation for this pattern 
might be that, by providing a legal framework for opting out of the EU-regulated market 
that does not require shareholders’ consent, the regulation might actually facilitate opt 
outs as criticized by investor protection institutions (FAZ, 2015b). 
My findings are subject to limitations. First, I am not able to directly measure costs of 
the listing and whether investors benefit from bonding to the EU-regulated market. I 
thus merely provide descriptive evidence on market reactions of firms presumably more 
affected by the regulation. Second, my measure of economic impact, firm value, reflects 
only shareholder welfare and does not reflect the impact of the regulation on the welfare 
of other stakeholders, such as creditors or employees. Third, event study methodology 
relies on the identification of the events of interest. Since it was not possible to identify 
the exact publication date for the court rulings prior to 2012, which are likely to have 
had an impact on the costs of being able to downlist, the market assessment of these 
events is not recognized. Finally, I do not investigate the impact of the regulatory 
changes on firms listed in the exchange-regulated market. These firms are affected by 
the regulation since changes in opt out requirements affect the value of the bonding to 
the EU-regulated market, which is an option for these firms. 
                                                 
21
  Regional court decisions from 2007 to 2009 had already established that no compensation was re-
quired. Nevertheless, investors, e.g., the shareholders of FRoSTA, were still trying to receive com-
pensation via legal proceedings. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This paper exploits an exogenous shock to recent changes in the requirements for opting 
out of the highly regulated EU-regulated market in Germany. Firms that opt out of the 
EU-regulated market downlist to the less regulated exchange-regulated market. I inves-
tigate whether the bonding to the EU-regulated market is valued by investors or whether 
investors welcome being able to leave the EU-regulated market, as proposed under the 
loss of competitiveness theory. The German setting, where opt out requirements in-
creased again following a stepwise reduction, allows me to draw inferences on the ef-
fects of being able to opt out of the EU-regulated market on shareholder welfare. 
Unlike prior U.S. findings that indicate that investors value the bonding to high disclo-
sure requirements (Doidge et al., 2010; Fernandes et al., 2010), my findings are mainly 
indicative of cost considerations that are shared by investors, consistent with the loss of 
competitiveness theory. For firms with high ownership concentration or previous error 
findings, and financially distressed firms, the costs of the listing seem to outweigh the 
benefits of the listing, and being able to opt out might be reasonable from an investor 
perspective. Nevertheless, findings on leverage can also be interpreted under the bond-
ing hypothesis as investors of firms that are less leveraged, and thus only weakly moni-
tored by banks, react more negatively to the reduced regulation. Also in contrast to the 
loss of competitiveness theory, firms that opt out subsequently under the reduced regu-
lation experience significantly negative price reactions to reductions in opt out require-
ments. This might indicate that investors in fact value the bonding to stricter disclosure 
requirements in the EU-regulated market. However, it is also possible that this price 
reaction is attributable to the fact that investors were hoping for compensation. If inves-
tors had anticipated compensation, they would incur welfare decreases when compensa-
tion is no longer required by law. Overall, while reductions in opt out requirements 
seem to have an impact on investors, as reflected in abnormally high trading volume, 
increases in the requirements for opting out do not. This finding might be attributable to 
the characteristics of the regulation. However, a likely reason for this finding is that 
firms, for which opting out constituted a reasonable option, had already left the EU-
regulated market. 
Overall, this paper’s findings extend prior U.S. evidence as they show that, in some cas-
es, investors seem to welcome being able to opt out of the EU-regulated market. Thus, 
this paper cautions that in the German continental European setting, where firms that 
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opt out remain within the same jurisdiction, the cost-benefit tradeoff seems to occasion-
ally outweigh the bonding to stricter disclosure requirements in the EU-regulated mar-
ket. Consequently, U.S. findings on changes in opt out requirements do not necessarily 
translate to the continental European environment, where a substantial number of firms 
has recently opted out from increased disclosure requirements (Fiechter et al., 2016; 
Pasch et al., 2015). These findings should also be of particular interest for regulators, as, 
unlike argued by regulators, weak trading volume reactions around events related to 
increases in opt out requirements indicate that the regulation did not matter much to 
investors.  
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3.7 Appendix 
Appendix A: Ownership structure across market segments of FSE (as of June 10, 2016) 
Panel A:Ownership structure across market segments of FSE 
Owner   EU-regulated market   Exchange-regulated market 
      All   
Prime 
Standard 
(PS)   
General 
Standard 
(GS)   
Entry Standard 
(ES)   
Down-
listing (DL) 
      Mean   Mean   Mean   Mean   Mean 

























































































































































      
         










Panel B: Analysis of differences between segments 
 Owner   PS vs. GS   PS & GS vs. ES   PS & GS vs. DL   GS vs. ES   GS vs. DL 
      Diff. t-stat.   Diff. t-stat.   Diff. t-stat.   Diff. t-stat.   Diff. t-stat. 







-0.006 ( -0.13) 
















  Bank & financial   -0.008 (-0.43)  






0.060 ( 1.47) 





0.006 ( 0.57) 
 
0.003 ( 0.21) 





-0.005 ( -1.42) 
 
- - 
























  Other   -0.002 (-0.89)  







































Foundations   -0.010 (-1.25)  




-0.003 ( -0.85) 
 
- - 













-0.001 ( -0.74) 
 
0.002 ( 0.77) 
This table summarizes the ownership structure across different market segments of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE). Data ist 
obtained from Amadeus database. Entry Standard includes firms that downlisted previously (DL). 
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Appendix B: Descriptive statistics for events leading to reductions in requirements 
Panel A: Descriptives 
    
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
  Min 25%-Quartile Median 75%-Quartile Max   N 
CMAR   0.005 0.050  
-0.326 -0.014 0.004 0.021 0.569 
 
1216 
CAVol   0.001 0.009  
-0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.232 
 
673 
Size   12.749 2.385  
6.635 10.983 12.377 14.227 19.268 
 
1216 
ROA   0.038 0.144  
-0.885 0.024 0.053 0.085 0.451 
 
1216 
Leverage   0.554 0.257  0.023 0.401 0.555 0.701 1.870  1216 
Sales growth   0.109 0.360  
-0.942 -0.010 0.070 0.155 2.630 
 
1216 
Bid-ask spread   -4.061 0.978  
-6.617 -4.834 -3.912 -3.306 -0.649 
 
1216 
% zero return days   0.092 0.147  
0.000 0.004 0.028 0.112 0.832 
 
1216 
Free float   0.578 0.283  
0.000 0.350 0.550 0.830 1.000 
 
1216 
Individual holdings   0.175 0.238  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.330 0.960 
 
1216 
Downlisting likelihood   0.072 0.080  
0.001 0.023 0.048 0.083 0.729 
 
1108 
Prime Standard   0.722 0.448  
0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
1216 
Voluntary IFRS adoption   0.664 0.472  
0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
1216 
Error announcement   0.025 0.155  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
1216 
Delayed reporting   0.104 0.305  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
1216 
Downlisting   0.066 0.248  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
1216 
Momentum   0.042 0.370  




Panel B: Correlations 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
CMAR (1) 1.000 
              
Size (2) 0.007 1.000 
             
ROA (3) -0.053 0.176 1.000 
            
Sales growth (4) -0.002 -0.023 0.153 1.000 
           
Leverage (5) 0.094 0.271 -0.161 -0.041 1.000 
          
Bid-ask spread (6) 0.035 -0.774 -0.220 -0.006 -0.087 1.000 
         
% zero return days (7) 0.045 -0.426 -0.055 -0.042 0.027 0.591 1.000 
        
Free float (8) -0.098 0.095 -0.012 0.055 -0.034 -0.282 -0.239 1.000 
       
Individual holdings (9) 0.091 -0.226 0.047 -0.035 -0.028 0.184 0.106 -0.398 1.000 
      
Prime Standard (10) -0.012 0.340 0.089 0.008 -0.042 -0.500 -0.554 0.205 -0.103 1.000 
     
Voluntary IFRS 
adoption 
(11) -0.017 0.147 -0.024 0.014 0.032 -0.294 -0.378 0.205 -0.055 0.383 1.000 
    
Error announce-
ment 
(12) 0.046 -0.021 -0.038 0.007 0.035 -0.007 -0.012 -0.006 0.032 -0.008 -0.078 1.000 
   
Delayed reporting (13) 0.068 -0.257 -0.141 -0.070 0.012 0.347 0.436 -0.097 0.121 -0.470 -0.187 -0.037 1.000 
  
Downlisting (14) -0.051 -0.091 0.013 0.004 -0.013 0.223 0.236 -0.092 -0.037 -0.161 -0.163 0.001 0.073 1.000 
 
Momentum (15) -0.045 -0.088 0.112 -0.032 0.069 0.062 0.052 0.004 0.058 -0.060 0.032 -0.033 0.068 -0.061 1.000 
This table summarizes descriptive statistics for variables examined in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Correlations in Panel B are confined to 
the full sample (Model (2) in Table 3.6). In Panel B, bold letters indicate significance at the 10% levels. 
  
Investor Perceptions of Opting Out of the EU-Regulated Equity Market 
 85 
Appendix C: Descriptive statistics for events leading to increases in requirements 
Panel A: Descriptives 
    
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
  Min 25%-Quartile Median 75%-Quartile Max   N 
CMAR   0.002 0.043 
 
-0.367 -0.019 -0.001 0.018 0.377 
 
1775 
CAVol   0.000 0.001 
 
-0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 
 
1016 
Size   12.960 2.447 
 
6.635 11.132 12.648 14.506 19.268 
 
1775 
ROA   0.026 0.151 
 
-0.885 0.015 0.046 0.074 0.451 
 
1775 
Leverage   0.577 0.272  0.023 0.409 0.558 0.725 1.870  1775 
Sales growth   0.078 0.341 
 
-0.942 -0.025 0.037 0.118 2.630 
 
1775 
Bid-ask spread   -4.140 0.965 
 
-6.611 -4.895 -4.064 -3.317 -0.981 
 
1775 
% zero return days   0.064 0.125 
 
0.000 0.004 0.012 0.056 0.824 
 
1775 
Free float   0.557 0.279 
 
0.010 0.320 0.540 0.780 1.000 
 
1775 
Individual holdings   0.182 0.238 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.350 0.960 
 
1775 
Downlisting likelihood   0.050 0.071 
 
0.001 0.014 0.024 0.061 0.729 
 
1506 
Prime Standard   0.748 0.434 
 
0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
1775 
Voluntary IFRS adoption   0.663 0.473 
 
0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
1775 
Error announcement   0.017 0.129 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
1775 
Delayed reporting   0.108 0.311 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
1775 
Momentum   0.099 0.397 
 




Panel B: Correlations 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
CMAR (1) 1.000 
             
Size (2) -0.020 1.000 
            
ROA (3) -0.048 0.235 1.000 
           
Sales growth (4) 0.023 -0.056 -0.048 1.000 
          
Leverage (5) 0.019 0.157 -0.217 -0.008 1.000 
         
Bid-ask spread (6) 0.051 -0.761 -0.204 0.094 0.017 1.000 
        
% zero return 
days 
(7) 0.024 -0.384 -0.015 -0.039 0.041 0.530 1.000 
       
Free float (8) -0.041 0.134 -0.083 0.013 -0.091 -0.344 -0.231 1.000 
      
Individual 
holdings 
(9) 0.032 -0.259 0.117 0.071 0.063 0.224 0.169 -0.403 1.000 
     
Prime Standard (10) -0.037 0.347 0.074 -0.073 -0.109 -0.492 -0.500 0.290 -0.162 1.000 
    
Voluntary IFRS 
adoption 
(11) -0.015 0.110 -0.055 -0.078 0.052 -0.229 -0.231 0.177 0.007 0.335 1.000 
   
Error an-
nouncement 




(13) 0.063 -0.296 0.001 0.004 0.074 0.329 0.390 -0.093 0.197 -0.458 -0.166 -0.032 1.000 
 
Momentum (14) 0.022 -0.061 0.120 0.140 0.075 0.124 0.050 -0.048 0.093 -0.124 -0.043 -0.026 0.104 1.000 
This table summarizes descriptive statistics for variables examined in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. Correlations in Panel B are confined to the 
full sample (Model (2) in Table 3.9). In Panel B, bold letters indicate significance at the 10% levels. 
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Abstract: This paper investigates the role of costs associated with mandatory IFRS 
adoption and pertinent enforcement activities. We exploit an exogenous shock to the 
cost-benefit trade-offs associated with opting out of the EU-regulated market in Germa-
ny, and find that the costs of IFRS compliance and enforcement play an important role 
for firms’ decisions to downlist, i.e., to migrate from the regulated market to unregulat-
ed segments. We exploit two particular features of our setting, the availability of error 
findings established by the enforcement mechanism, and the observability of market 
and accounting data after firms downlisted. This enables us to identify a strong en-
forcement effect, which on many occasions appears to be the principal driver of firms’ 
decisions to opt out of the IFRS and enforcement mandate. Our findings shed light on 
the hitherto virtually unexplored costs of the EU’s IAS regulation. They raise concerns 
about potentially restrictive costs of applying and complying with IFRS, and suggest 
that self-selection issues need to be addressed when investigating economic effects of 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
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4.1 Introduction 
This paper sheds light on the potential costs for firms that have been mandated to adopt 
IFRS and to subject themselves to the scrutiny of enforcement institutions. Since 2005, 
the so-called IAS regulation requires all firms listed on regulated EU stock market seg-
ments to prepare consolidated accounts in accordance with IFRS (with a few excep-
tions). Also, the regulation mandates member states to set up institutions charged with 
the enforcement of accounting standards, to ensure an even level of compliance with 
IFRS across member states. Numerous academic studies have documented various posi-
tive effects of this ‘IFRS experiment’, in particular significant positive capital market 
outcomes such as increases in liquidity (for an overview, see e.g., Brüggemann et al. 
2013). Also, recent evidence by Christensen et al. (2013) finds that the mandated 
strengthening of enforcement quality likely played an important role in generating or 
facilitating the observed positive liquidity effects upon IFRS adoption in the EU. In 
contrast to this abundant evidence of positive economic effects, far less is known about 
the costs of the IAS regulation, on the firm-level, and for economies as a whole. One 
likely reason for this lack of pertinent research is the scarcity of information and data on 
IFRS-related cost of compliance and enforcement.   
Our paper adds to the literature of IFRS-related cost of compliance and enforcement by 
exploiting one specific EU setting, Germany, whose features and data availability allow 
for the identification of said costs. For one thing, the German system is quite transparent 
with respect to the activities of enforcement institutions. The main sanctioning device is 
‘adverse disclosure’, i.e., firms that have been found to publish erroneous financial 
statements are mandated to disclose error findings established by the enforcement insti-
tutions (Hitz et al. 2012). This market-based ‘name and shame’ approach to enforce-
ment enables us to identify firms which have been investigated and censured by en-
forcement institutions and therefore have on average incurred substantial costs of en-
forcement. Also, these enforcement announcements give a detailed account of the error 
findings and hence allow for an assessment of error severity. The second feature we 
exploit is a recent alteration to the listing requirements. Since 2009, authoritative court 
rulings in Germany have substantially lowered the legal threshold for firms to downlist, 
i.e., to migrate from the EU-regulated market to a private, exchange-regulated market. 
While downlisting requirements were almost prohibitively restrictive prior to 2009, the 
revised legal interpretation substantially reduces the costs for firms to, in essence, opt 
out of both the IFRS mandate, and enforcement supervision. Hence, these recent court 
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rulings delivered an exogenous shock to firm-level cost benefit trade-offs of their listing 
status. As a third feature, downlisting firms stay listed on a public stock exchange, and 
also remain subject to disclosure regulation, including filing requirements. This enables 
us to investigate firm-level accounting and market outcomes after the downlisting, to 
discern more effectively enforcement related from IFRS-compliance related downlisting 
motives. 
We shed light on the cost-benefit trade-offs associated with mandatory IFRS application 
and enforcement scrutiny using a determinants model and two sets of supplementary 
analyses. In our main analysis, we investigate determinants associated with the likeli-
hood of firms to opt out of the regulated market. Effectively, we document the particular 
characteristics of firms likely to downlist, identifying factors that may tip the cost-
benefit trade-off of being listed in the regulated market. Our analyses are based on a 
sample of all firms that announced their intent to downlist during the 2009-2014 period. 
We find evidence consistent with IFRS compliance and enforcement related cost repre-
senting significant determinants of firms’ decisions to opt out of the regulated market. 
Accordingly, the likelihood for firms to opt out of the IFRS and enforcement mandate is 
negatively associated with firm size and profitability, and increases for firms that were 
censured by the enforcement mechanism, in particular for firms with severe accounting 
errors. In contrast, opt out likelihood is reduced as transparency benefits such as liquidi-
ty increase. These findings suggest that despite the benefits that prior literature has doc-
umented, the pertinent costs of the IFRS mandate may be restrictively high for a sub-
stantial number of firms.  
In our first supplementary analysis, we investigate market reactions to firms’ first-time 
announcements of their intent to downlist. Stock price reactions should be indicative of 
whether shareholders regard the downlisting decision as value enhancing, or not. The 
results from our event study analysis document large variation in market price reactions. 
Analyses of the determinants of market reactions unveil a positive association for firms 
that credibly pursue cost reductions, given their prior commitment to transparency. On 
the other hand, the market penalizes downlisting announcements by firms that very pre-
viously were censured by the enforcement mechanism, in particular if material errors 
were established. This finding may indicate that investors suspect managerial intent to 
intentionally dodge transparency requirements and enforcement oversight. However, as 
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our findings also indicate that downlisting announcements unveil unfavorable firm pro-
spects per se, inferences from this event study are limited.  
Our second supplementary analysis investigates market and accounting characteristics 
of firms after their downlisting. Findings demonstrate that more than half of the firms 
that downlisted before 2013 opted to continue reporting under IFRS on a voluntary ba-
sis. Compared to a sample of matched firms that retained their listing in the regulated 
market, downlisting firms after migrating to the open market experienced slight de-
creases in size, liquidity, and in audit fees. 
Taken together, our analyses reveal that for some firms that have originally been subject 
to the IFRS mandate, pertinent costs of compliance and enforcement have been substan-
tial, and appear to outweigh IFRS-related transparency benefits. Combining the deter-
minants model with the post-downlisting analysis suggests that the costs of being sub-
jected to the scrutiny of the German enforcement mechanisms represent a particularly 
important factor. These findings are important because they cast light on a phenomenon 
that has so far received little attention in the literature – the systematic opt out of firms 
from the IFRS compliance and enforcement regime. We investigate these downlisting 
decisions to contribute a cost perspective to the IFRS literature, effectively identifying 
what may represent “unintended consequences” of IFRS adoption from a regulatory 
perspective (Brüggemann et al. 2013). This evidence of presumably restrictive compli-
ance costs is of potential relevance for the IASB’s approach to standard setting, but also 
for the regulatory assessment of IFRS-related net benefits, e.g., as part of the EU Com-
mission’s ongoing efforts to evaluate the IAS regulation and related network benefits. 
Also, our findings indicate potential self-selection problems in studies that investigate 
implications or economic effects of the IFRS mandate, because systematic opt outs from 
this mandate may bias samples towards the very firms that likely benefit from increased 
transparency and enforcement. 
Our paper contributes to two literature streams. First, we contribute to the literature on 
the costs and benefits of the IFRS mandate. In particular, we augment the literature on 
economic effects of IFRS enforcement, showing that enforcement action creates poten-
tially substantial costs that may outweigh the benefits of being listed in a highly regulat-
ed market. Hence, we supplement prior evidence on the economic effects of enforce-
ment action in Germany (Hitz et al. 2012), and cross-country evidence by Christensen et 
al. (2013) on positive liquidity effects of IFRS and enforcement, by shedding light on 
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pertinent costs. Also, we complement evidence in particular by Fiechter et al. (2016), 
who demonstrate for the Swiss environment that IFRS related costs likely drive firms’ 
decisions to opt out of specific stock market segments. However, other than these pa-
pers, our setting allows us to identify a “pure” enforcement effect, showing that en-
forcement related costs represent a decisive factor for opt out decisions. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 4.2, we outline details of the institu-
tional setting in Germany, and place our paper within the pertinent literature. Sections 
4.3 to 4.5, respectively, outline the methodology and present the findings for the deter-
minants model, the event study, and the post-downlisting analyses. Section 4.6 provides 
a discussion of our findings, and section 4.7 concludes. 
4.2 Background  
4.2.1 Disclosure and securities markets regulation in Germany 
Mandatory IFRS adoption and enforcement 
Since 2005, Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 mandates all firms listed on a regulated 
European stock market segment to prepare consolidated accounts in accordance with 
IFRS (with a few exceptions). Par. 16 of this so called ‘IFRS-regulation’ also requires 
member states to “take appropriate measures to ensure compliance with international 
accounting standards”, i.e., to install effective mechanisms for the enforcement of IFRS 
accounting standards. This mandate was formalized in the Transparency Directive in 
2004. The coordination of European enforcement activities was delegated to CESR, 
which was succeeded by the European securities regulator ESMA in 2011. 
Germany followed this legal mandate in 2004 by adopting legislation that established an 
external enforcement mechanism organized in two tiers, combining the Financial Re-
porting Enforcement Panel (FREP) as a private body, and the German securities regula-
tor (BaFin) as a federal public agency. This mechanism has been in operation since mid-
2005. The FREP conducts reviews of the financial reports of firms listed on a regulated 
market segment, based on a proactive sampling approach (about 85 percent of investiga-
tions), but also upon indication (about 5 percent of investigations), and upon specific 
request from the securities regulator (about 10 percent of investigations).  From the an-
nual reports of the FREP it can be gleaned that roughly 20 percent of the investigations 
that had been concluded by the end of 2014 resulted in an error finding. Once the FREP 
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establishes materially erroneous financial statements, the case is referred to the securi-
ties regulator BaFin, who will order the firm to disclose the error finding. In cases 
where a firm does not concur with the FREP’s error findings, BaFin will undertake an 
investigation of its own and, if the error finding prevails, enforce disclosure. Disclosure 
of error findings established by FREP or BaFin hence represents the principal sanction-
ing device. This ‘name and shame’ mechanism of adverse disclosure is thus reflective of 
a market-based approach to enforcement, where market participants are duly informed 
about financial reporting irregularities, and may act on this information, e.g., by selling 
the stock, or by attempting to enact governance changes (Hitz et al. 2012).   
 The stock exchange landscape: EU-regulated market vs. open markets 
The stock exchange landscape in Germany comprises the EU-regulated market and the 
so-called open market, which comprises securities markets administered and regulated 
by the respective stock exchanges only. Apart from the most important and most visible 
stock exchange, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE), there are six other regional stock 
exchanges: Munich, Stuttgart, Hamburg, Hanover, Dusseldorf, and Berlin. In addition 
to the EU-regulated market, each of these stock exchanges runs at least one exchange-
regulated market segment. 
Characteristically, reporting and compliance requirements are more numerous for firms 
that list in the EU-regulated market. In particular, the mandate to prepare IFRS group 
accounts and to subject financial reporting to the reviews of the German enforcement 
mechanism only applies to firms in the EU-regulated market. Hence, firms listed in the 
open market are mandated to prepare their annual financial statements based on German 
GAAP, which is deemed to be less informative given the importance of the prudence 
principle, and the comparatively small amount of notes disclosures. However, firms 
listed in the open market may elect to voluntarily prepare IFRS group accounts instead. 
In addition, for firms in the EU-regulated market, the securities act and the commercial 
code stipulate a number of other compliance requirements, which do not (fully) apply 
for firms listed in the open market.
4
 By way of example, Appendix A gives a detailed 
account of respective legal requirements for firms listed on the FSE. These requirements 
                                                 
4
  Note however that supplementary to this legal framework, the respective stock exchanges are free to 
introduce additional listing requirements for firms to be listed in the respective open market seg-
ments. 
Why Do Firms Downlist? Evidence on the Costs of IFRS Compliance and Enforcement 
 92 
are to a large extent similar to those imposed by the six regional exchanges. In a nut-
shell, firms listed in the EU-regulated market are subject to more extensive periodic 
reporting requirements, including a report on Corporate Governance Code compliance, 
interim-annual financial statements, quarterly interim reporting (until 2016), directors’ 
dealings, and the requirement to divulge to the market any material information, e.g., on 
mergers and acquisitions or other major economic incidents, on an ‘ad hoc’ announce-
ment basis. In contrast, open market firms are subject to semi-annual reporting only, 
and to a weaker form of ad hoc disclosures. Also, filing periods are more generous, as 
firms in the regulated market must file their annual (semi-annual) financial statements 
within three (two) months after fiscal year end, whereas these filing periods extend to 
six (four) months for firms in the open market. Plus, while firms in the EU-regulated 
market invariably are required to fully disclose the respective financial statements, firms 
in the open market, depending on size, may only disclose condensed reports. 
Taken together, legal reporting and compliance requirements are more comprehensive 
and strict for firms listed in the EU-regulated market, compared to firms listed in the 
open market. Hence, being listed in the open market entails providing fewer information 
on a less timely basis, quite likely at substantially lower cost. 
Legal requirements for downlistings from the EU-regulated to the open market 
Par. 39 of the German stock market act allows for firms to downlist from the EU-
regulated market to an open market segment on the condition that investors (stockhold-
ers) are not negatively affected. As the stock market act provides no further clarification 
of this requirement, it has been up to the courts to provide guidance. To that end, the 
influential 2002 “Macrotron” ruling by the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) 
stipulated that a listing on the EU-regulated market could only be revoked if two condi-
tions were met, (1) a majority vote of the shareholders’ meeting in support of the delist-
ing / downlisting decision, and (2) a mandatory cash offer to minority shareholders to 
buy back their stock, at a “reasonable” price which must equal at least the current mar-
ket price. While the Macrotron case referred to a delisting decision, the court made it 
clear that these principles were also applicable to downlistings. Hence, the then legal 
requirements for an opt out of the regulated market set high cost obstacles, as campaign-
ing for a majority vote of shareholders represents a cumbersome and risky venture, in 
particular given the high costs involved in buying out minimum shareholders (e.g., 
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Holzborn and Hilpert 2010). Consistent with these costs involved being prohibitive in 
nature, opt outs from the regulated market effectively did not take place at that time. 
As the various stock exchanges in Germany gradually developed their respective ex-
change-regulated open market segments from 2005 onwards,
5
 a series of court rulings 
followed which, by April 2009, gradually modified and revoked the Macrotron princi-
ples (Appendix B). At the core, these rulings established that the Macrotron principles 
were not applicable to downlistings, as the migration from one market to another would 
not negatively affect stockholders. In July 2012, this legal interpretation was ultimately 
confirmed by the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG), who held that the liquidity of 
a stock did not constitute a property right of equity owners. Adopting this view, in Oc-
tober 2013, the “Macrotron” principles were finally revoked both for downlistings and 
for delistings by the highest court, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), with its 
“FRoSTA” decision. 
In summary, in April 2009, the Macrotron principles were quite suddenly removed for 
firms migrating to the exchange-regulated market (Holzborn and Hilpert 2010). As a 
result, executive and supervisory board members were now able to revoke the listing in 
the EU-regulated market solely based on a board decision. The new ruling therefore 
represented an exogenous shock to individual firms’ trade-offs of costs and benefits of 
being listed in the regulated market, effectively lowering the threshold for an opt out 
from the regulated market. Consistent with this, Panel A of Table 4.1 documents that in 
the three years from 2006 to 2008, only four firms in total announced their intent to 
move from the regulated market to the open market, whereas this number rose markedly 
during the following years, with 24 firms in 2009 alone, and a total of 118 firms over 
the period 2009 – 2014. Only briefly afterwards, on October 1, 2015, the German legis-
lator, pressurized in particular by representatives of minority shareholders, revised the 
stock market act to introduce downlisting and delisting criteria essentially equal to the 
former Macrotron principles, effectively raising the threshold for opt outs to the pre 
2009 level. 
 
                                                 
5
  Appendix A gives a detailed comparison of reporting and compliance requirements for the regulated 
market and for the exchange-regulated market at Germany’s main stock exchange, Frankfurt. Note 
however that requirements for the exchange-regulated market vary somewhat for other stock ex-
changes in Germany. 
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Table 4.1: Sample selection 
Panel A: Distribution of downlistings from 2005 to 2014 
  Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
  
Number of firms in the EU-
regulated market (as of July 1) 
1,235 1,122 1,074 1,030 966 915 873 825 751 756   
  
Change in the number of firms in 
the EU-regulated market (as of 
July 1)   
-113 -48 -44 -64 -51 -42 -48 -74 5 -479 
  Number of announcements   1 1 2 24 22 17 22 10 23 122 
  Number of migrations   1 0 1 21 21 13 23 12 11 103 
Panel B: Sample selection of downlisting firms for determinants model 
  Year         2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
  Number of announcements         24 22 17 22 10 23 118 
./. Missing data         5 6 2 2 1 7 23 
./. Banks         1 1 1 3 0 0 6 
./. Partnership limited by shares         2 1 1 2 0 0 6 
./. No IFRS         4 0 1 1 1 3 10 
= Sample I (Determinants model)       12 14 12 14 8 13 73 
Panel C: Control Sample Determinants Model                 





(firms)       
  
Firms continously subjected to enforcement by FREP / BaFin (2008 to 
2014) 2,622   437       
./. Banks       156   26       
./. Missing data       399   49       
./. No IFRS       119   17       
./. Partnership limited by shares           53   9       
./. Balanced panel       221   57       
= Control sample determinants model       1,674   279       
+ 
Downlisting sample determinants model (Sample 
I)       73   73       
= Total sample determinants model       1,747   352       
Panel D: Sample selection of downlisting firms for event study 
  Year         2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
  Sample I (Determinants model)         12 14 12 14 8 13 73 
+ Non-missing data         2 1 0 0 2 1 6 
./. Missing data         0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
./. Confounding events         2 2 0 3 0 2 9 
./. % zero return days > 75%         0 1 1 2 0 1 5 
= Sample II (Event study)         12 12 10 9 10 11 64 
Panel E: Sample selection of downlisting firms for post downlisting analysis 
  Year         2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
  Sample I (Determinants model)         12 14 12 14 8 13 73 
./. Downlisting date unknown         1 0 0 1 2 4 8 
./. Downlisting after fiscal year end 2013     0 0 0 0 3 9 12 
./. Missing data         1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
./. Balanced panel     3 1 3 5 1 0 13 
= Sample III (Post downlisting analysis)       7 13 9 8 2 0 39 
                          
Panel A summarizes the distribution of downlisting announcements of German firms from 2009 to 2014. The number of firms in the 
EU-regulated market is obtained from data provided by BaFin. Ad hoc announcements on firms' intent to downlist are obtained from 
LexisNexis. In the total number of migrations to the open market, five firms are missing since the exact migration date could not be 
identified, four firms are missing because they did not downlist, and ten firms have a migration date set for 2015. Panel B and C 
display the sample selection process for the determinants model. Panel D summarizes the sample selection process for the event 
study. Confounding events are events such as earnings announcements or financing transactions that occur on the same day as the 
downlisting announcement. Panel E summarizes the sample selection process for the post downlisting analysis. Data is obtained 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
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4.2.2 Prior literature 
By examining firms’ downlisting decisions to investigate the cost-benefit trade-offs 
associated with IFRS reporting and enforcement, our paper contributes to two literature 
streams. First, we contribute to the literature on the economic effects of IFRS enforce-
ment by addressing pertinent costs, and whether and how these costs are sufficiently 
substantial to outweigh the benefits of the IFRS mandate. Hence, we augment prior 
country-level evidence on the economic effects of enforcement action in Germany by 
Hitz et al. (2012), who, consistent with a potential sanctioning effect of the ‘name and 
shame’ mechanism, document significant market value discounts upon the disclosure of 
accounting errors by the two-tier enforcement mechanism. Also, Hitz et al. (2012) doc-
ument that the size of the stock market penalty increases with the severity of error find-
ings. Consistent with these results, Ernstberger et al. (2012) provide evidence that earn-
ings management decreases and stock liquidity and market valuation increases for firms 
that are subject to the new enforcement regime and concurrently installed audit over-
sight procedures. These country-level studies for Germany are in line with cross-
country evidence, in particular by Christensen et al. (2013). These authors demonstrate 
that the positive liquidity effects in European markets after 2005, which earlier studies 
mostly attributed to the mandatory adoption of IFRS (e.g., Daske et al. 2008), material-
ize significantly only in those five jurisdictions (one of them being Germany) which 
introduced enforcement mechanisms based on random reviews concurrent with the 
IFRS adoption in 2005. 
We contribute to the literature on the economic effects of enforcement of IFRS by fo-
cusing on enforcement-related costs. Therefore, we are able to identify potential side 
effects and costs of the IFRS and enforcement mandates, which are not captured in prior 
studies that investigate market outcomes. Also, other than Christensen et al. (2013) who 
are ultimately unable to disentangle effects from the IFRS mandate and effects from 
enforcement activities, our setting allows for better identification of enforcement related 
costs. This owes to the detailed nature of published enforcement announcements, and to 
the fact that we are able to identify firms that solely opted out of the enforcement man-
date, while choosing to continue preparing IFRS financial statements after the downlist-
ing. 
Second, we contribute to the stream of literature that examines drivers and consequenc-
es of firms’ decisions to select into or out of specific listing requirements that entail 
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specific compliance costs. For example, Leuz et al. (2008) find that the introduction of 
SOX lead to significant increases in the number of firms that deregister with the SEC 
and move to the open market (i.e., “go dark”). Firms experienced a negative market 
reaction when the intent to go dark was announced, and, compared to a control group, 
were small, had weak stock performance, higher leverage, small asset growth, and were 
incorporated in federal states with little disclosure regulation. Our setting is similar to 
Leuz et al. (2008) to the extent that we are able to investigate regulation-induced deci-
sions of firms to opt out of specific stock market listings. Yet, while Leuz et al. (2008) 
investigate firms that completely dispensed with reporting requirements, firms in our 
setting continue filing reports. Therefore, we are able to observe accounting and market 
data after the actual downlisting took place. This makes our paper similar to the con-
temporaneous paper by Fiechter et al. (2016), who examine a small sample of 34 listed 
Swiss firms that switched from IFRS to Swiss GAAP. The authors find that these firms 
are small, have higher inside ownership, and fewer foreign investors. The authors also 
examine the economic consequences of switching to Swiss GAAP and do find evidence 
of decreases in liquidity following the switch for firms with dispersed ownership. Our 
paper resembles Fiechter et al. (2016) to the extent that we also investigate decisions to 
opt out of IFRS. However, we go further because our setting enables us to adopt an 
identification strategy that isolates the incremental role of enforcement related costs. 
4.3 Determinants of the downlisting decision 
We conduct three sets of analyses. In our main analysis, we explore the determinants of 
firms’ opt out decisions to infer whether specific IFRS and enforcement related factors 
are conducive to the downlisting decision. In our supplemental analyses, we first inves-
tigate market reactions to firms’ first time announcement of their intent to downlist, and 
discuss to what extent these are in line with the determinants analysis. Second, we ana-
lyze accounting and market data of firms after their downlisting, to investigate reporting 
choices and to identify potential motives and implications of the downlisting decisions. 
4.3.1 Theoretical background 
To infer whether cost of IFRS compliance and enforcement play a role in firm-level 
decisions to downlist, we identify sets of factors that we hypothesize to shape these de-
cisions, and estimate a determinants model. At the outset, we compiled the reasons that 
downlisting firms stated. To that end, we conducted an exploratory content analysis of 
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the ad hoc announcements released by firms to divulge to the market their intent to mi-
grate to the exchange-regulated market. Out of the total sample of 118 downlisting 
firms during the 2009-2014 period, 92 firms (78.0 percent) in their announcement ex-
plicitly stated one or more reasons for their decision (see Appendix C). The three cate-
gories of objectives most frequently quoted were (1) to dispense with the cost of being 
listed in the EU-regulated market (48 out of 92 firms, 52.2 percent), (2) to reduce ad-
ministrative costs of reporting and compliance (42 out of 92 firms, 45.7 percent), and, 
quite related to (1) and (2), (3) to improve the cost-benefit ratio of the stock market list-
ing (30 out of 92 firms, 32.6 percent).  
The stated reasoning of downlisting firms is consistent with the cost savings hypothesis, 
which predicts that firm managers rationally trade off costs and benefits of being listed 
in the EU-regulated market in order to maximize firm value. However, this hypothesis 
rests on the notion that managers are well-governed and act in the interest of sharehold-
ers. The alternative agency hypothesis holds that this is not the case, and predicts that 
managers maximize their personal welfare, potentially at the cost of shareholders. If this 
is the case, managers may decide to downlist despite a favorable cost-benefit trade-off 
of being listed in the EU-regulated market, to improve their personal welfare. This may 
be the case because the downlisting reduces transparency and dispenses with enforce-
ment scrutiny, hence increasing managers’ leeway to extract private control benefits, 
such as excessive remuneration / pay without performance, or various perks, or by 
shirking on the job (Leuz et al. 2008). Combining both theories, we arrive at the empiri-
cal prediction that the likelihood for firms to migrate from the regulated market to the 
open market is positively associated with reporting and compliance costs, with en-
forcement cost, and with managerial opportunism, and negatively associated with trans-
parency benefits. 
4.3.2 Research design 
Our predictions are incorporated into Equation (1), which captures determinants of the 
likelihood of a firm i’s decision to downlist for a given fiscal year t: 
(1) Prob (Downlisting announcementit) = Reporting and compliance costsit + Costs 
of enforcementit + Transparency benefitsit + ∑ Controlsit + ∑ Fixed effectsit + ɛ 
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In line with our theoretical background, we identify three vectors of test variables, and 
supplement the model by a range of control variables and controls for fixed effects. As 
we are interested in particular in the trade-off of IFRS compliance and enforcement re-
lated costs and benefits, we treat managerial opportunism as a control variable. 
Reporting and compliance costs. If managers rationally trade off the cost and benefits of 
being listed in the EU-regulated market, then this trade-off is more likely to become 
unfavorable as relative reporting and compliance costs increase. Since compliance costs 
are not directly observable, we use firm size as a construct that is likely associated with 
these costs. Because a substantial portion of reporting and compliance costs is not pro-
portionally related to size, e.g., fractions of costs of building up and maintaining IFRS 
expertise, and some costs of preparing IFRS accounts and having them audited, we as-
sume that relative IFRS compliance costs decrease with firm size. As a second indica-
tor, we use firm profitability. Hence, we assume that as profitability declines, the per-
ceived costs related to IFRS compliance and enforcement increase, as the firm runs the 
danger of missing earnings benchmarks, breaching covenants, or running into financial 
distress. In line with Leuz et al. (2008) and Fiechter et al. (2016), we measure Size as 
the natural logarithm of total assets, and profitability as ROA (i.e., net income plus in-
terest expense divided by mean total assets). 
Costs of enforcement. Being under the auspices of an enforcement institution involves 
an additional set of specific benefits and cost. On the benefits side, being subject to a 
strict enforcement regime potentially increases the (perceived) quality of financial 
statements, which in turn facilitates market benefits such as lower cost of capital and 
higher liquidity. This ever more so as firms, by effectively choosing to be listed in the 
regulated market, self-select into the enforcement regime, thus signaling their commit-
ment to high financial reporting quality. This is consistent with the so-called ‘bonding 
hypothesis’, according to which managers voluntarily subject the firm to strong en-
forcement oversight in order to create more favorable financings terms (Doidge et al. 
2010). At the same time, being subject to enforcement oversight creates various costs. 
These involve direct costs, in particular if a firm is subject to an investigation and needs 
to commit resources to communicating with the enforcer. These costs would typically 
also include additional fees to the auditors. More importantly, potentially significant 
costs materialize in case of an error finding by the enforcer. As noted, Hitz et al. (2012) 
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document that firms are penalized on the occasion of such error announcements, and 
that the market value discount is positively associated with the severity of the errors.  
While the benefits of enforcement activities are hard to discern, the German setting al-
lows us to identify firms that have faced potentially high costs of enforcement, i.e., 
firms that have been censured publicly for erroneous accounting. We assume that for 
these firms, costs of enforcement are c.p. higher than for non-censured firms. Hence, for 
our empirical analyses, we measure costs of enforcement using the binary variable Er-
ror announcement, which takes the value of one for firms that were mandated to publish 
an error announcement following an investigation by FREP / BaFin in the past fiscal 
year, and zero otherwise. Second, as a more detailed measure, we introduce error severi-
ty, and divide the sample of error firms into firms that faced potentially high costs of 
enforcement (High error severity), and those that did not (Low error severity). Con-
sistent with the Hitz et al. (2012) findings, we exploit the detailed account of error find-
ings that the German enforcement mechanism mandates to be published, and tie error 
severity to the amount of material accounting errors by categorizing as high error se-
verity those error announcements that included two or more accounting errors with a 
direct impact on net income.  
Transparency benefits. Benefits of high quality financial reporting include increases in 
liquidity, and reductions in cost of equity and debt financing. Firms differ to the extent 
that IFRS enables them to create these benefits, and to the extent that they are able to 
exploit them. We use two constructs to capture transparency benefits. Our first measure, 
liquidity, represents both an outcome and an indicator of transparency. We measure 
liquidity using two variables: Bid-ask spread and % of zero return days. Bid-ask spread 
is measured as the natural logarithm of the mid-point scaled median bid-ask spread 
(Christensen et al. 2013) over the past fiscal year, % of zero return days is the percent-
age of zero return days during the past fiscal year. Our second measure of transparency 
benefits is whether firms adopted IFRS prior to the mandate in 2005. An exhaustive 
literature demonstrates that such ‘voluntary adopters’ are specific firms with a relatively 
high level of transparency and hence a well-developed information environment 
(Soderstrom and Sun 2007). Therefore, firms voluntarily adopted IFRS because of ex-
pected net benefits from transparency. To the extent that these benefits persist, we ex-
pect voluntary adopters to be less likely to opt out of the IFRS regime. In our empirical 
analysis, we include the binary variable Voluntary IFRS adoption, which takes the value 
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of one for firms which voluntarily applied IFRS or US-GAAP prior to 2005, and zero 
otherwise.  
We add to our model various control variables that prior literature has shown to have an 
impact on a firms’ decision to voluntarily decrease disclosure. Panel A of Table 4.2 de-
tails the definitions and calculations of these control variables, and of our main test var-
iables. To control for managerial opportunism, we include Discretionary accruals, 
which as a measure of earnings management has been shown to be associated with 
managerial opportunism (Walker 2013). As further controls, we include Sales growth as 
proxy for a firm’s financing needs (e.g., Fernandes et al. 2010, Doidge et al. 2010). Fol-
lowing Fiechter et al. (2016), we include Leverage as a measure of financing con-
straints, and Past return (i.e., stock return over the past year) to control for a firm’s past 
year performance. Free float is included to control for a firm’s ownership concentration 
(e.g., Fiechter et al. 2016). In addition, we also control for firms being listed on the FSE. 
As noted FSE is the most important and visible stock exchange in Germany and com-
promises 90.3% of our sample observations. Firms listed on the FSE are likely to differ 
from firms listed on the less visible regional stock exchanges. Finally, we use industry- 
and year-fixed effects and cluster standard errors by firm (e.g., Doidge et al. 2010).  
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Table 4.2: Variables measurement 
Panel A: Determinants model and downlisting analysis 
Variable name Definition 
Downlisting announcement Binary variable indicating that a firm announced its intent to downlist in the 
respective year 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year
1
 
ROA Return on assets (i.e., net income plus interest expense divided by mean total 
assets) at the beginning of the year
1
 
Error announcement Binary variable indicating that a firm had to publish an error announcement 
in the past fiscal year 
High error severity Binary variable indicating that a firm had to publish an error announcement 
following an erroneous financial report with more than one error that affect-
ed net income in the past fiscal year 
Low error severity Binary variable indicating that a firm had to publish an error announcement 
following an erroneous financial report with no more than one error that 
affected net income in the past fiscal year 
Bid-ask spread Natural logarithm of median bid-ask spread over the past year (i.e., price ask 
minus price bid divided by price bid plus half the difference between price 
ask and price bid) 
% zero return days Percentage of zero return days in the past fiscal year 
Voluntary IFRS adoption Binary variable indicating that a firm voluntarily adopted IFRS or US-
GAAP prior to 2005 
Discretionary accruals Absolute discretionary accruals derived from Jones model based on total 
accruals without growth and ROA adjustment (Kothari et al. 2005) at the 
beginning of the year 
Sales growth Two-year average of sales growth at the beginning of the year
1
 
Leverage Total assets less common equity divided by total assets at the beginning of 
the year 
Past return Stock return over the past year
1
 
Free float Percentage of free float shares measured at the beginning of the year 
Audit fees Natural logarithm of auditing fees in the past fiscal year 
Panel B: Event study 
Variable name Definition 
CMARs Three-day market adjusted returns [-1;1] relative to the CDAX around the 
announcement date of downlisting 
Voluntary IFRS adoption Binary variable indicating that a firm voluntarily adopted IFRS or US-
GAAP prior to 2005 
Bid-ask spread Natural logarithm of median bid-ask spread over the past year (i.e., price ask 
minus price bid divided by price bid plus half the difference between price 
ask and price bid) 
Error announcement Binary variable indicating that a firm already had to publish an error an-
nouncement 
High error severity Binary variable indicating that a firm already had to publish an error an-
nouncement following an erroneous financial report with more than one 
error that affected net income 
Low error severity Binary variable indicating that a firm already had to publish an error an-
nouncement following an erroneous financial report with no more than one 
error that affected net income 
ROA Return on assets (i.e., net income plus interest expense divided by mean total 
assets) at the beginning of the year
1
 
Future ROA Return on assets (i.e., net income plus interest expense divided by mean total 
assets) at the end of the year
1
 
Market capitalization Natural logarithm of market capitalization prior to the downlisting an-
nouncement 
Free float Percentage of free float shares on the day of the downlisting announcement 
This table summarizes the variables used in this paper. 
 
1 Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
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4.3.3 Sample selection 
To identify firms that discontinued the listing of their stocks in German EU-regulated 
markets and moved to German exchange-regulated market segments, we searched Lex-
isNexis for ad hoc announcements using the terms “change” and “open market”.
6
 A 
change in listing status is a corporate event that must be reported immediately to the 
investment public via ad hoc announcements, because of the likely impact on firm / 
stock value. After removing foreign firms, we identify 118 firms that announced their 
intent to move their stocks to the open market during 2009 to 2014. We limit our sample 
observation period to the years 2009 to 2014 because, as outlined in section 4.2.1, there 
were essentially prohibitive barriers to downlistings prior to 2009.  
The sample selection process for the determinants analysis is summarized in Panel B of 
Table 4.1. We exclude 23 firms due to missing data, six banks, six firms with specific 
liability and ownership structures (partnerships limited by shares ), and ten firms that do 
not prepare consolidated financial statements and were hence not subject to the IFRS 
mandate (“no IFRS”). This yields a final sample of 73 downlisting observations (Sam-
ple I), which we compare to a control sample of firm-year observations of firms that 
decided not to downlist during the sample period (Panel C of Table 4.1). This control 
sample compromises a balanced panel of all firms continuously subjected to enforce-
ment by FREP / BaFin from July 2008 to July 2014 with stocks listed on regulated 
German stock markets. From the initial sample of 2,622 firm-year observations, we ex-
clude 156 firm-year observations for financial institutions, 399 firm-year observations 
due to missing data, 53 firm-year observations for partnerships limited by shares, 119 
firm-year observations for firms that did not prepare consolidated financial statements, 
and 221 firm-year observations to construct a balanced panel structure. This results in a 
final control sample of 1,674 firm-year observations and a total sample of 1,747 firm-
year observations for the determinants model. For all analyses, data on market prices, 
bid-ask spreads, free float, and balance sheet data is obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. Data on FREP / BaFin error announcements is hand-collected from the 
Federal Gazette (www.bundesanzeiger.de). 
                                                 
6
  „Wechsel“ and „Freiverkehr“. 
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4.3.4 Empirical findings  
Table 4.3 reports descriptive statistics (including correlations) for the variables used to 
estimate the determinants model, separately for the downlisting firms, and for the con-
trol sample of continuously listed firms. It follows from the data that, on average, firms 
that announce their intent to downlist are significantly smaller than the firms that remain 
in the EU-regulated market. Also, these firms are significantly less liquid in terms of 
both our measures for liquidity (Bid-ask spread, % zero return days). Firms that volun-
tarily adopted IFRS or US-GAAP prior to 2005 appear to be less likely to downlist, 
while firms that were subject to enforcement action in the last year cluster more strongly 
in the downlisting sample (Error announcement), in particular firms with more severe 
error findings (High error severity). Taken together, the differences in our test variables 
are all consistent with our empirical predictions that costs and benefits of IFRS compli-
ance and enforcement are important factors in shaping firms’ opt out decisions.  
Panel A of Table 4.4 reports the results of estimating our determinants model. We esti-
mate a total of five different specifications of Equation (1). Models (1), (2), and (3) are 
estimated for the full sample. Models (4) and (5) are estimated for a subsample of firm 
year observations, owing to data limitations imposed by the calculation of the control 
variable Discretionary accruals. 
For our full sample analyses (models (1), (2), (3)), coefficient estimates for the variables 
Size and ROA turn out negative and significant. This indicates that smaller firms and 
less profitable firms are more likely to opt out of the regulated market, consistent with 
our prediction that firms opt out of the regulated market because of substantial costs of 
applying and complying with IFRS. Analysis of economic effects for model (1) shows 
that a one standard deviation increase in Size (ROA) reduces the likelihood of downlist-
ing by 21.9% (13.1 %).
7
 
                                                 
7
  We also re-estimate model (1) for a reduced sample in order to include ad hoc announcements as a 
proxy for non-IFRS disclosure costs, i.e., disclosure costs that result from the listing in the EU-
regulated market irrespective of the application of IFRS. The reduction in sample size results from 
data limitations since the number of ad hoc announcements is available only for a subsample of 
firms. We find that the number of ad hoc announcements in the past fiscal year, as a proxy for non-
IFRS disclosure costs, does not significantly affect a firm’s decision to downlist. Further, we re-
estimate models (1) and (2) including Future ROA, i.e., return on assets at the end of the year to con-
trol for poor future prospects. We find that the coefficient on Future ROA is significantly negative 
(5% level) when excluding ROA from the model. While this might point to poor future prospects be-
ing a driver of downlisting decisions, the finding might also be attributable to the high correlation of 
ROA and Future ROA. 
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Table 4.3: Descriptives of determinants of firms' decisions to downlist 
Panel A: Descriptives                   
  Downlisting sample   Control sample   Difference t-value 
Wilkoxon 
z-value 
Variables mean N   mean N         
Size 11.354 73   12.822 1,674   -1.469 (-5.40)*** (-5.40)*** 
                    
ROA -0.031 73   0.033 1,674   -0.064 (-4.10)*** (-5.29)*** 
                    
Error announcement 0.082 73   0.028 1,674   0.054 (2.64)*** (2.64)*** 
                    
High error severity 0.041 73   0.004 1,674   0.037 (4.11)***  (4.09)*** 
                    
Low error severity 0.041 73   0.024 1,674   0.017 (0.93) (0.93) 
                    
Bid-ask spread -3.135 73   -4.011 1,674   0.876 (7.10)*** (7.34)*** 
                    
% zero return days 0.283 73   0.112 1,674   0.171 (8.35)*** (7.53)*** 
                    
Voluntary IFRS adoption 0.397 73   0.670 1,674   -0.273 (-4.85)*** (-4.81)*** 
                    
Discretionary accruals 0.068 49   0.049 966   0.019 (2.68)*** (1.91)* 
                    
Sales growth 0.040 73   0.106 1,674   -0.066 (-1.45) (-3.50)*** 
                    
Leverage 0.582 73   0.582 1,674   0.000 (0.01) (0.41) 
                    
Past return 0.124 73   0.150 1,674   -0.027 (-0.50) (-0.94) 
                    
Free float 0.552 73   0.585 1,674   -0.033 (-0.95) (-0.86) 
 
Panel B: Correlations       
Variables   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Downlisting announce-








0.098 0.164 1.000               
 




0.055 1.000               






0.003 1.000             






0.006 0.576 1.000           










0.383 1.000         








0.028 1.000       
Leverage (9) 0.000 0.091 
-
0.251 0.076 0.007 0.077 
-
0.039 0.003 1.000     






0.008 0.079 0.038 0.023 
-
0.021 -0.015 1.000   








0.238 0.175 0.003 0.005 -0.036 1.000 
This table displays the descriptives for the variables used in the determinants model in Table 4.4. Definitions of variables are report-
ed in Table 4.2 Panel A. In Panel B, bold letters indicate significance at the 10%-level. 
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Also consistent with our predictions, our variable that captures costs of enforcement 
action (Error announcement) turns out significantly positive (1% level) in models (1) 
and (2). This finding indicates that the direct and indirect costs associated with being 
investigated and, ultimately, censured by the two-tier enforcement panel are likely to be 
substantial, and for some firms may outweigh the benefits from being subjected to that 
enforcement regime. With regard to economic effects, mandated publication of an en-
forcement error finding during the past fiscal year increases a firm’s probability of 
downlisting substantially, by 71.4% (68.2%) in model (1) (model (2)). In model (3), we 
substitute the error announcement variable by two non-overlapping indicator variables 
for high and low error severity. Only the coefficient on high severity loads significantly 
(at the 1 % level), indicating that the downlisting likelihood increases with the severity 
of the errors established by the enforcement institutions. The coefficient on High error 
severity translates into an increase of the firm’s downlisting likelihood by 127.1% in 
case of a highly severe error. This finding prevails for an alternative measure of severi-
ty, where all firms with at least one income-related error are coded as high error severity 
firms (untabulated). 
All our test variables that capture transparency benefits accruing from adopting and 
complying with high quality accounting standards show the predicted signs. The posi-
tive signs on both our measures of liquidity (Bid-ask spread and % zero return days, 
both significant at the 10 % level) suggest that firms with lower liquidity are more likely 
to move to the exchange-regulated market. A one standard deviation increase in Bid-ask 
spread (% zero return days) increases the probability of downlisting by 24.0% (12.0%). 
Second, the coefficient on the Voluntary IFRS adoption variable is negative and, in 
models (1) and (3), significant (at the 10 % level). Hence, firms which presumably ben-
efited particularly from the transparency benefits associated with IFRS adoption are less 
likely to downlist. This decision to voluntarily adopt high-quality international stand-
ards prior to 2005 translates into a 30.9% (24.6%) reduction for the likelihood of down-
listing in model (1) (model (2)). 
In model (4), we re-estimate the baseline model (1) for a reduced sample, to include into 
the analyses our proxy for managerial opportunism, discretionary accruals. The coeffi-
cient on the discretionary accruals variable turns out positive, yet does not do so in a 
statistically significant manner. Also, the inclusion of Discretionary accruals barely 
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impacts the results from model (1), which we demonstrate by re-estimating for compar-
ative reason model (1) for the sub-sample (model (5)). 
Table 4.4: Determinants of firms' decisions to downlist 
Panel A: Regression results 
      Full sample   Subsample 
Variables Prediction   (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) 
Size -   -0.095 -0.131 -0.096  -0.171 -0.194 
    (-1.73)* (-2.94)*** (-1.73)*  (-1.76)* (-1.99)* 
ROA -   -1.008 -1.108 -1.021  -1.192 -1.285 
    (-2.42)** (-2.69)*** (-2.42)**  (-1.64) (-1.72)* 
Error announcement +   0.714 0.682   0.685 0.683 
    (2.82)*** (2.70)***   (2.16)** (2.18)** 
High error severity +     1.115    
       (2.74)***    
Low error severity      0.500    
       (1.48)    
Bid-ask spread +   0.229  0.225  0.144 0.127 
     (1.90)*  (1.86)*  (0.81) (0.73) 
% zero return days +    0.687     
     (1.67)*     
Voluntary IFRS adoption -   -0.309 -0.246 -0.313  -0.345 -0.338 
    (-1.81)* (-1.38) (-1.83)*  (-1.43) (-1.38) 
Discretionary accruals        1.722  
        (1.07)  
Sales growth    -0.363 -0.373 -0.334  -0.176 -0.169 
    (-1.52) (-1.54) (-1.44)  (-0.86) (-0.85) 
Leverage    -0.295 -0.286 -0.332  0.502 0.546 
    (-2.05)** (-2.04)** (-2.22)**  (1.03) (1.14) 
Past return    -0.136 -0.097 -0.140  -0.157 -0.181 
    (-0.80) (-0.58) (-0.83)  (-0.66) (-0.74) 
Free float    -0.174 -0.200 -0.176  -0.279 -0.250 
    (-0.73) (-0.84) (-0.74)  (-0.86) (-0.77) 
Constant    -2.668 -3.161 -2.617  2.182 2.444 
     
(-4.60)*** (-4.90)*** (-4.30)***  (2.52)*** (2.75)*** 
N (obs.)     1,747 1,747 1,747   1,014 1,014 
N (downlisting obs.)     73 73 73   49 49 
Pseudo R-Squared     0.21 0.21 0.22   0.26 0.26 
Industry-fixed effects     yes yes yes   yes yes 
Year-fixed effects     yes yes yes   yes yes 
Control for FSE     yes yes yes   yes yes 
Clustered standard errors   firm firm firm   firm firm 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
Panel B: Economic effects 
      Model (1)
1
   Model (2)   
  
Standard 











one   
Variables                 
Size 2.294  -0.219   -0.300    
ROA 0.130  -0.131   -0.144    
Error announcement 0.172   0.714   0.682   
High error severity 0.083   1.271
1
    
  
Low error severity 0.151   0.472
1
    
  
Bid-ask spread 1.046  0.240       
Zero return days 0.174     0.120    
Voluntary IFRS adoption 0.474   -0.309   -0.246   
Panel A of this table displays coefficient estimates using industry- and year-fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm from 
a probit model. The dependent variable is Downlisting announcement, a binary variable indicating that a firm announced its intent to 
downlist. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 4.2 Panel A. z-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel B displays economic effects for variables from Models (1) and (2) 
based on one standard deviation change for continuous variables and the value one for binary variables. 
 
1Economics effects on High error severity and Low error severity are based on Model (3). 
 
4.4 Market reactions to downlisting announcements 
4.4.1 Theoretical background 
On a semi-strong form efficient market, market prices instantaneously and correctly 
reflect all new information made available to the investment public. Market value reac-
tions to firms’ announcements of their intent to downlist are therefore reflective of in-
vestors’ assessments of the benefits and costs that firms are expected to experience by 
moving from the regulated market to the unregulated market. Hence, investigation of 
market reactions potentially provides a complementary perspective on managers’ mo-
tives that underlie the decision to downlist, from the investors’ point of view.  
As noted in section 4.3.1, there are essentially two economic explanations for downlist-
ings, which are associated with different predictions with respect to the sign of market 
value reactions. Under the cost savings hypothesis, the decision to downlist reflects that 
managers deem the cost of being quoted in the regulated market to outweigh the bene-
fits. Or rather, they believe the cost-benefit trade-off is more positive for the firm if it 
went to the open market, dispensing with reporting and compliance costs. In this case, 
the announcement to downlist represents positive news, as it implies implementation of 
a listing policy which potentially yields cost savings and, hence, increases firm value. 
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Under the competing agency hypothesis, downlisting might represent a rational man-
agement strategy, because the decrease in transparency and the opt out from the scrutiny 
of the public enforcement mechanism potentially increase management’s leeway to ap-
propriate benefits of private control at the cost of shareholders. If market participants 
believe that the decision to downlist is driven by such an opportunistic motive, they 
would regard this as an indication of potential firm value reductions from expected ap-
propriation of private control benefits by managers, and discount market value accord-
ingly. 
Finally, it needs to be borne in mind that the announcement of downlisting intent may 
also reveal new information concerning the firm’s future prospects of success. For in-
stance, managers’ reasonable decision to downlist under the cost savings hypothesis 
might be driven by their private knowledge of lower expected firm growth in the future, 
which reduces financing needs and might therefore tip the cost-benefit trade-off in favor 
of leaving the regulated market. In this case, the market learns of firm value decreases 
(poor prospects) and value increases (cost savings from downlisting) at the same time. 
Hence, observable negative market reactions can be reconciled with both explanations, 
the agency and the cost savings motive. 
4.4.2 Research design 
We investigate market reactions to downlisting announcements to shed light on the 
three proposed explanations and to gain an understanding of market perceptions pertain-
ing to the costs and benefits of leaving the regulated market. Hence, we estimate the 
following Equation (2), which investigates the market perception of constructs similar 
to our original determinants analysis: 
(2)  Stock price reactionit = Reporting and compliance costsit + Cost of enforcementit + 
Transparency benefitsit + ∑ Controlsit +∑ Fixed effectsit + ɛ 
The dependent variable, stock price reaction, is measured as the cumulative market ad-
justed return (CMAR) around the firm’s downlisting announcement. We examine a 
three-day window around the announcement date [-1; 1] to account for the possibility 
that the intent to downlist was already factored into prices the day prior to the actual 
announcement (Doidge et al. 2010, Fernandes et al. 2010). Cumulative market adjusted 
returns are calculated relative to the CDAX (i.e., all German firms listed on the FSE) as 
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a proxy for the market portfolio. We test whether CMARs around the announcement 
date are significantly different from zero using standard errors clustered by announce-
ment month. 
Most variables we use to proxy our three vectors of determinants correspond to the var-
iables used in our determinants analysis, yet with somewhat different interpretations, 
which follow from the three generic interpretations of market reactions outlined in sec-
tion 4.4.1. As the determinants analysis yields that firms select to downlist based on 
those very variables, the variation therein is lower, and results mechanically weaker.  
Cost savings hypothesis. We retain profitability (ROA) as a direct measure of potential 
cost savings, expecting a positive sign. In line with Leuz et al. (2008), we exclude Size 
and instead include Market capitalization as a control variable. Our second measure of 
potential cost savings is the voluntary IFRS adoption indicator variable, which indicates 
firms historically bonding themselves to higher standards of transparency and compli-
ance. As such a bonding potentially lends credibility to downlisting announcements 
reflecting a cost-benefit trade-off, we predict an incrementally positive market reaction 
to downlisting announcements by these firms. In line with our perspective of liquidity 
as an indicator of transparency benefits, we expect a negative association with market 
value, i.e., that the market greets the downlisting decision for firms with low liquidity 
and low pertinent transparency benefits. We solely use Bid-ask spread as our measure 
of liquidity for this analysis, as this measure captures among other things information 
asymmetry. Finally, as noted, firms that have been censured by the enforcement mecha-
nism before have potentially experienced high enforcement costs already. To the extent 
that they expect these costs to persist or recur, opting out of the enforcement mechanism 
may represent a rational strategy. We use Error announcement to measure enforcement 
exposure, and High (Low) error severity as an indicator for firms with relatively high 
(small) costs following from that exposure. 
Agency hypothesis. If firms that have been censured for erroneous accounting announce 
their downlisting intent, markets may also regard this as a negative sign, because it indi-
cates that managers which have been ‘caught red-handed’ attempt to escape the critical 
eyes of enforcers in the future, which is consistent with the endeavor to retain or in-
crease private control benefits. Therefore, we have no prediction for the sign of the 
market reaction to downlisting announcements by censured firms. Due to sample size, 
we confine our analysis to the full sample, excluding Discretionary accruals. 
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New information. It is obviously difficult to establish whether a downlisting announce-
ment reveals additional information, in particular negative future prospects. However, 
on a very general level, it is reasonable to assume that such information revelation is 
dependent on the overall quality of the firm’s information environment, which is in turn 
captured, e.g., by liquidity. Therefore, we predict that as liquidity decreases, the likeli-
hood for negative information content of the downlisting announcement increases. 
Hence, from an information revelation perspective, we expect a positive association 
between liquidity and the market value reaction, while we expect a negative association 
from a cost savings perspective. To introduce a more direct measure of new infor-
mation, we use Future ROA instead of current ROA, and predict a positive sign. 
Finally, we include Market capitalization and Free float, i.e., the percentage of free 
float shares on the day of the downlisting announcement, as control variables. Further, 
in line with Fernandes et al. (2010), we include industry-fixed effects and standard er-
rors clustered by announcement month. Similar to the determinants model, we also con-
trol for firms being listed on the FSE. Definitions of variables used in Equation (2) are 
summarized in Table 4.2, Panel B. 
4.4.3 Sample selection 
For the event study, we add six observations to the previous sample of 73 downlisting 
observations because unlike for the determinants model, the data required for the event 
study is available for these observations, and remove one firm because the required data 
is not available. Repeatedly, firms announce their intent to downlist simultaneously on 
the same day as other news such as earnings or capital measures. Thus, we exclude nine 
observations from the analysis of the market reactions due to these confounding events. 
Additionally, we exclude five observations of firms with stocks traded on less than 25% 
of trading days in the year prior to the announcement date, since stocks of these firms 
are highly illiquid. This results in a final sample of 64 firms for the event study (Table 
4.1, Panel D). 
4.4.4 Empirical findings 
Panel A of Table 4.5 reports average cumulative market adjusted returns (CMARs) for 
the three day window around the announcement date for the full sample. The results 
reveal that the average market reaction around the first-time announcement of the intent 
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to downlist is significantly negative (-0.019) at the 5% level. However, the number of 
firms that experience positive and negative announcement returns, respectively, is rela-
tively even (29 and 35, respectively), which demonstrates that investor perceptions of 
downlisting decisions vary substantially on the firm-level. 
Table 4.5: Market reactions to downlisting announcements 
Panel A: Cumulative market adjusted returns around downlisting announcements 
Sample CMARs t-value 
Wilkoxon z-
value N % N (pos) % (pos) 
                
All firms -0.019 (-2.35)** (-1.99)** 64 100.0% 29 45.3% 
                
Panel B: Determinants of cumulative market adjusted returns around downlisting announcements 
Variables (1)   (2)   (3)     
Voluntary IFRS adoption 0.034   0.035   0.023     
  (1.53)   (1.71)*   (1.19)     
Bid-ask spread -0.008   -0.009   -0.003     
  (-0.58)   (-0.66)   (-0.25)     
Error announcement -0.054       -0.039     
  (-1.81)*       (-1.51)     
High error severity     -0.099         
      (-1.93)*         
Low error severity     -0.034         
      (-1.13)         
ROA 0.071   0.064         
  (1.52)   (1.32)         
Future ROA         0.156     
          (3.10)***     
Market capitalization -0.008   -0.008   -0.009     
  (-0.99)   (-0.95)   (-1.11)     
Free float -0.004   -0.005   0.000     
  (-0.13)   (-0.16)   (0.01)     
Constant -0.027   -0.030   0.008     
  (-0.69)   (-0.72)   (0.19)     
N 64   64   61     
Adjusted R-squared 0.01   0.04   0.14     
Industry effects yes   yes   yes     
Control for FSE yes   yes   yes     
Clustered standard errors month   month   month     
Panel A of this table reports three-day [-1;1] cumulative market adjusted returns (CMARs) in the respective event windows around 
firms' announcements to downlist. ***, ** and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, from 
testing whether cumulative market adjusted returns are different from zero using robust standard error clustered by announcement 
month. N(pos) (% (pos)) denotes the respective (percentage) number of firms with positive CMARs.Panel B of this table reports 
results from regressing the variables of interest on three-day [-1;1] market adjusted returns relative to the CDAX around the an-
nouncement date of downlisting using robust standard errors clustered by announcement month and industry fixed effects. Defini-
tions of variables are reported in Table 4.2 Panel B. Descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix D. t-values are reported in paren-
theses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B of Table 4.5 presents the results from estimating three versions of Equation (2). 
In addition to the original model (1), we use the high / low enforcement cost partition in 
model (2), and future ROA instead of current ROA in model (3). With respect to the 
potential cost savings rationale, the coefficient for the variable indicating voluntary 
IFRS / US-GAAP adopters shows the predicted positive sign, but is only weakly signif-
icant for model (2) at the 10% level. This might point towards markets perceiving 
downlisting decisions by these firms to be more credible in the sense of being value-
enhancing. Our second indicator of transparency benefits, liquidity, measured by Bid-
ask-spread, does not support this reasoning, as liquidity appears to be positively, but 
insignificantly, associated with market reactions. However, as noted, we also need to 
interpret the negative sign on the bid-ask spread in terms of our information revelation 
prediction. Accordingly, the downlisting announcement reveals negative information to 
the market, which is more relevant to less liquid (less transparent) firms. The coefficient 
on our indicator variable for firms censured by the enforcement mechanism (Error An-
nouncement) shows a negative sign and is weakly significant for model (1) (10% level). 
Findings from model (2) reveal that this impact is slightly more pronounced in case of 
highly severe errors (High error severity). This represents weak evidence that the mar-
ket subscribes to the agency motive for such firms. 
In model (3), we use future ROA instead of current ROA. This leaves most findings 
essentially unaltered, while yielding a highly significant positive coefficient on future 
ROA. This finding is in line with information revelation, as it indicates that the market 
infers negative future prospects from announcements, and prices them accordingly. 
4.5 Post downlisting analyses  
4.5.1 Objectives and research design 
To shed further light on the determinants, but also on potential economic and account-
ing effects of downlisting decisions, we exploit the availability of both market and ac-
counting data for firms after migrating from the regulated market to the open market. In 
order to analyze a representative period of two (fiscal) years after the downlisting, we 
restrict our analyses to a subsample of firms that effectively downlisted prior to fiscal 
year end 2013. We perform two analyses. First, we document accounting standard 
choice by inferring whether firms, after dispensing with the IFRS mandate, switched to 
German GAAP, or whether they decided to voluntarily resume IFRS reporting instead. 
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Second, we analyze how firm characteristics evolve after the downlisting decision. This 
analysis aims at gleaning further insights into effects that downlisting firms potentially 
anticipated, and potentially consequences of the downlisting. We note that our research 
design cannot distinguish between these two phenomena. To implement the analysis of 
firm characteristics, we compare our sample of downlisting firms to a sample of compa-
rable firms, which decided not to downlist in the respective year. To proxy for these 
“counterfactual” firm-year observations, we identify firms that were similar to our 
downlisting firms when the downlisting decision was announced. We use propensity 
score matching and match firms based on Equation (1) using only the vector variables 
of interest, i.e., Size, ROA, Error announcement, Bid-ask spread, and Voluntary IFRS 
adoption. We then compare firm characteristics between both samples for the two fiscal 
years before and after the actual downlisting. 
4.5.2 Sample selection 
For the post downlisting analyses, we exclude 12 firms that migrated to the exchange-
regulated market after fiscal year end 2013. Further, we exclude eight firms because the 
migration data is not available, in particular, because these firms have not yet migrated, 
and one firm because the financial report prior to the downlisting is not available. This 
results in a sample of 52 firms for the post downlisting analysis.  To examine a balanced 
sample, we exclude firms for which the required data was not available for all fiscal 
years examined, e.g., due to a delisting. This leads to a final sample of 39 firms (Table 
4.1, Panel E). 
4.5.3 Empirical findings 
Table 4.6 reports results of our post downlisting analyses. Panel A reveals that more 
than half our sample firms, 22 out of 39, voluntarily chose to resume IFRS reporting 
after opting out of the IFRS mandate, rather than switching to presumably less expen-
sive domestic GAAP. While purely descriptive in nature, this finding suggests that for a 
large fraction of firms, dispensing with costly IFRS reporting was not the motive for the 
downlisting decision. Or rather, these firms downlisted although they appear to experi-
ence net benefits from IFRS reporting.
8
 Hence, this observation is in line with the en-
                                                 
8
  We re-estimate Equation (1) at the migration date using the switch to German GAAP as the depend-
ent variable to assess the determinants of a firm’s switch to German GAAP. Findings reveal that 
firms are significantly more likely to switch to German GAAP when they are comparably small and 
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forcement costs being a particularly strong opt out driver for a large fraction of down-
listing firms. 
Table 4.6: Post downlisting analysis 
Panel A: Accounting standard choice (balanced sample) 
  t-1 t0 t+1 t+2       
IFRS 39 39 23 22       
German GAAP 0 0 16 17       
                  
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for downlisting firms pre and post downlisting, relative to a sam-
ple of PSM matched firms 
    t-1 t0 t+1 t+2 Diff. (t+2-t-1) (t-stat) N 
Size               
  PSM matched 11.091 11.048 11.134 11.232 0.141 (0.46) 36 
  Downlisting 11.145 11.044 10.881 10.859 -0.286 (-0.82) 36 
  Diff. -0.054 0.004 0.253 0.372 0.427 (0.92)   
  (t-stat) (-0.17) (0.01) (0.76) (1.10)       
ROA               
  PSM matched -0.003 -0.062 -0.018 0.006 0.009 ( 0.19) 36 
  Downlisting -0.019 -0.027 0.011 -0.011 0.008 (0.23) 36 
  Diff. 0.016 -0.035 -0.030 0.018 0.001 (0.02)   
  (t-stat) (0.39) (-0.84) (-0.70) (0.41)       
Bid-ask spread               
  PSM matched -3.334 -3.209 -3.300 -3.402 -0.068 ( -0.43) 36 
  Downlisting -3.242 -3.120 -2.940 -3.130 0.112 (0.74) 36 
  Diff. -0.093 -0.089 -0.359 -0.272 -0.179 (-0.83)   
  (t-stat) (-0.62) (-0.57) (-2.33)** (-1.75)*       
% zero return days               
  PSM matched 0.186 0.195 0.184 0.163 -0.023 (-0.46) 36 
  Downlisting 0.258 0.284 0.311 0.313 0.055 (0.96) 36 
  Diff. -0.072 -0.089 -0.126 -0.150 -0.078 (-1.02)   
  (t-stat) (-1.36) (-1.78)* (-2.39)** (-2.74)***       
Audit fees               
  PSM matched 4.793 4.789 4.821 4.881 0.088 (0.38) 31 
  Downlisting 4.716 4.658 4.418 4.363 -0.353 (-1.40) 31 
  Diff. 0.077 0.131 0.404 0.518 0.441 (1.28)   
  (t-stat) (0.34) ( 0.61) (1.58) (2.00)**       
Panel B of this table summarizes descriptive statistics of downlisting firms from the balanced sample (Panel A) relative to a sample 
of PSM matched firms (matched at the announcement date) based on the variables Size, ROA, Error announcement, Bid-ask spread, 
and Voluntary IFRS adoption from Equation 1. The sample reduction in three firms is attributable to the lack of suitable matches for 
these firms. t0 equals the last fiscal year end prior to effectively downlisting. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 4.2 Panel 
A. ***, ** and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
                                                                                                                                               
 
have not adopted IFRS voluntarily prior to 2005. Both coefficients are significantly negative at the 
1% level. 
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Panel B of Table 4.6 reports results from our pre-post comparison of downlisting firms 
to a sample of PSM matched firms. The results indicate that after downlisting, firms on 
average decrease slightly in size, yet not significantly. However, untabulated analyses 
show that the decrease in size is significant for the group of firms that opted to switch to 
German GAAP.  In contrast, no meaningful pattern can be observed with respect to firm 
profitability (ROA). For both measures of liquidity, the data shows significant differ-
ences between downlisting firms and comparable firms after downlisting. While the 
difference-in-differences is not significant, this evidence is broadly consistent with re-
duced transparency benefits in the less regulated markets. Finally, we also observe a 
reduction in audit fees. Untabulated results show that this effect is mainly driven by the 
firms that switched to German GAAP, resulting in an average reduction of audit fees of 
12 percent (from 4.407 in t0 to 3.866 in t+2). This finding underscores that the switch to 
German GAAP likely creates cost savings. 
4.6 Discussion 
Our determinants analysis yields consistent evidence that for a substantial number of 
firms, the costs of preparing IFRS financial statements and being subject to strict en-
forcement outweigh the benefits from reporting high quality financial information to the 
market. The decline in audit fees post downlisting, in particular for firms that move to 
domestic GAAP, is consistent with this observation. These findings are in line with 
Fiechter et al. (2016), who document that for smaller firms in particular, IFRS compli-
ance costs may be overly high. Therefore, we show that the Fiechter et al. (2016) find-
ings are not specific to Switzerland, but rather generalize to other settings as well. 
Hence, this combined evidence is consistent with a rather general pattern: many of the 
firms which were initially affected by the IFRS mandate decide to opt out of this report-
ing standard due to specific firm-level cost-benefit trade-offs. This casts up the question 
of whether IFRS as they stand are overly costly to implement, owing to standard com-
plexity and exhaustive disclosure requirements. An alternative view would be to greet 
this pattern, as firms that have little to gain from high quality reporting standards geared 
to investor demands are pushed out of the IFRS mandate. Put differently, we believe 
that these observations should be of interest to standard setters such as the IASB, and to 
regulators. On a different note, the ongoing stream of opt outs may challenge the 
IASB’s claim as a setter of globally accepted standards for listed firms, if effectively 
IFRS are standards which benefit only very few specific, large listed firms. This ever 
more so as one rationale for the IFRS mandate, to create and exploit network externali-
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ties by forcing listed firms to prepare comparable financial statements, is likely to lose 
relevance with the increasing number of listed firms that cease to apply IFRS. 
Going beyond Fiechter et al. (2016) and Christensen et al. (2013), findings from all 
three sets of analyses demonstrate that costs of enforcement also drive firms’ opt out 
decisions, and that on many occasions, enforcement indeed appears to be the primary 
downlisting driver. By the same line of reasoning, this result casts up the question of 
whether enforcement is too costly indeed, and why. More importantly though, our spe-
cific setting allows us to identify that as firms face increasing costs from enforcement 
action, they become more likely to opt out and dodge FREP / BaFin oversight. Hence, 
while the concurrent IFRS literature is still debating whether enforcement facilitates 
positive IFRS benefits or creates benefits per se (Christensen et al. 2013, Barth and Is-
raeli 2013), our setting provides identification of a link between costs of enforcement 
and firms’ downlisting decisions, which entail economic consequences. To that end, our 
identification of an enforcement cost effect is stronger, e.g., than evidence on IFRS and 
enforcement-related benefits documented by Christensen et al. (2013). At the same 
time, we are not able to fully disentangle the precise nature of enforcement cost, i.e., 
whether these costs are borne by shareholders, or rather by (opportunistic) managers, 
who to the potential harm of shareholders evade enforcement scrutiny to appropriate 
private control benefits. If anything, the findings from our event study indicate that the 
market in many cases suspects the latter, as evidenced by incrementally more negative 
reactions for firms censured by the enforcement mechanism, and for firms that step back 
from a prior commitment to transparency (“de-bonding”). However, as a limitation, 
most of the observed market reactions in our setting are also consistent with the revela-
tion of new, negative information about future prospects. This leads us to caution that 
we cannot ultimately identify which managerial motives market participants assume, 
and which they do not. 
The combined findings on IFRS and enforcement related motives for downlisting deci-
sions not only shed light on the pertinent costs and their economic significance. They 
also underscore that any academic study which investigates economic outcomes of 
IFRS adoption based on samples which include reporting years after initial IFRS adop-
tion in 2005 is potentially prone to sample selectivity. Our findings demonstrate that the 
IFRS mandate is one that firms effectively select to adopt by not opting out, rather than 
being forced to do so. Hence, quite likely, it is those firms that yield particularly sub-
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stantial benefits from IFRS compliance and enforcement, e.g., in the shape of liquidity 
benefits, that consistently opt to stick to the IFRS mandate. Therefore, although to a 
lesser degree, studies on mandatory adoption effects may be subject to similar sample 
selection issues as earlier studies on voluntary adoption (Soderstrom and Sun 2007). 
4.7 Conclusion 
This paper exploits an exogenous shock to the cost-benefit trade-off of firms being 
listed in EU-regulated markets, which enables us to identify (prohibitive) costs of IFRS 
compliance and enforcement. We find that the costs of IFRS adoption and the associat-
ed transparency benefits are important drivers of individual firms’ decisions to opt out 
of the IFRS mandate. Most importantly though, we provide strong evidence that for a 
substantial number of firms that opted out of the regulated market, dispensing with en-
forcement supervision appears to be the principal motive. Our findings on the role of 
enforcement related costs are particularly strong due to the quality of our empirical 
proxies (being censured for erroneous accounting, severity of error findings), and be-
cause we are able to exploit the observability of accounting standards choice after firms 
downlisted. Hence, we contribute to the scarce literature on costs associated with the 
EU’s IAS regulation, unveiling another set of potentially “unintended consequences” 
(Brüggemann et al. 2013, Ball 2016). In particular, we contribute to the literature on the 
role and effects of EU enforcement of IFRS. Other than most pertinent papers in this 
literature, we are able to provide identification of an enforcement effect. Hence, our 
findings reiterate that “enforcement matters” (Christensen et al. 2013, p. 171) indeed, 
and that it likely presents the key driver for many downlisting decisions in our setting. 
Our findings are important as they contribute to a literature that so far has been domi-
nated by evidence of benefits associated with IFRS adoption and enforcement. For re-
searchers active in this literature, our results suggest that studies that investigate effects 
of mandatory IFRS adoption need to carefully address selection issues stemming from 
the ever increasing number of firms that opt out of the IFRS mandate. Also, our findings 
should be of interest to regulators, e.g., with the European Union and its member states, 
and to the IASB, as they document that despite the global success of IFRS, the im-
portance of this reporting standard faces challenges with respect to the actual number of 
listed firms that choose to adopt IFRS. 
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Finally, our findings point at several avenues for future research. For instance, issues of 
self-selection deserve increased attention for settings of mandatory IFRS adoption. Al-
so, second-order effects of the decreasing number of IFRS adopters in countries such as 
Germany or Switzerland require investigation, e.g., regarding network or comparability 
benefits. Finally, we caution that, while we are able to identify an enforcement effect on 
downlisting decisions, we are unable to precisely discern to what extent the perceived 
costs of enforcement reduce firm value, or rather reduce managerial leeway to appropri-
ate private control benefits. 
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4.8 Appendix 
Appendix A: Reporting and compliance requirements at Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Requirements   EU-regulated market   Exchange-regulated market 
    Prime Standard   General Standard   Entry Standard 
Mandatory IFRS-
reporting 
  Mandatory IFRS-reporting for consolidated 
financial statements (sec. 315a HGB) 




  Preparation of annual financial reports 
(‚Jahresfinanzbericht‘) within four months 
of fiscal year end (sec. 37v, 37y WpHG) 
  Publication of audited financial statements 
(‚Jahresabschluss‘) and management report 
within six months of fiscal year end (sec. 19 




  Preparation of semi-annual financial report 
within two months (sec. 37w, 37y WpHG) 
  Preparation of semi-annual financial state-
ment within three months (sec. 19 para. 1b 
GTC Open Market) 
Interim financial 
reports1 
  Preparation of 
interim financial 
reports within two 
months (§ 51 
BörsO, sec. 37w, 
37y WpHG) 
  Publication of 
interim announce-
ments around the 
end of the first and 
thírd quarter (sec. 
37x WpHG) 




  Ad hoc announcements (sec. 15 WpHG), 
directors‘ dealings (sec. 15a WpHG), voting 
rights notification (sec. 21 WpHG), capital 
measures notifications (sec. 30e WpHG) 
  Publication of important information re-
garding securities and the issuers (sec. 19 
para. 1c GTC Open Market) 
Language of 
publication 
  German and Eng-
lish (sec. 50, 51 
and 54 BörsO) 
  German or English   German or English (sec. 19 para. 6 GTC 
Open Market) 
Analyst meetings   At least one meet-
ing per year (sec. 
53 BörsO) 
  




  Enforcement of accouting standards by 




This table displays reporting and compliance requirements as of 2014 for firms listed in the Prime Standard, General Standard, and 
Entry Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, respectively 
. 
1Since November 2015, the preparation of interim financial reports for firms listed in the EU-regulated market is no longer required. 
Under the revised regulation, firms listed in the Prime Standard segment are required to prepare interim announcements within two 
months according to § 51 BörsO (revised version). 
 
2From July 2016 on, firms listed in the exchange-regulated market are mandated to publish ad hoc announcements and directors' 
dealings. 
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Appendix B: Court decisions pertaining to changes in downlisting requirements 




  German Federal 
Court of Justice 
(‘Bun-
desgerichtshof’) 
  “Macrotron principles”: the listing on the 
EU-regulated market could only be revoked 
if two conditions were met, (1) a majority 
vote of the shareholders’ meeting in support 
of the delisting / downlisting decision, and 
(2) a mandatory cash offer to minority 
shareholders to buy back their stock, at a 
“reasonable” price which must equal at least 
the current market price 
  Decision of 
November 25, 






  Munich Regional 
Court 
(‘Landesgericht’) 
  Ruling that the 2002 “Macrotron principles" 
were not applicable to the migration from 
an EU-regulated segment to the exchange-
regulated m:access segment, because such a 
venture was not comparable to a delisting as 
addressed in the “Macrotron” decision 
  Decision of 
August 30, 








  Munich Higher Regional Court agreed that 
m:access was a higher quality segment than 
the regular open market (appeal proceedings 
against decision of Munich Regional Court) 
  Decision of 
May 21, 2008 – 
31 Wx 62/07 
17 June 
2008 
  Berlin Regional 
Court (‚Landger-
icht‘) 
  Berlin Regional Court followed the reason-
ing of the Munich Higher Regional Court 
and ruled that an offer to buy out minority 
shareholders (i.e., "Macrotron" principles) 
was not required when moving to the Entry 
Standard.  
  Decision of 
June 17, 2008 – 
102 O 91/08 
30 April 
2009 
  Berlin Superior 
Court of Justice 
(‘Kammergericht’) 
  Berlin Superior Court of Justice agreed with 
Berlin Regional Court (appeal proceedings 
against decision of Berlin Regional Court) 
  Decision of 
April 30, 2009 
– 2 W 119/08 
11 July 
2012 




  German Constitutional Court ultimately 
confirmed legal interpretation established in 
2007 to 2009 court decisions 
  Decision of 
July 11, 2012 – 
1 BvR 3142/07 
08 October 
2013 
  German Federal 
Court of Justice 
(‘Bun-
desgerichtshof’) 
  “Macrotron principles" were completely 
revoked 
  Decision of 
October 8, 




This table summarises court decisions pertaining to changes in downlisting requirements. 
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Appendix C: Reasons for downlisting stated in ad hoc announcements 
Panel A: Ad hoc announcements N % 
Reason stated 92 78.0% 
No reason stated 26 22.0% 
Total 118 100.0% 
      
Panel B: Reasons stated in ad hoc announcements N % 
Costs of the listing in the EU-regulated market / cost reduction 48 52.2% 
Reduction of administrative efforts 42 45.7% 
Cost-benefit ratio of the stock market listing 30 32.6% 
Costs of financial reporting 12 13.0% 
Switch to German GAAP 6 6.5% 
Increasing regulation in the EU-regulated market 5 5.4% 
Low trading volume 4 4.3% 
Costs of disclosures 3 3.3% 
Low free float 1 1.1% 
Increased liquidity if stocks are only traded at one stock exchange 1 1.1% 
Long-term increase of firm value 1 1.1% 
Migration is part of various measures for increased costs efficiency 1 1.1% 
Regional reorientation of the firm 1 1.1% 
Reduction of business segments 1 1.1% 
      
This table summarizes reasons stated in firms' ad hoc announcements for downlisting. 26 out of 118 firms do not name 
reasons for their decision. % values in Panel B are based on the 92 firms that name a reason for downlisting. 
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Appendix D: Descriptive statistics for the event study 
Panel A: Descriptives 
Variables   mean sd min 25%-quartile median 75%-quartile max N 
CMARs   -0.019 0.063 -0.276 -0.043 -0.011 0.018 0.111 64 
Voluntary IFRS Adoption   0.406 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 64 
Bid-ask spread   -3.095 0.661 -4.637 -3.357 -3.121 -2.761 -0.913 64 
Error announcement   0.203 0.406 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 64 
High error severity   0.063 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 64 
Low error severity   0.141 0.350 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 64 
ROA   -0.039 0.161 -0.928 -0.066 0.012 0.039 0.226 64 
Future ROA   -0.047 0.173 -0.932 -0.089 0.007 0.045 0.179 61 
Market capitalization   3.557 1.564 0.270 2.552 3.445 4.688 7.695 64 
Free float   0.518 0.323 0.030 0.230 0.500 0.785 1.000 64 
 
Panel B: Correlations 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)    
CMARs (1) 1.0000 
          
Voluntary IFRS 
Adoption 
(2) 0.1495 1.0000 
         
Bid-ask spread (3) -0.0145 0.0661 1.0000 
        
Error announcement (4) -0.2771 0.1145 -0.0477 1.0000 
       
ROA (5) 0.1158 -0.2133 -0.3433 0.0510 1.0000 
      
Market capitalization (6) -0.0259 -0.1742 -0.6224 -0.1789 0.1649 1.0000 
     
Free float (7) 0.0372 0.0274 0.0326 0.1251 0.0510 -0.2317 1.0000     
                      
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the event study in Table 4.6. Definitions of variables are reported in 






5.1 Summary of major findings and implications of the thesis 
In the light of the call for evidence-based disclosure regulation (Buijink, 2006; Gassen 
and Günther, 2014; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016), this thesis aims to investigate intended 
and unintended consequences of recent regulatory action in the fields of corporate gov-
ernance and disclosure. Overall, main findings from this thesis emphasize that in the 
German continental European setting (1) regulation of disclosure and corporate govern-
ance does not increase, or may even decrease, shareholder welfare and that (2) regula-
tion potentially drives firms away from high levels of disclosure. Consequently, evi-
dence indicates that regulation fails to meet objectives intended by regulators. In the 
first study, that addresses regulation in the field of corporate governance, regulation of 
executive compensation contracts was intended to align incentives from remuneration 
arrangements with long term growth of the firm (Deutscher Bundestag, 2009b). Howev-
er, unlike intended by regulators, regulation of executive compensation contracts de-
creased shareholder welfare. This finding indicates that private compensation contracts 
absent regulation were sufficient from a shareholder perspective. Also unlike argued by 
regulators (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015), evidence on investor perceptions of reduced 
requirements for leaving the EU-regulated market with its high disclosure requirements 
and high level of enforcement indicates that, in some cases, investors welcome reduced 
securities markets regulation (second study). By contrast, increased regulation of opt out 
requirements, that was intended to increase investor protection, does not seem to matter 
from an investor perspective. Therefore, the regulatory measure likely misses the objec-
tive of increased investor protection as it does not increase shareholder wealth. Moreo-
ver, evidence from this thesis also reveals that regulation of disclosure and enforcement 
can also lead to unintended consequences (third study). Findings from the final study 
indicate that costs of IFRS compliance and enforcement seem to have driven firms away 
from the EU-regulated market, and thus the IFRS mandate and the enforcement mecha-
nism. From an investor perspective, these unintended consequences might be negative 
because the downlisting decreases the firm’s level of disclosure and enforcement. How-
ever, on the upside, a systematic opt out of less liquid and less transparent firms in-
creases the overall level of liquidity and transparency in the EU-regulated market. 
Findings from the first study are in line with Larcker et al. (2011), who investigate regu-
lation of executive compensation in the U.S., and document negative market reactions 
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for firms with excess CEO compensation. In the German two-tier system, an independ-
ent supervisory board sets management compensation, with the objective of enacting 
not only shareholders’ interests, but also to recognize other stakeholders such as credi-
tors or employees (e.g. Haar, 2012). Therefore, ordinary shareholders have less influ-
ence on board matters in Germany as, for example, in the U.S. (Larcker and Tayan, 
2011). Despite these differences in the German governance model, and unlike intended 
by regulators (Deutscher Bundestag, 2009b), findings from the first study do not indi-
cate beneficial effects of regulating executive compensation from an equity market per-
spective. This suggests that, at least from a shareholder perspective, there is no evidence 
in support of executive compensation regulation, be it in a shareholder-based economy 
or a stakeholder-oriented system. 
Unlike prior U.S. findings that indicate that investors value the bonding to high disclo-
sure requirements (Fernandes et al., 2010; Doidge et al., 2010), findings from the sec-
ond study are mainly indicative of cost considerations, as proposed under the loss of 
competitiveness theory. The costs of the high level of disclosure in the EU-regulated 
market seem to occasionally outweigh the value of the bonding to the stricter disclosure 
requirements. Consequently, U.S. findings on changes in opt out requirements do not 
necessarily translate to the continental European environment, where a substantial num-
ber of firms has recently opted out of increased disclosure requirements (Fiechter et al., 
2016; Pasch et al., 2015). While reductions in opt out requirements seem to have an 
impact on investors, as reflected in abnormally high trading volume, increases in the 
requirements for opting out do not. This finding should be of interest to regulators, as, 
unlike argued by regulators (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015), weak trading volume reac-
tions around events related to increases in opt out requirements indicate that the regula-
tion did not matter much to investors. 
For some firms that have originally been subject to the IFRS mandate, pertinent costs of 
compliance and enforcement have been substantial, and appear to outweigh IFRS-
related transparency benefits (third study). These findings are important because they 
cast light on a phenomenon that has so far received little attention in the literature, 
namely the systematic opt out of firms from the IFRS compliance and enforcement re-
gime. This phenomenon may represent unintended consequences of IFRS adoption from 
a regulatory perspective (Brüggemann et al., 2013). This evidence of presumably re-
strictive compliance costs is of potential relevance for the IASB’s approach to standard 
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setting, but also for the regulatory assessment of IFRS-related net benefits, for example, 
the EU Commission’s current efforts to evaluate the IAS regulation and related network 
benefits. 
5.2 Limitations 
This thesis is subject to limitations as outlined in the respective chapters. First, while 
most provisions of the VorstAG regulation (first study) pertain to listed and private 
firms, findings relate to the former only. As governance mechanisms and ownership 
structures are distinctively different for private firms, findings on the impact of the regu-
lation are not generalizable to these firms. Second, when applying an event study de-
sign, the measure of economic impact, firm value, reflects shareholders’ welfare only. 
Therefore, the first and the second study are unable to give a thorough assessment of the 
usefulness of the regulation with respect to other stakeholders’ welfare, such as credi-
tors or employees. Event study methodology also critically relies on the precise identifi-
cation of the events of interest. Since it was not possible to identify the exact publica-
tion date for the court rulings prior to 2012 (second study), which are likely to have had 
an impact on the costs of being able to downlist, the market assessment of these events 
is not recognized. Third, findings are subject to the quality of the empirical constructs. 
In the first study, as existing contracts in place cannot be directly observed, the study 
needs to rely on observable data on management compensation to identify firms with 
contracts that may provide for abnormally high remuneration, or that may only weakly 
tie pay to performance. In the second study, I am not able to directly measure costs of 
the listing and whether investors benefit from bonding to the EU-regulated market. I 
thus merely provide descriptive evidence on market reactions of firms presumably more 
affected by the regulation. Similarly, in the third study, the costs of IFRS compliance 
and transparency benefits cannot be directly observed. The study is also unable to disen-
tangle the precise nature of enforcement costs. It remains largely an open question 
whether observed enforcement-induced downlistings in their majority capitalize cost 
savings for firm owners or rather do so for managers, who to the potential harm of 
shareholders evade enforcement scrutiny to appropriate private control benefits. Fourth, 
in the second study, I do not investigate the impact of the changes in the requirements 
on firms listed in the exchange-regulated market. These firms are affected by the regula-
tion since changes in opt out requirements affect the value of the bonding to the EU-
regulated market, which is an option for these firms. Finally, in the third study, the ex-
ogenous shock pertains to a shock in the requirements for downlisting and lowers costs 
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associated with downlisting, which can trip an unfavorable cost-benefit tradeoff. How-
ever, it does not affect the costs and benefits of the listing in the EU-regulated market. 
5.3 Outlook 
The takeaway that recent regulation of disclosure and corporate governance does not 
increase, or may even decrease, shareholder welfare, and potentially drives firms away 
from high levels of disclosure, even more highlights the need for evidence-based disclo-
sure regulation as demanded by Buijink (2006), Gassen and Günther (2014), and Leuz 
and Wysocki (2016). Results from this thesis should be of interest to national and su-
pranational regulators, in particular the European Union, as they emphasize that regula-
tors should carefully evaluate whether regulation is required from an economic perspec-
tive. Findings raise the question of whether the level of regulation should even be re-
duced, in some cases. In line with such considerations, the European Union has recently 
abolished the quarterly reporting mandate stating: “The obligations to publish interim 
management statements or quarterly financial reports represent an important burden 
[…], without being necessary for investor protection” (Directive 2013/50/EU (2013), p. 
L294/13). However, it remains an open question whether these rare attempts to reduce 
the level of regulation should also apply to other fields of disclosure and corporate gov-
ernance regulation. 
It is up to future research to demonstrate whether there are areas of disclosure and cor-
porate governance where regulatory interference potentially generates welfare. As em-
phasized by Leuz and Wysocki (2016), most research in the field of disclosure regula-
tion investigates the U.S. setting, in particular due to the high level of data availability. 
While prior findings from the U.S. on investor perceptions of regulating executive com-
pensation translate to the German continental European setting, findings on investor 
perceptions of leaving a highly regulated disclosure regime differ from prior U.S. evi-
dence. Consequently, the optimal level of regulation potentially varies across jurisdic-
tions, and U.S. findings do not necessarily translate to different institutional settings. 
Therefore, future research should also investigate regulation of disclosure and corporate 
governance outside of the U.S. 
Finally, findings on the downlisting phenomenon also indicate potential self-selection 
problems in studies that investigate implications or economic effects of mandatory IFRS 
reporting because systematic opt outs from this mandate may bias samples towards the 
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firms that likely benefit from increased transparency and enforcement. Any academic 
study which investigates economic outcomes of IFRS adoption based on samples which 
include reporting years after initial IFRS adoption in 2005 is potentially prone to sample 
selectivity. Thus, this phenomenon emphasizes the need to test whether prior results on 
economic effects of the IFRS mandate hold, when researchers control for the potential 
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